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ABSTRACT                                                                                   
 
The building construction industry is growing all over the world and considered as a 
labour-intensive industry. It is associated with significant safety risks and losses 
resulting from major accidents. These critical safety risks are largely due to ignorance 
or lack of awareness, which causes poor performance in building construction 
activities. Furthermore, it is difficult to estimate the safety risks because of the 
incomplete quantitative safety risk database and uncertainty within construction 
projects. Most of the safety risk assessment tools which are employed in the 
construction domain may not produce adequate outcomes, since it may not be easy to 
evaluate a hazardous event quantitatively in a safety risk assessment, as the lack of 
information in the safety risk database makes it difficult to determine whether there is 
an opportunity for a possible consequence to occur. Moreover, in construction 
management projects, risk assessment tools are still widely employed by adopting two 
traditional parameters, severity of consequence (SC) and probability of occurrence 
(PO), to analyse the safety risk level. It is not clear, however, whether this analysis 
can evaluate the safety risk magnitude appropriately, which necessitates the 
introduction of another parameter, probability of consequence (PC), to improve the 
risk evaluation. Therefore, this study aims to provide an effective tool to develop 
safety risk and management measures to reduce injuries and improve the safety of 
workers within the building construction industry.  
The findings of the study show that the fuzzy reasoning technique (FRT), based on the 
fundamentals of fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic, is useful for quantifying and dealing 




effectively with the lack of certainty, subjectivity, badly defined challenges, and 
vagueness related to the domain of building construction projects and other fields. PC 
was incorporated into the model which allows safety risks to be assessed correctly.  
Furthermore, the modified fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (MFAHP) and fuzzy 
technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (FTOPSIS) methods are 
integrated into a new construction safety risks model to be ranked based on 
management priorities for the evaluation of important safety risks. Four specific case 
studies are employed to illustrate the applicability and performance of the proposed 
model. This research contributes significantly to construction safety management 
projects and can be utilised to analyse and manipulate the safety risk level of every 
possible hazardous event that is identified during the construction period. The 
proposed model could also be applied in other construction projects to obtain results 
with greater accuracy and reliability from the evaluation and ranking of safety risks, 
which would yield data that would be useful in helping the management team to 
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The construction industry has a poor record on safety risk management in comparison to 
other industries, and construction sites are dangerous places (Carr and Tah, 2001; Carter and 
Smith, 2006; Zeng et al., 2007; Fung et al., 2010; Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila, 2011; Sherratt 
et al., 2013; Sousa et al., 2014) because of their high accident, injury and fatality rates. The 
risks of fatal accidents in the construction industry are five times more probable than in other 
industries (Sawacha et al., 1999). Although the number of fatal occupational accidents in the 
construction industry worldwide is difficult to quantify as information on this issue is not 
available for many countries, it is reasonable to expect that at least 55,000 deaths occurred 
every year on construction sites (Adane et al., 2013). Compared to many other activities in 
other industry sectors, construction activities are more dangerous due to the unique features 
of construction work, for example, the high-risk characteristics of construction activities, 
which include steel erection, demolition, scaffolding, excavation, falsework or temporary 
framework, maintenance, roof work, and site transport when people work at complex work 
sites. Specifically, the most frequent hazards, such as falls from height, falling objects and 
materials, electricity, trips, asbestos, manual handling, noise and vibration, chemicals, and, 
mobile plants, in construction projects identified by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in 
Britain in 2011 (HSE, 2011) provide useful information for risk analysis. Thailand’s 
construction development has risen significantly and rapidly in recent years (Aksorn and 
Hadikusumo, 2008). The construction industry in Thailand is still unable to treat safety and 
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health as important issues, however. Although there have been improvements, progress is 
slow compared to other countries. Safety programmes offering a proactive approach are one 
of the best ways to improve site safety performance (Tam et al., 2004). An effective safety 
programmes can considerably reduce accidents as it can help management to develop safer 
methods of operation and create a safer workplace for the employees (Abdelhamid and 
Everett, 2000). Therefore, it is essential to create construction safety risk management 
schemes that can be used to evaluate the relative effectiveness of safety programmes based 
upon the activities expected for a given process. Furthermore, determining the probability and 
severity of risk for the employees’ activities associated with a task and defining the 
probability and severity reduction values resulting from the implementation of various safety 
programme elements should be studied to improve the occupational safety management in 
building construction.  
In recent years, there has been an increase in the use of risk assessment and occupational 
safety management mechanisms for safety. Risk assessment is becoming increasingly 
important for construction industries (Zeng et al, 2007). Many companies have installed 
safety management systems for monitoring safety, and efforts have been made to improve 
safety. Tam et al., (2002, cited in Gürcanli and Müngen, 2009, p.372) suggest that in every 
case, the primary importance of safety practices is the risk analysis and hazard assessment. 
Moreover, the assessment of risk is a complex subject shrouded in vagueness and uncertainty. 
Ambiguity is unavoidable as safety experts tend to assess the risks for the workers in the 
construction industry in terms of linguistic expressions rather than metrics. 
A recent study shows that risk assessment and management is one of the most important 
stages in the success of a project. Regarding the UK, Zeng et al., (2007) state that due to the 
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inherent risks, risk analysis in construction projects, especially in the early stages, is often 
affected by many factors, including human error and vague information. 
Therefore, construction project safety risk assessment has been recognised as an important 
issue in the safety risk management process to identify and assess the potential safety risks. 
Safety risk mitigation measures must be applied by reducing the probability of occurrence or 
controlling the possible consequence if a hazardous event has been identified and analysed as 
having a high risk level. In many circumstances, safety risk assessment approaches, such as 
event tree analysis (ETA), fault tree analysis (FTA), failure mode and effects analysis 
(FMEA), Monte Carlo simulation (MCS), consequence analysis, equivalent fatality analysis 
(EFA), and sensitivity analysis (Zeng et al., 2007; An et al., 2011; Nieto-Morote and Ruz-
Vila, 2011) are widely employed in building construction projects. Nonetheless, the 
application of these techniques may make it more difficult to determine an adequate level of 
liability to a satisfactory degree of confidence, as the safety risk data is often incomplete or 
the information may be inadequate to determine the risk level. Therefore, it is necessary to 
develop new safety risk assessment and management methods and models that can be used to 
estimate and assess the safety risks in building construction projects, for example, by using 
the Fuzzy Reasoning Technique (FRT). The fuzzy reasoning approach, which is based on the 
principle of fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic, offers advantages which can systematically measure 
both quantitative as well as qualitative information from available sources to simplify risk 
analysis. Furthermore, this method can be used to reduce the uncertainties, subjectivity, ill-
defined problems, and vague information effectively. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problems 
Recently, Thailand’s construction industry has been experiencing widespread growth in 
construction sites, especially in the capital city. Aksorn and Hadikusumo (2008) state that 
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Thailand’s economy and infrastructure development has increased considerably and rapidly. 
Furthermore, the construction industry continues to play a significant role in the continued 
development, and construction activities have been implemented to fulfil the high demand for 
market expansion. With the rise in construction sites, however, the number of construction 
accidents has also increased. On many building construction sites there are too many unsafe 
conditions and ill-advised activities are performed. Most employees currently employed in 
the construction industry are originally from the agricultural sector. Moreover, both 
construction and agricultural work are characterised by temporary workers who are more 
likely to split their time between these seasonal jobs during agricultural production and 
construction (Aksorn and Hadikusumo, 2008). Regarding construction sites in Thailand, 
Pipitsupaphol and Watanabe (2000, cited in Hamid et al., 2008, p.247) found that an accident 
do not just happen; they are caused by the workers’ carelessness, failure of workers to follow 
safety procedure, working at high elevation, using equipment without safety devices, harsh 
job operation, unskilled workers and workers’ lack of knowledge, poor attitude of workers, 
unusual nature of the industry, working site conditions, misuse of equipment, improper 
loading or placement of equipment, lack of warning for co-workers, failure to secure 
equipment, failure to use personal protective equipment (PPE), unsafe operations, human 
elements, and poor site management.  
 
Safety risk management programmes are a key to eliminate occupational accidents and 
injuries. Siriruttanapruk and Anuntakulnathi (2004 cited in Aksorn and Hadikusumo, 2008, 
p.711) point out that the low levels of safety in the construction industry in Thailand are 
mainly due to inadequate implementation of safety and weak enforcement of law. Similarly, 
Limsupreeyarat et al., (2010) highlight that although safety guidelines, regulations and safety 
rules have been implemented and enforced, Thai construction safety measures, such as 
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guardrails, safety nets, harness, and safety line systems, are still insufficient. Moreover, the 
involved parties, namely, construction engineers and supervisors, have not given much 
attention to the unsafe conditions, which may be due to ignorance and lack of awareness of 
the personnel’s safety concerning hazards and risks.  
 
Based on the statistics in a report about occupational accidents by the Social Security Office 
(2016), the rapid expansion of Thailand’s construction activities has caused a continuing 
increase in the reported number of accidents. Furthermore, in the construction sector, the 
category of injury is reported to have the highest number of accident cases (7,129 people in 
2016) compared to other sectors. Figure 1-1 shows the statistics on occupational accidents 
among workers in Thailand during the period 2012-2016 classified by the top five types of 
establishment. From the statistics, it can be seen clearly that accidents in construction 










Figure 1-1: Occupational accident and diseases statistics 2012-2016 classified by top five 
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All the accident records from around Thailand are collected by the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Welfare to facilitate the processing of compensation requests and other issues. 
Furthermore, there is improper documentation, and the classification system for the data 
collection and the cause of industrial accidents in the building construction industry are 
inadequate. Moreover, the number of unregistered employees in the building construction 
industry is very high. As a result, many injuries are not recorded or documented appropriately. 
When conducting safety risk assessments for the building construction industry, there is often 
insufficient data or vague information available. 
In many circumstances, however, there is a high level of uncertainty in the safety risk data 
(Yildiz at al., 2014). It is not well known how people address hazards and how safety risk 
information is processed and evaluated. The application of safety risk assessment tools in the 
building construction industry may not provide good results, as the safety risk information or 
data has limited the intervention process to improve occupational safety on construction sites 
in Thailand. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives  
The research aims to provide an effective tool to develop safety risk and management 
measures to reduce injuries and improve the safety of workers within the building 
construction industry. 
This will involve the development of a risk assessment and occupational safety management 
model in building construction for the building construction industry. The research objectives 
are: 
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1) To examine the current occupational safety problems and investigate the various 
types of risk. Data and information on accidents in the industry will be collected 
from reports, articles, and the industry. 
2) To undertake a comprehensive literature review to establish potentially viable 
research routes. The literature will be reviewed to establish a research framework 
to complete this research successfully. 
3) To identify most of the key possible safety risks in the building construction 
industry. A questionnaire survey will be used to collect data and confirm the 
safety risks identified and to find other important risks in the Thai building 
construction industry.  
4) To develop a safety risk management model for a risk assessment and 
occupational safety management strategy. The information received from the 
collection of data will then be used to define the standards of qualitative 
descriptors and develop an associated safety risk management model. Secondary 
sources will be interpreted and processed for analysis of the safety risk 
management model. 
5) To verify the reliability of risk assessment and occupational safety management 
models through case studies. This model will be applied in the real construction 
industry. Case studies will be used to illustrate the application of the proposed 
safety risk management model. 
6) To produce an effective and efficient safety risk assessment and management 
framework that could be accepted by the Thai building industry. An interview 
survey will be used to collect data and find out how to manage high risks.  
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1.4 Research Questions 
This study focuses on the practice used for safety risk assessment and management. The 
overall aim and objectives mentioned in Section 1.3 were developed into specific research 
questions for this thesis by reviewing the relevant literature on safety risk assessment and 
management. The research questions are: 
Research question 1: Why does the construction industry have a very poor 
performance in safety risk management?  
Research question 2: What techniques and methods can be employed to develop a 
safety risk management model and deal with the uncertainty in the construction 
industry? 
Research question 3: What are the benefits and implications of implementing safety 
risk management for handling uncertainties in construction projects? 
 
1.5 Research Novelty 
Firstly, in many circumstances, the applications of the current safety risk assessment 
techniques in the building construction industry use two safety risk parameters, probability of 
occurrence and severity of consequence, to assess the safety risk magnitude. However, this 
analysis is insufficient to determine the safety risk level effectively and accurately, which 
requires the introduction of a third parameter, probability of consequence, to be incorporated 
into the proposed model to obtain more accurate and reliable results of safety risk analysis. 
Secondly, in the previous building construction research, no research has been conducted to 
study the combination of the FRT, analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and technique for 
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order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) methods to develop a new safety 
risk management model.  
The FRT can be used to assess both quantitative and qualitative risk data and information on 
building construction projects to reduce the uncertainties, subjectivity, ill-defined problems, 
and vague information associated with building construction projects and activities. 
Furthermore, the fuzzy technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution 
(FTOPSIS) and a modified Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (MFAHP) model will be 
employed to obtain the final ranking for evaluation of important safety risks to support 
effective safety risk decision-making based on limited resources for managing and 
controlling safety risks. The results from the proposed safety risk management model can 
provide final ranking for evaluation of important safety risks in the building construction 
projects, which can provide useful information for project managers, safety managers and 
engineers to manage and control risks during building construction projects.  
 
1.6 Research Outcomes 
Proper construction risk safety management will be developed in the Thai building 
construction industry. A new safety risk assessment model should be identified to assess the 
specific risks. Furthermore, when the research activities have been completed, the findings 
will be published in journals that are easily accessible by the construction industry and 
appropriate policymakers. By introducing occupational safety management relating to the 
model of risk identification and safety management of the research area, the government 
could take the necessary initiatives for the prevention of accidents. This research will provide 
information about the hazard identification for critical incidents and the hazards that could 
lead to the uncontrolled critical risk events.   
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The research will add to the knowledge base of new safety risk assessment and management 
models in the construction domain in Thailand to improve workers’ well-being and business 
functions. Moreover, this study can be used to help and guide the parties on construction sites 
to minimise the potential risks. Recommendations will be generated which can help 
industries to improve the safety management performance on building construction sites. 
 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis comprises nine chapters followed by the references and appendices. The outline of 
these chapters is as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature on construction projects in the building 
construction industry, and introduces the current practice of safety risk management in the 
construction industry. The concept of the risk assessments, Construction (Design and 
Management) Regulations 2015 and the fuzzy reasoning approach, AHP and TOPSIS are 
reviewed. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodologies that will be applied to achieve the aims and objectives 
of this research.  
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the feedback and the research findings. The analysis of the 
questionnaire surveys is discussed.  
Chapter 5 outlines FRT, FAHP, MFAHP, and FTOPSIS.    
Chapter 6 presents a construction safety risk assessment and management model developed 
by using FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS. The third safety risk assessment parameter, 
probability of consequence, is proposed. A case example is presented which demonstrates the 
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effectiveness of the developed safety risk analysis model in construction safety risk 
management. 
Chapter 7 outlines case studies collected from real construction projects by applying the 
proposed construction safety risk management model. The interview findings on how to 
manage high risks in the Thai building construction industry are provided. Risk responses for 
specific construction projects are discussed. 
Chapter 8 presents the findings of the research. The achievements in the study, contribution 
of knowledge and impact of the study are discussed. 
Finally, Chapter 9 presents the conclusions, recommendations and the limitations of using 
FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS in the building construction safety risk management process and 
discuss how the research aim and objectives are achieved. At the end, suggestions are made 
for future studies. 
 
1.8 Summary 
This chapter provided the background of the study, including the statement of the problems 
and the aims and objectives related to the development a new risk assessment and 
occupational safety management model in construction projects. The chapter started by 
discussing the importance of construction project safety on construction sites and their 
dangerous activities owing to the unique features of construction work, such as the different 
hazards and risks that continually emerge during daily jobs, and the changes in construction 
processes and procedures in different kinds of projects that may lead to safety risks faced by 
construction workers. Then, the increasing importance of risk assessment and management 
mechanisms for safety for construction industries was discussed. Moreover, the review of 
safety risk data and information in the construction industry showed that there is a high level 
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of uncertainty in determining the safety risks. Challenges and problems which cause poor 
performance in coping with risk hazards in construction activities were also discussed.   
The significance of the novelty of this research and the research outcomes were discussed, 
and the organisation of the thesis was outlined. The next chapter presents a review of the 
major statistics relating to construction accidents, safety risk assessment and management in 
building construction projects and the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 
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This chapter provides details of the major statistics relating to construction accidents. The 
definitions of safety risk assessment and management related to building construction 
projects, construction safety risk management, construction (design and management) 
Regulations are outlined. Major injuries in building construction industry are reviewed. 
Finally, FRT, AHP and TOPSIS are discussed.  
2.2 Safety Management in Construction Industry 
2.2.1 Safety Management Framework 
The safety management framework consists of a set of measures relating to safety 
management which are operated and implemented continually. Most of the key elements 
required for safety management are similar to those for construction management, business 
financial management, and total quality management. Hughes and Ferrett (2012) identified 
five key elements in a successful safety management framework, as shown in Figure 2-1. 
2.2.1.1 Policy  
Organisations should have a well-prepared documented policy regarding the ILO Guidelines 
on occupational safety and health management systems (ILO-OSH, 2001) provides general 
guidelines for a safety policy application as:  
a) The policy should be suitable with scales and types of organisations.   
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b) It should be clearly and simply written and approved by the head of the 
organisation so that it can be simply applied by employees.   
c) It should be circulated by different means of communication and followed 
by employees, who should be familiar with its instructions.  
d) It should be editable for continuous updating.   









Figure 2-1:  The principles of the safety management framework                                                   
(reproduced from Hughes and Ferrett, 2012) 
 
2.2.1.2 Organising  
The organisation section of the policy should provide the names and duties of the people 
within the organisation who are responsible for the development of the policy and its 
communication to the workforce. Two key personnel to be identified are the most senior 
accountable person for managing occupational health and safety and the health and safety 
competent person (ILO-OSH, 2001; Hughes and Ferrett, 2012). 
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2.2.1.3 Planning and implementing  
This section outlines the arrangements in place within the organisation for dealing with any 
specific hazards, for example, legal requirements, health and safety rules and procedures, and 
the provision of facilities. Risks arising from workplaces, hazardous substances, activities, 
and fire should be evaluated and managed (ILO-OSH, 2001; Hughes and Ferrett, 2012).  
 
2.2.1.4 Measuring performance  
This stage consists of the following: conducting an internal audit, evaluating legal 
compliance, identifying non-conformities, and actively monitoring people, procedures, and 
systems. The most effective and robust systems ensure that this process runs smoothly at all 
times. This means that the performance of this process should be measured as well, and any 
non-conformities must be dealt with (ILO-OSH, 2001; Hughes and Ferrett, 2012). 
 
2.2.1.5 Reviewing and auditing performance  
The best control systems deteriorate over time, or become obsolete due to changes or new 
processes. Therefore, it makes sense to review the policy periodically to ensure that it 
remains effective, measure the aims and objectives and update the organisational and 
arrangement sections as necessary (ILO-OSH, 2001; Hughes and Ferrett, 2012). 
 
2.2.2 Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS 18001) 
The occupational health and safety assessment series (OHSAS 18001) is a widely recognised 
occupational health and safety management system which includes a process to identify, 
reduce, and control potential safety risks to prevent accidents and improve operational 
performance (Pheng et al., 2003; Omran et al., 2008; Marhani et al., 2013). It was developed 
to comply with the ISO 9001 (Quality) and ISO 14001 (Environment) management system 
standards to organise the combination of quality, environment and occupational health and 
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safety management systems. The basis of the core elements of OHSAS 18001 is shown in 








Figure 2-2 :  Occupational health and safety management system model for OHSAS 18001 
standard (reproduced from OHSAS, 2007) 
 
2.2.2.1 Occupational health and safety 
In this stage, the occupational health and safety (OH&S) policy should be established and 
authorised by the organisation’s top management (OHSAS, 2007). A documented policy 
should be defined to ensure that it is appropriate to the nature and scale of the organisation’s 
occupational health and safety risks, including a commitment to preventing injury and 
improving occupational health and safety continually (OHSAS, 2007). This policy provides 
the framework for setting and reviewing occupational health and safety objectives. 
2.2.2.2 Planning 
The planning stage of the process requires the organisation to establish, implement, and 
maintain procedures for (OHSAS, 2007): 
 
OHSAS 18001: Occupational health and safety management series 
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Table 2-1: Planning requirements of OHSAS 18001 
 
Furthermore, the organisation is responsible for establishing, implementing and maintaining 
the occupational health and safety management system in the organisation to ensure that the 
occupational health and safety risks and determined controls are taken into account.  









 Human factors and human behaviour and capabilities 
 Non-routine and routine works of all personnel 
 All workers’ activities, including visitors and contractors 
 Created hazard works related to all activities under the control of 
the organization 
 Materials, infrastructure and equipment 
 Changing activities or materials in the organization 
 Alteration of the occupational health and safety management 
system, including the process, operation and changing activity 
 Any applicable legal obligations related to risk assessment and 
implementation of necessary controls 
 Work design, work organisation, processes, installations, 




      




    The objectives should be measured and reviewed based on the legal 
    and other requirements, and the programmes should be included 
    with the designated activities of the organisation through the regular 
    reviewing and planning 
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2.2.2.3 Implement and operation 
Emergency response procedures will be required to deal with potential incidents, accidents, 
and emergencies. A process will be needed for the occupational health and safety team to 
assess compliance with legal and other requirements. Monitoring and measuring of 
equipment will need to be controlled and calibrated. Records will be need to simplify 
preventive and corrective actions. Impact safety will be required for measuring and 
monitoring process and product characteristics. 
 
2.2.2.4 Checking 
Appropriate emergency preparedness operation procedures should be developed to identify, 
mitigate and prevent potential incidents and emergencies. A documentation procedure to 
control nonconformities must be identified, assessed, and controlled appropriately when 
specified process limits have exceeded potentially unsafe conditions. Moreover, corrective 
actions should be identified and eliminated to reduce safety risks and the nonconformities. 
 
2.2.2.5 Management review 
Internal audits, corrective actions, analysis of data, and updates of the occupational health and 
safety management system must be continually reviewed using management reviews to 
improve the occupational health and safety management system. 
 
2.2.3 Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 
The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 (CDM 2015) were updated in 
April 2015, replacing CDM 2007 (Patterson et al., 2015). These Regulations apply to all 
construction work within the UK, including workers, domestic clients, clients, principal 
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contractors, contractors, principal designers, and designers (HSE, 2015). CDM 2015 is  
divided into five parts:  
Part 1 deals with the application of the definitions CDM 2015. 
Part 2 covers the duties of clients that apply to all construction projects. 
Part 3 contains the health and safety duties and roles of other duty holders. 
Part 4 includes the general requirements for all construction sites. 
Part 5 contains transitional arrangements and revocations. 
The key elements include managing the risks by applying the general principles of prevention, 
appointing the right people and organisations at the right time, and ensuring that everyone has 
the instruction, supervision , information,  and training they need to carry out their jobs in a 
way that secures health and safety (Patterson et al., 2015). Duty holders communicate and 
cooperate with each other and coordinate their work and engage and consult with workers to 
develop and promote measures to secure health, safety and welfare effectively (HSE, 2015). 
The different duty holders are summarised in Table 2-2. 
 
Table 2-2: Summary of roles and duties of CDM 2015 (HSE, 2015) 
 
 




Confirm competence of all duty holders and confirm appointments 
of duty holders for managing a project and notify the HSE of 
construction projects. The pre-construction information is prepared 
and provided to other duty holders. The principal contractor and 
principal designer carry out their duties and welfare facilities are 
provided. 
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Table 2-2: Summary of roles and duties of CDM 2015 (cont.) 
 





 Domestic clients are under the scope of CDM 2015, but their 
duties as a client are usually transferred to the contractor on a 
single contractor project or the principal contractor on a project 
involving more than one contractor. However, a domestic client 
can choose to have a written agreement with the principal 






Prepare or modify designs to eliminate, reduce or control 
foreseeable risks that may arise during construction and the 
maintenance and use of a building once it is built. Information is 
provided to other members of the project team to help them 




Help the client to present a project brief and pre-construction 
information. Ensure cooperation and coordinate health and safety 
in the pre-construction phase of a project, which includes 
identifying, eliminating or controlling foreseeable risks and ensure 
that designers carry out their duties and provide relevant 
information to other duty holders.   The relevant information is 
updated and provided to help the principal contractor with 
planning, managing, monitoring and coordinating health and 
safety in the construction phase.  
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Table 2-2: Summary of roles and duties of CDM 2015 (cont.) 
 
CDM duty holders Main duties 
Principal contractors 
 
Develop a construction phase health and safety plan. Plan the work 
properly. Communicate the hazards, risks and any precautions 
required. Provide information instruction, training and supervision. 
Control, manage and monitor all sites. Ensure that design works 
undertaken during the construction phase are specifically assessed 
regarding to health and safety. Prepare the health and safety file. 
Contractors 
 
Formulate a construction phase health and safety plan for every 
project irrespective of the size, duration, complexity or type of 
construction work. Manage and monitor construction work under 
their control so that it is carried out without risks to health and 
safety. In the case of projects involving more than one contractor, 
coordinate their activities with others in the project team. 
Specifically, comply with directions given to them by the principal 
contractor or the principal designer.  
Workers 
 
Must be consulted about matters which affect their health, safety and 
welfare, take care of their own health and safety and that of others 
who may be affected by their actions, report anything they see which 
is likely to endanger either their own or others’ health and safety, 
and cooperate with their employer, fellow workers, contractors, and 
other duty holders. 
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2.3 Overview of Construction Safety Management  
The manufacturing industry is essentially very different from the construction industry; 
therefore, it is difficult to use the same safety management techniques and systems in the 
construction industry (Rowlandson, 2004). A review of the literature on construction safety 
reveals that much research effort has been focused on the increase in fatal or non-fatal 
accidents on construction sites as one of the most dangerous places (Carr and Tah, 2001; Chi 
et al., 2005; Zeng et al., 2007; Fung et al., 2010; Nieto-Morote and Ruz- Vila, 2011; 
Sansakorn and An, 2015; Senouci et al., 2015). The studies reveal the status of construction 
safety in some countries, and it can be inferred that construction safety is a major global 
problem. For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the US (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2015) highlighted that the 937 fatal work injuries in the private construction industry in the 









Figure 2-3: Number and rate of fatal work injuries in the US, 2015                                                 
(Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015) 
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According to Safe Work Australia (2015), which produces reports that provide information 
on the circumstances of work-related deaths in Australia, 30 fatalities were recorded in 2015 
and the mechanism with the highest number of worker fatalities in the construction industry 
is falls from height. These fatalities accounted for almost one-third of the fatalities (133 out 










Figure 2-4: Construction sub-divisions by mechanism of worker fatalities, 2003-2015              
(Source: Safe Work Australia, 2015) 
 
2.4 Background of Construction Safety Management in the UK and 
Thailand  
2.4.1 UK Construction Industry Safety 
The construction industry is one of the largest sectors for the UK economy. The importance 
of the UK construction industry to the nation’s economy is clear to see. In 2014, the annual 
output of the construction industry contributed £103 billion in economic output, 6.5 per cent 
overall. The HSE in Great Britain (GB) recorded an accident rate of 0.55 per 100,000 
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workers in 2017, which was lower than that of many European Union (EU) member states, 
such as Sweden, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain (HSE, 2017), as shown in 
Figure 2-5. Furthermore, the overall rate of fatal injuries at work in GB has consistently been 








Figure 2-5: Rate of fatal injuries at work per 100,000 workers (Source: HSE, 2017) 
Figure 2-6 presents the data on fatalities in GB construction per 100,000 workers. The overall 
trend of fatalities is downward. The number and rate of fatal injuries can vary quite 









Figure 2-6: Number of fatal injuries to employees in construction, 2000-2017                               
(Source: HSE, 2017) 
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Figures 2-7 illustrates that the worker fatal injury rate in construction was 1.37 per 100,000 
workers. This is more than three times the average rate across all industries. Furthermore, in 
2016/17 there were 30 fatal accidents involving construction workers, around 30 per cent 
lower than the five-year average for 2011/2012-2015/2016 (HSE, 2017). Almost half of the 








Figure 2-7: Rate of fatal injuries to employees in construction per 100,000 workers, 












Figure 2-8: Main injury types for fatal injuries to workers in construction in the last five years                                      
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Figure 2-9: The most common causes of fatal injuries to employees, 2012/13-2016/17                      
(Source: HSE, 2017) 
 
2.4.2 Thai Construction Industry Safety 
Thai construction has been growing at a rapid rate. Data on both new construction and 
alterations collected by the National Statistical Office in 2016 shows that the total permitted 
number of workers in new building projects and alterations was 40,907 people, which 
comprised 35,842 people in building construction and 5,065 people in civil engineering 








Figure 2-10: Number of permits for new building construction and alterations in Q3/2015, 
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The overall permitted construction floor area was about 10.4 million square metres in 
Q3/2016. Residential building accounted for about 65.1 per cent of the permitted floor areas, 
while hotel buildings accounted for 5 per cent. The floor area for education and health 










Figure 2-11: Permitted floor area of new building and alteration projects by type of building 
in Q3/2015, Q2/2016 and Q3/2016 (Source: National Statistical Office, 2016) 
 
However, the number of construction accidents is decreased, as evidenced by the statistics on 











Figure 2-12: Major construction accidents in Thailand 2009-2016                                                  
(Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, 2016) 
3,169 3,152 3,347
3,936 4,058 3,902 4,105 3,334
9,506
9,319















2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Absent more than 3 days




















0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Total
Residential Buildings
Commercial and Office Buildings
Industrial and Factory Buildings







CHAPTER TWO  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
28 
   
There are some major injuries in the building construction industry, which are outlined below as in Table 2-3 below. It includes the types of 
safety risks and the referenced articles for the final list of 15 safety risks extracted from literature. 
Table 2-3: Major injuries in building construction industry 
Type of safety risk Sources Discussion 















Pipitsupaphol and Watanabe, 
(2000 cited in Hamid et al., 
2008:247); Limsupreeyarat et 
al., (2010), Perlman et al., 
(2014), Grant and Hinze 
(2014) 
Pipitsupaphol and Watanabe, 
(2000 cited in Hamid et al., 
2008:247); Leggat (2001)  
 
Pipitsupaphol and Watanabe, 
(2000 cited in Hamid et al., 
2008:247) 
Behm (2005), Rozenfeld et al., 
(2010),  Gürcanli and Müngen 
(2013)  
Kadikon and Rahman (2016), 
Laryea (2010),  Gurcanli and 
Sevim., (2015) 
Falls from height have been considered as one of the most frequent causes of death in 
building construction. It may occur due to unprotected openings in building or a lack of 




The major causes of accidents associated with height are objects falling on workers or 
people below. In Thailand, statistics indicate that during the nine-month period from 
November 1997 to July 1998, three deaths and 11 injuries were a result of construction 
sites falls 
The main causes of construction injuries were due to improper loading or equipment 
placement or supplies; failure to warn co-workers or to secure equipment; and 
improper use of equipment. Construction sites in Thailand have poor safety measures 
The brick wall collapsed onto the crane and crushed the worker as the brick wall was 
not designed to be freestanding 
 
The movement of loads by worker effort alone. It can include any activity causing 
overload of workers, such as lifting, pushing, pulling, and carrying 
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Table 2-3: Major injuries in building construction industry (cont.) 
 
Type of safety risk Sources Discussion 
















Lipscomb et al., (2006), Fung 
et al., (2010),  Dewlaney et al., 
(2011), Hu et al., (2011),  
Perlman et al., (2014)     
 
Aneziris et al., (2012), Perlman 
et al., (2014) 
 
Cheng et al., (2010), Gürcanlı 
et al., (2015)  
 
Haslam et al., (2005), Aneziris 
et al., (2012)   
Aneziris et al., (2012), 
Vongpisal and Yodpijit (2014)   
 
Vongpisal and Yodpijit (2014)   
Slips and trips are recognised as a serious source of injury in construction. Movement, 
speed of work jobs, and performance are related to injuries from slips and trips. Trips 
and Slips happen due to lack of awareness, poor attention to detail, absence of signage 
and markings, poor illumination, slippery surfaces, and access routes obstructed by 
materials 
Electricity is widely used in the building construction industry; however, there might 
be potential for hazards with possible fatal results.  The cause was electrocution by 
contacted impermanent electricity panels 
Working in close proximity to roads and trucks entering or reversing on construction 
sites 
 
Moving vehicle with loss of control. Crane overturn, mobile plant overturn, such as 
tractors, dumper trucks, forklifts 
Fires caused by hot work are the most serious hazards for workers installing 
reinforcement.  Working with or being near flammables/combustibles 
 
Exposure to hazardous substances such as dust, vapour and solvent 
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Table 2-3: Major injuries in building construction industry (cont.) 















Arphorn et al., (2003),  
Vongpisal and Yodpijit (2014)   
 
Mitropoulos et al., (2005),  
Tangtinthai (2016)   
 
Awakul and Ogunlana (2002), 
Henry and Kato (2012) 
 
Chan (2011),   Rosen and 




Safety signs have been used for radiation on construction sites to prevent exposure to 
arc welding or exposure to or generation of lasers 
 
Separating demolition activities on construction sites has been involved with confined 
spaces. Entering tunnels, hoppers, vats, tanks or pits to inspect or test, work or clean  
 
Noise and vibration can result directly from construction 
 
Human error is most unpredictable. Unsuitable safety training profiles for workers may 
emerge for exposure to human factor risks, for example, poor work posture or 
repetitive movement 
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2.5 Safety Risk Assessment and Management 
 
2.5.1 Definition of Risk 
In the construction industry, risk can be defined in relation to occupational accidents leading 
to fatal incidents. According to Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila (2011), risk is intrinsic in all 
project undertakings, as it can never be fully eliminated, although it can be effectively 
managed to mitigate the impacts on the achievement of the objective of the project. Other 
definitions of risk are available in the literature, for example, “the traditional view of risk is 
negative, representing loss, hazard, harm and adverse consequences” (Jannadi and Almishari, 
2003; KarimiAzari et al., 2011; Tangtinthai, 2016) and “the underlying condition that can 
generate a possible risk event at some time forward from the point of decision-making” 
(Winch, 2010). Zeng et al, (2005) state that the impact of risk can be measured as the 
probability of a specific unwanted event and its unwanted consequences or loss: 
RM = RL × RS                                                                                          Eq. 2-1 
 where  RM = Risk magnitude; RL = Risk likelihood; and RS = Risk severity 
Risk management is becoming increasingly important for the construction industry as 
construction projects involve uncertainty and complexity (Aminbakhsh et al., 2013). In many 
circumstances, however, based on the general agreement in the literature, risk management 
uses the following four-phase process (Mills, 2001; Zeng et al, 2005; Zeng et al, 2007; Nieto-
Morote and Ruz-Vila, 2011): 
 Risk identification 
 Risk assessment 
 Risk response 
 Risk monitoring and reviewing 
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Furthermore, Winch (2010) suggests that risk management can be divided into four phases: 
identifying and classifying the risk; assessing the risk; responding to the risk, and controlling 









Figure 2-13: The risk management process (reproduced from Winch, 2010) 
 
2.5.2 Risk Identification 
KarimiAzari et al., (2011) and Zavadskas et al., (2010) highlight that risk identification is the 
essential first step in risk management. The identification of each risk is aimed at determining 
potential risks attached to assignments to be performed by workers. Identifying the source of 
risk and the components allows the risk item to be separated from others. An et al., (2011) 
suggest that the purpose of risk identification is to identify all potential hazardous events 
systematically. Moreover, various hazard identification techniques, such as the brainstorming 
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FMEA, have been used (Zeng et al, 2005; Zeng et al, 2007; An et al., 2011; Pinto et al., 
2011;).  
 
2.5.3 Risk Assessment 
Risk is assessed from the risk identification in the previous stage. Some authors refer to the 
processes which include identifying and assessing risks, as the stage called ‘risk analysis’. 
The main purpose of risk assessment is to assess the risk by identifying potential undesirable 
events, the probability of occurrence of the events, and the consequences of such events 
(Gürcanli and Müngen, 2009; KarimiAzari et al., 2011). The risk likelihood and risk severity 
that can be caused by a hazard are considered. Zeng et al., (2005) state that the risk criteria 
which are widely used in judging risk magnitude are risk likelihood, risk severity, risk timing, 
and risk impact. Risk likelihood and risk severity are frequently used as fundamental criteria 
for risk assessment. Moreover, risk likelihood depends highly on personal experience and 
historical data obtained from company documentation and industrial records. Risk severity is 
the degree of seriousness and the scale of the impact if the risk turns into reality (Zeng et al., 
2005). However, risk assessment methods have ranged from simple classical methods to 
fuzzy reasoning approach mathematical models, and a risk assessment model based on fuzzy 
reasoning and the AHP approach is proposed (Zeng et al., 2007).  
 
2.5.4 Risk Evaluation 
The main purpose of risk evaluation is to determine whether a risk is acceptable. If the risk is 
regarded as an acceptable risk as indicated in Figure 2-14, it may be sufficient to control the 
risk instead of reducing it. Conversely, if the risk is regarded as an unacceptable risk, 
measures must be taken to eliminate or reduce the risk (Zeng et al., 2005). 
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The results generated from the risk assessment stage may be used in the risk evaluation stage 
to help project managers, risk analysts and engineers to develop maintenance and operation 
policies (An et al., 2011). If risks are high, risk mitigation programmes must be applied to 
reduce the probability of occurrence or control the possible consequences. The unacceptable 









Figure 2-14: The matrix for risk assessment (reproduced from Zeng et al., 2005) 
 
 
2.5.5 Risk Monitoring 
The final stage in the risk assessment is the process of monitoring the identified risks. The 
control of the risk may involve choosing alternative strategies to ensure the execution of the 
risk plans and evaluate their effectiveness in reducing risk. Many hazards have had specific 
regulations and actions, or other recognised standards have been developed to mitigate the 
risks involved (Hughes and Ferrett, 2012). Moreover, when conditions change, a further 
review may be necessary due to the implementation of new machinery or processes or the 
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development of new hazards (Hughes and Ferrett, 2012). However, when assessing the 
adequacy of existing controls or introducing new controls, a hierarchy of risk controls should 
be applied. The hierarchy of controls for risk consists of five stages (Cooper, 2001), as shown 










Figure 2-15: The hierarchy of control for risks (reproduced from Cooper, 2001) 
 
2.6 Current Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Assessment in Construction 
Industry 
Once safety risks are identified, their characteristics need to be evaluated to determine 
whether the safety risks require further control. Many different mature risk assessment 
techniques are currently employed in the construction industry based on safety risk 





Eliminate the hazard 
altogether 
Change to a less 
hazardous alternative 
Change to a less 
hazardous alternative 
Reduce the amount of 
exposure 
Protect Provide (PPE) 
Re-Evaluate 
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Cagliano et al., 2015). Several safety risk assessment techniques, ETA, FTA, a HAZOP study, 
FMEA, and MCS, which are found in the literature that are outlined in the following section. 
A HAZOP study is a systemic qualitative risk assessment technique which was originally 
applied in the chemical industry in the UK during the 1960s (Nolan, 2014). This method aims 
to detect and evaluate design faults, potential hazards, and operational problems in term of 
plant design and human error. It is principally useful for assessing possible hazards designed 
in a work process (Dunjo et al., 2010; Rossing et al., 2010). The HAZOP study is commonly 
based on the principle with several experts’ backgrounds that they can identify more 
problems and interact when working together than when working separately and combining 
their obtained results. This technique is usually used to check safety design and running 
safety structures, improve the safety of existing facilities, and evaluate unwanted hazards 
designed, undesirable events in a system or a process. The process of this technique is 
divided into functional blocks. Guidewords are systematically formulated to determine how 
deviation from the intended operating conditions can lead to hazardous problems. However, 
HAZOP method is a complicated process of analysis and it is not suitable in construction 
project involved massive uncertainties and subjectivities (Zhang et al., 2014). An example of 
the HAZOP technique is shown in Figure 2-16. 
FTA is a quantitative top-down risk assessment technique which was first introduced by H.A. 
Watson of Bell Laboratories in 1961. It is one of the most used widely techniques and has 
generated numerous studies in multidisciplinary fields such as safety management, quality 
management, security management, nuclear engineering, and human engineering (Hyun et 
al., 2015).  It is a logical structure relationship between events and causes lead to failure, 
which is used to evaluate the probability of failure or reliability of complex systems. There 
are two basic types of FTA diagram notations: logic gates, such as OR gate and AND gate 
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and the basic failure event is usually denoted with a circle. (Abdelgawad and Fayek, 2010; 
Zio, 2013). However, the construction of the tree in this method depends on the ability of the 
analyst who must be well experienced and trained, and this technique is not suitable in the 
risk analysis process under incomplete and uncertain situation (An et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 















Figure 2-17 An example of the FTA structure                                                                           
(reproduced from Abdelgawad and Fayek, 2010) 
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ETA is a quantitative bottom-up risk assessment technique which provides an analysis 
method for identifying and assessing the potential accident sequences involved in a specific 
initiating event (Zio, 2013; Ouache and Ali, 2014). This method is similar to the FTA method. 
It utilises a visual logic tree structure known as an event tree between the failures of defined 



















Figure 2-18 An example of the ETA (reproduced from Ouache and Ali, 2014) 
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FMEA is a quantitative bottom-up risk assessment technique that was first introduced by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1963 (Bahrami, et al., 2012) 
which can be employed to evaluate the effects of the potential failure modes of functions, 
components, and subsystem (Zeng et al., 2010). The concept of this technique is to calculate 
the risk priority number for each failure mode. FMEA states with a known potential failure 
mode at one level and then examines the effect on the next subsystem level (Sharma, et al., 
2005). An example of the FMEA technique is shown in Figure 2-19. 
However, ETA and FMEA are not suitable for risk assessment modelling under poor quality 












Figure 2-19 An example of the FMEA (reproduced from Bahrami, et al., 2012) 
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Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is one of the powerful modelling tools for analysing and 
evaluating complex systems in project risk analysis (Rezaie et al., 2007; Kwak and Ingall., 
2007; Zio, 2013). MCS was named after the city in Monaco which is known for games of 
chance, for example, roulette wheels, with involve repetitive events with known probabilities. 
This method has also been useful in domains outside project management, such as 
engineering, computer applications, finance, and public health. It has been widely used in risk 
assessment based on a combination of multiple probability density functions in risk to 
quantify uncertainty in a probabilistic framework using computer simulation (Arunraj et al., 
2013). However, MCS is not suitable for construction risk management, as the information 
arising contains subjective and linguistically expressed information (Sadeghi et al., 2010). 
 
2.7 Review of FRT, AHP and TOPSIS  
The FRT, which was first introduced by Zadeh in 1979 provides a useful mathematical 
process for reasoning to cope with uncertain and imprecise information. Taylan et al., (2014) 
state that construction projects are complex, are exposed to high degrees of risk, and face a 
significant amount of uncertainty. It is difficult to assess the risk level. Therefore, using the 
fuzzy expert system based on risk analysis can accommodate experts’ experience and 
judgement and can prove helpful for contractors when conducting project risk management.  
An et al., (2011) studied the FRT to assess the railway risk in the UK railway industry 
qualitatively. They state that fuzzy reasoning approaches are knowledge-based and 
constructed from expert knowledge in the form of if-then rules, which can provide a 
systematic procedure for transforming a knowledge base into non-liner mapping. 
Furthermore, Zeng et al., (2007); Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila (2011) state that using the FRT 
method has advantages which mean that it can be used to assess risks associated with 
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construction projects effectively in ambiguous situations based on substantial uncertainties 
and subjective judgements.  
 
Furthermore, Majumder et al., (2013) argue that the FRT is a key solution for dealing with 
uncertain, incomplete, ambiguous, and imprecise information in the historical data (the 
percentage of accidents, severity of accidents, and safety expenditure and activities), which 
can help safety professionals and engineers to improve the safety management system of the 
construction sites. Moreover, Lam et al., (2001) state “The fuzzy reasoning involved the 
transformation of linguistic variables into quantitative variables, and the exploration of the 
meanings of linguistic variables for the assignment of fuzzy sets to linguistic variables is 
essential for the resolution of fuzziness, vagueness, uncertainty and imprecision in decision-
making problems”. Therefore, the FRT should be considered as an effective tool to solve 
problems where there is complexity or imprecision. It enables the handling of imprecise 
information and uncertain knowledge in the construction industry, which can utilise a fuzzy 
rule-based system to describe nonlinear functions linguistically. 
 
The AHP, developed by Thomas Saaty in 1980, is a quantitative technique based on 
mathematics to solve many complicated decision-making problems using a hierarchical 
structure (Taylan et al., 2014). Nowadays, it is widely used around the world to solve multi-
criteria decision-making (MCDM) problems in domains such as business, industry, and 
health and safety, which helps in setting their priorities (Badri et al., 2012; Aminbakhsh et al., 
2013). The AHP has also been used for identifying and weighting in the field of project risk 
assessment (Zeng et al., 2007, An et al., 2011; Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila, 2011).  This 
structured technique works by minimising complex evaluation criteria into a series of one-to-
one pairwise comparisons (Taylan et al., 2014).  
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To obtain the factor contributions of the evaluation criteria, Liu et al. (2015) employed the 
AHP to obtain the subjective weights of each risk factor by pairwise comparisons. 
Consequently, the risk factor weights were determined, which made the risk analysis results 
more consistent with the actual situation. 
Aminbakhsh et al., (2013) adopted the AHP for prioritisation of safety risks in a construction 
project with the theory of cost of safety. The proposed safety risk framework revealed that the 
AHP can provide a robust method for creating a rational budget for accident prevention 
during planning and budgeting of construction projects. Moreover, Gudienė et al., (2014) 
applied the AHP to rank different critical success factors for construction projects in 
Lithuania. Based on their findings, the weight of the critical success factors by using the AHP 
can rank different construction projects successfully. 
Furthermore, Li et al., (2013) employed the FAHP method in a case project for modular 
construction in Canada within a framework aimed to identify risk factors and assess the 
impacts of the identified risk factors on project costs and duration. This method is utilised to 
determine the weightings of risk factors in construction projects.  
 
Another area in which fuzzy logic has been widely used is in decision-making processes. For 
instance, the TOPSIS technique was originally suggested in 1981 by Yoon and Hwang for 
solving MCDM problems (Yoon and Hwang, 1980; KarimiAzari et al., 2011; Tamosaitiene 
et al., 2013; Jato-Espino et al., 2014). This technique is a very helpful concept for coping 
with situations which are too complex to be calculated (Zavadskas et al., 2010). The main 
idea of this technique is that an alternative is chosen that should have the shortest and the 
farthest distances from the positive and negative ideal solutions respectively (Tan et al., 
2010). However, the traditional formulation of the TOPSIS method, based on human 
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judgements in the decision-making process, is represented with crisp numbers, non-
obtainable and incomplete information. The FTOPSIS method will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Torfi et al., (2010) applied FAHP to obtain the criteria weight factors and applied the 
FTOPSIS method for evaluating the alternative rankings when the criteria weights and 
performance ratings were vague and inaccurate. They indicate that in combination, these are 
practicable techniques for coping with the performance ratings and the challenges of vague 
and imprecise information. 
Taylan et al., (2015) carried out risk assessment of a selection of construction projects based 
on imprecise, ambiguous and uncertain information by using FAHP to obtain appropriate 
weights for five main criteria and then applied FTOPSIS to rank 30 construction projects in 
Saudi Arabia.  
Haghshenas et al., (2016) applied FTOPSIS, which is a powerful and effective tool to rank 
risk, for solving complex problems under implicit conditions and with uncertain information 
in risk assessment of dam construction projects. Similarly, Tamošaitienė et al., (2013) studied 
the risk assessment of construction objects for a commercial centre construction project under 
a fuzzy environment, in which FTOPSIS was applied for risk assessment to rank three 
commercial objects.  
Mousavi et al., (2015) proposed an MCDM model by employing the FTOPSIS method to 
rank appropriate construction projects under an intuitionistic fuzzy set environment. The 
ranking results compared with FTOPSIS were efficiently applicable for determining the 
criteria’s weights to obtain a precise solution. Moreover, Junior et al., (2014) suggest that 
although the application of both FTOPSIS and FAHP is suitable to solve the supplier 
selection problem, FTOPSIS is better suited to solve the problem of supplier selection. 
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2.8 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on safety management in the construction industry. 
The statistics on the previous accidents and incident reports in some countries differ from 
those in other countries, as health and safety systems in other countries differ regarding 
recording, reporting, and enforcement. Therefore, the background of construction safety 
management in the UK and Thailand has been focused on this chapter.  According to the data 
on constriction fatalities the UK, it had the lowest fatal accident at work rate of all EU 
countries. One of the most significant issues in this chapter is that the construction industry 
has a higher risk level than other industries. This chapter also reviewed the concepts of the 
safety management framework and OHSAS 18001. This review revealed that the main 
features of the safety management framework and OHSAS 18001 are occupational health and 
safety management systems, which are a fundamental part of their safety risk management 
strategy to deal with the potential safety risks in the building construction industry. Moreover, 
many of the general risk assessment techniques in the construction industry use two 
fundamental risk parameters, risk likelihood and risk severity, to assess the risk level. Many 
of the construction safety risk assessment models may be unable to determine the safety risk 
level, however. For example, a specific risk depends highly upon the probability that the 
accident will occur, as these two parameters do not take into account the probability of the 
consequences caused in the construction projects. 
It was found that many of risk assessment techniques are widely used in risk assessment, for 
example, FMEA, ETA, HAZOP, FTA, and MSC have limitations. They do not deal well with 
uncertainty and imprecise and ambiguous information. Furthermore, quantitative risk data are 
not always available when needed or not in the form required, therefore using subjective 
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judgements are often more appropriate for safety risk assessment. The subjective approach or 
human judgement mainly utilises the relation measures of expert experience and knowledge.  
This chapter also discussed the FRT, AHP and TOPSIS methods and found that the FRT 
method would be used in the risk criteria calculation and estimation stages in the construction 
safety risk management model to assess the potential safety risks and reduce the uncertainties, 
subjectivity, ill-defined problems, and vague information associated with building 
construction projects and activities.  
It was found that FAHP has the advantage of reducing the number of pairwise comparisons, 
especially when there are a huge number of comparisons, which would be employed in the 
risk ranking stage to obtain the weighting factors that will be used in the FTOPSIS process. 
Furthermore, FTOPSIS would be used to rank the important safety risks under a vague and 
fuzzy environment. 
In conclusion, this chapter discussed the safety management systems and safety risk 
management process, and reviewed the major safety risks in the construction industry.  
Therefore, it is expected that the proposed model that will be developed can be applied under 
a vague and fuzzy environment in construction projects and various other areas. 
The next chapter, Research Methodology, outlines the methodology adopted in the thesis, 
including the research design, questionnaire survey design and model testing design. The case 
study and robustness and limitations of the approaches are also outlined. 










In this chapter, the research methodology is described, highlighting the importance of the key 
steps in the research and describing the methods to be used to develop a construction safety 
risk management model based on FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS. A questionnaire is employed 
as a survey programme to collect data on the building construction sites. The next steps in 
this research, the development of the research model, model testing, case studies and group 
interviews, are described. The chapter ends with the limitations and robustness of the 
approaches relating to develop a construction safety risk management model. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
 
The research design should be the most appropriate to obtain an answer to the proposed 
research questions. It is selected by considering how to connect the research with the data and 
information and the analysis of the results. According to Lyons and Skitmore (2004), 
common data collection methods are frequently used in the qualitative research method. 
Meng (2012) states that using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods is more useful 
and makes the research more reliable. Therefore, combined qualitative and quantitative 
methods have been adopted in this research to confirm the identified safety risks and find 
other important safety risks on the building construction sites, and interviews will 
help to determine how to manage the safety risk. The following section will discuss each 
stage of the research design. Figure 3-1 shows the research design of the study. 
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Figure 3-1: The research design of the study 
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3.2.1 Research Objectives 
 
As stated earlier, the overall aim of this research is to provide an effective tool to develop 
safety risk management measures based on the development of a mathematical approach to 
building construction projects. The objectives of the research are achieved with the help of 
the FRT, AHP and TOPSIS methods, which will help the safety risk management terms to 
reduce injuries and improve the safety of workers within the building construction industry.  
 
3.2.2 Problem Identification and Literature Review 
 
Stage two of the research design will examine the current occupational safety problems, and 
the various types of safety risk in the Thai building construction industry will be investigated. 
Data and information on accidents in the building construction industry will be collected 
from reports, articles and the industry, and will draw on the source of possible safety risk in 
formulating the theoretical and research framework identified through the literature review. 
Many hazard identification techniques are currently used, for example, brainstorming, 
checklist, ‘what if?’ analysis, and a HAZOP study (Zeng et al., 2007). Specifically, this study 
will seek to address how safety risks are assessed in the Thai building construction industry. 
The review of the literature has found other research studies that supported this research work 
on the construction safety risk assessment and management domain during the whole 
research project, which is described in Section 2.7. An essential early stage of this research is 
examined potentially relevant theories and literature. Furthermore, the concepts of FRT, AHP 








   
3.2.3 Survey Programme 
 
A questionnaire survey is a tool for data collection (Lyons and Skitmore, 2004) in which 
respondents are asked to give written or verbal replies to a written set of questions. A cover 
letter will be attached to the questionnaire explaining the aim and objectives of the research 
study and guaranteeing the confidentiality of the responses. In this research, the questionnaire 
survey will be used to collect and confirm identified safety risks based on the knowledge 
obtained from the literature review and to find other important risks in the Thai building 
construction industry. Based on the survey programme, an ethical review of the research is 
required and an application to obtain permission/information is required. Respondents will be 
informed that they can withdraw from the research at any time and that the data will be 
anonymised once it has been collected. All data will be kept in a locked cabinet and the 
computer used will be password protected. 
 
3.2.4 Development of Research Model 
 
The conceptual model for the study will be based on problem-solving in mathematics. The 
information obtained from the review of various methods of estimating safety risks on 
construction projects and from the data collection will be utilised to define the standards of 
qualitative descriptors and the associated safety risk management model. Secondary sources 
will be interpreted and processed for the analysis of the safety risk management model. The 
proposed model will address quantitative risk data and documentation generated by industries 
which are generally insufficient for determining the safety risks. Three parameters, 
probability of occurrence (PC), severity of consequence (SC), and probability of consequence 
(PC) will be incorporated into the proposed model. The FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS 
methods will be combined to develop a new safety risk management model, which will be 




   
used to obtain the final ranking to evaluate important safety risks in the construction projects. 
 
3.2.5 Model Testing 
 
In this stage, the proposed model will be tested by using a case example to ensure successful 
model development to generate results efficiently and effectively. The proposed construction 
safety risk management model testing will have two possible results: satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory. If the result is not good enough to be accepted, then the existing data will need 
to be verified or the model will need to be modified. Furthermore, a conference paper will be 
published to communicate, interact and negotiate with the international audience working in 
the same field, which will generate useful feedback on the proposed model. 
 
3.2.6 Case Studies 
 
Case studies will help to identify the circumstances and are used as a tool to facilitate 
learning regarding specific projects (Yin, 2011; Yildiz et al., 2014). In this research, case 
studies are employed to verify the reliability of the risk assessment and occupational safety 
management model in the construction industry. The cases will be selected in Bangkok, 
Thailand. There has been a significant increase in the growth of building construction 
activities and occupational safety risk in the construction industry.  
 
 
3.2.7 Group Interviews 
 
Once the case studies have been collected from the specific construction projects, group 
interviews will be conducted with experienced building construction managers, safety 
managers, and senior engineers, who will provide their views on critical safety risk 
management on the building construction sites. Questions will be formulated to determine 
how to manipulate the critical safety risks. Many studies confirm that interviews are 




   
particularly useful for obtaining respondents’ experiences (Turner, 2010; Brinkmann, 2014). 
All the group interviews will be conducted by the researcher himself. A face-to-face group 
interview allows the researcher to observe any non-verbal communication.    
 
 
3.3 Robustness and Limitations of the Approaches  




3.3.1.1 FRT Application 
The robustness of the FRT application has been recorded in the work of Chan et al. (2009). 
The researchers used a comprehensive literature review based on the application of fuzzy 
logic /fuzzy set, and hybrid fuzzy techniques in construction management research. The 
robustness aspects of the FRT application are: 
 Ability to model highly complex problems 
 Highly appropriate for computational modelling in complex non-linear problems 
which are poorly understood 
 Improved cognitive modelling of expert judgements 
 Competency for multiple experts modelling 
 Reduced model complexity 
 Improved handling of uncertainty  
 
3.3.1.2 FTOPSIS Application 
The strength of FTOPSIS has been used in dealing with ranking reversal issues. It performs 
slightly better than FAHP (Junior et al., 2014; Mousavi et al., 2015). According to Dantsoho 
(2015), the robustness of the FTOPSIS application is described as follows:  




   
 High computational performance 
 Ability to measure the relative performance for each alternative in a simple 
mathematical form 
 Simple and rationally comprehensive concept 
 Improved flexibility with large-scale in the definition of the choice set 
 Simplified computational process in a spreadsheet 
 
3.3.1.3 FAHP Application 
The strengths of FAHP over other multi-criteria methods are its intuitive appeal, flexibility to 
the decision-makers, and its competency to detect inconsistencies (Javanbarget et al., 2012). 
In general terms, users find the pairwise comparison form of data input straightforward and 
convenient (Torfi et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, the FAHP technique has the distinct advantage that it breaks down a decision- 
making problem into its component parts and builds hierarchies of criteria and helps to 
capture both objective and subjective evaluation measures. While providing a powerful 
mechanism to check the consistency of the evaluation measures and alternatives, it reduces 
bias in making a decision (Mahmoodzadehet et al., 2007).  
 
3.3.2 Limitations 
3.3.2.1 FRT Application 
The limitations of the FRT application which have been outlined in work of Abdelgawad and 
Fayek (2010), are described as follows:  
 Determining and tuning membership functions 
 Though easier to design and more prototypical than conventional systems, FRT 
requires more fine tuning before they are in operation. 




   
 Bias among traditionalists for crisp logic- based systems. 
 
3.3.2.2 FTOPSIS Application 
Despite FTOPSIS being one of the most applicable techniques in multiple-criteria decision- 
making, it is not capable of ranking when there is a substantial number of criteria. Lack of 
ability to compute the weight of indices is one of the main limitations of this method. Using 
the FAHP method for the criteria calculation and sub criteria weights eliminates the weakness 
of the FTOPSIS method (Jato-Espino et al., 2014; Haghshenas et al., 2016).  
 
3.3.2.3 FAHP Application 
Despite the popularity of FAHP, some authors have expressed concern regarding certain 
issues in the FAHP methodology, which are described as follows: 
 With AHP the decision making is divided into several subsystems, within which and 
between which a substantial number of pairwise comparisons need to be completed. 
This approach has the limitation that the number of pairwise comparisons to be made 
may become very large (n(n-1)/2), and thus it becomes a lengthy work (Zeng et al., 
2007; Chen et al., 2011). 
 Another weakness of the AHP technique is the artificial limitation of using of the 9-
point scale. Sometimes, the decision-maker might find it difficult to distinguish 
among them (Macharis et al., 2004). 
 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the research methodology has been described which will provide the means to 
answer the research questions of this thesis by explaining how the gaps will be filled and how 
to resolve the problems in the existing construction risk management models. To achieve the 




   
research aim and objectives, the research project framework design of this study has been 
adopted. Based on the review of the literature on existing construction safety risk 
management models, a questionnaire survey will be employed on construction sites to 
confirm the identified safety risks that were analysed to develop a proposed construction 
safety risk management model. Before a model was implemented in the specific projects, 
model testing was used to ensure that the model is conceptually sound and can generate all 
safety risks efficiently and effectively. Specific project case studies will be carried out to 
verify the reliability of the proposed construction safety risk management model that could be 
accepted by the Thai building construction industry.  
Finally, group interviews with experienced construction managers and safety managers will 
be conducted to produce an effective and efficient safety risk management framework in their 
real construction projects. In the next chapter, the questionnaire will be developed to collect 
information and find other important safety risks in the Thai building construction industry. 
The related diagrams and tables will illustrate the results of the questionnaires. 
 
  







SURVEY PROGRAMME  
  
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, the preferred research methodology that has been adopted for this research was 
discussed, including the research design and Thailand as the chosen case. 
This chapter focuses on the questionnaire survey, one of the most powerful research tools for 
collecting, analysing and interpreting data from a target group (Nardi, 2018). It is used in 
conjunction with many other methods in survey research. Descriptive statistics and interviews 
are presented in this chapter, which also provides results confirming the specifications of the 
hazard groups in the construction industry.  The key findings of the survey based upon 
statistical analysis are also provided.   
 
4.2 Questionnaire Survey Design  
A part of the research endeavour to improve safety risk management models for building 
construction projects, there is a need to identify the various categories of hazard. From this 
risk criteria can be determined using fuzzy reasoning approaches, allowedly the membership 
functions of risk parameters such as probability of occurrence, severity of consequence and 
probability of consequence to be found. 
The questionnaire was designed to collect data from project managers, safety managers, 
safety officers, and site engineers on construction projects. The respondents were asked about 
the importance of different areas and activities of occupational safety according to their 





experience. The questionnaire results are used to develop a set of important safety risks and 
confirm the potential hazards in construction safety risk management models. 
 
4.3 Structure of the Questionnaire  
The questionnaire was divided into three main sections:  
1. General information 
2. Evaluation of 15 safety risks  
3. Evaluation of the safety risk parameters of 15 safety risks 
A copy of the questionnaire and an example of a completed questionnaire are provided in 
Appendix A and B respectively. The questionnaire was completed by 42 respondents 
involved in the building construction industry. 
To identify the various categories of hazard that are related to safety risk management models 
in building construction projects and to develop membership functions of risk parameters 
such as probability of occurrence, severity of consequence, and probability of consequence, 
the feedback in sections 1, 2 and 3 of the questionnaire survey needed to be analysed. The 
general information was investigated by calculating the number and percentage from section 
1 in the questionnaire survey. The level of importance of safety risks in construction projects 
is indicated in section 2 of the questionnaire survey by calculating the weighted average mean 
scores. In the final section safety risk parameters are defined to measure the probability of 
occurrence, severity of consequence, and probability of consequence. 
 
 





4.4 Analysis of the Questionnaire Survey Feedback 
This section presents the finding of the questionnaire data. Fifty employees respondents in 
construction industry projects were contacted, and 42 responses were received. Descriptive 
statistics are provided, and tables and graphs illustrate the results in the following sections. 
 
4.4.1 General Information 
In section 1 of the questionnaire, four questions were asked to capture the general 
background of the respondents. Table 4-1 shows the distribution of the types of companies. It 
was found that 73.8 per cent of the companies are contractor companies, the both the 
government agency and the client account for 4.8 per cent of the total. The results also show 
that 38.1 per cent of the respondents have 11-15 years’ experience, with 33.4 per cent having 
more than 16 years’ experience in this field. This experience is considered potentially 
profitable for improving the construction performance on the complex project sites. 
Interestingly, most of the construction types in industry projects are involved in building 
construction with 92.9 per cent of the total, and 7.1 per cent are involved in either building 
extension works or building maintenance works as shown in Figure 4-1 and Table 4-1. 
Furthermore, the distribution of the roles in the construction industry is also shown in Table 
4-1, which reveals that 35.7 per cent of the survey respondents are project managers, 30.9 per 








   










Figure 4-1: Types of construction industry projects 
Type of company Years of experience Type of construction industry projects 










































































































Contractor 31 73.8% 6-10 8 19.0% Building 
extension 
works 
1 2.4% Engineer 13 30.9% 
Developer 3 7.1% 11-15 16 38.1% Building 
maintenance 
works 
2 4.7% Planner 1 2.4% 
Government 
agency 
2 4.8% 16-20 7 16.7%    Contractor 1 2.4% 
Client 2 4.8% More 
than 
20 
7 16.7%    Safety officer 10 23.8% 




















   
4.4.2: Evaluation of 15 Safety Risks  
The second part of the questionnaire contained questions about the safety risks identified 
from the literature review. Respondents were asked to give one of five scores for each of 15 
safety risks to indicate their importance (1= low importance to 5 = high importance). The 
experience factor of 42 respondents with different backgrounds and experience in this subject 
who are involved in the construction projects is illustrated in Table 4-2.  
Table 4-2: Respondents’ experience factors  
 
 
The level of importance of each hazard group was measured in five interval levels on a Likert 
scale. The range was obtained based on manual scoring to obtain the division of scores, for 
example, “Less important” can be calculated by (5-1=4/5+1=1.8), as shown in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3: The importance of the hazard groups 
 
Title Description Ranges 
Very important Extremely important in project construction 
industry 
          4.21-5.00 
Major Highly important in project construction industry           3.41-4.20 
Average Has impact on project construction industry           2.61-3.40 
Minor Has little impact on project construction industry           1.81-2.60 
Less important Has no or very little impact            1.00-1.80 
 
Respondent groups Years of experience Score Contribution factor 
C1 1-5 1 0.10 
C2 6-10 2 0.15 
C3 11-15 3 0.20 
C4 16-20 4 0.25 
C5 20+ 5 0.30 




   
Fifteen hazard groups that were believed to have an influence on risk identification and 
prevention were identified through a literature review in Section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2 and in the 
second section of the questionnaire. These 15 safety risks are listed as shown in Table 4-4, 
and a short definition of each of them is provided. 
Table 4-4: The definition of the 15 hazard groups 
Hazard group Descriptions 
Falls from height 
Workers are typically required to work at heights on the 
construction sites. These heights include both temporary 
structures such as scaffolding and permanent structures such 
as roofs 
Falling objects 
Objects falling from work ladders, platforms, scaffolds or 
mobile scaffolding. Debris from grinding operations. Wind 
blown particles 
Manual handling 
The movement of loads by worker effort alone. It can include 
any activity that requires overload by workers by lifting, 
pushing, pulling or carrying 
Equipment, machinery, 
tools 
Most of the equipment used on site can be hazardous as it 
could strike construction workers while at work 
Electricity 
Contact with overhead electric power lines and building 
power constitutes the most common source of electric shock 
Slips and trips 
Trips and slips happen due to lack of awareness, poor 
attention to detail, absence of signage and markings, poor 
illumination, slippery surfaces, and access routes obstructed 
by materials 
Traffic hazards 
Working in close proximity to roads, trucks entering or 
reversing on construction sites 
Fire and explosions 
These could occur due to a ruptured utility gas line, 
flammable fumes, and electrical connections to the 
construction site 
  




   
Table 4-4: The definition of the 15 hazard groups (cont.) 
Hazard group Descriptions 
Exposure to hazardous 
substances 
Exposure to hazardous substances such as silica dust, 
asbestos, and solvent 
Radiation hazards Exposure to arc welding or exposure to or generation of lasers 
Vehicle overturn 
Crane overturn, mobile plant overturn, such as tractors, 
dumper trucks, forklifts and Bobcats 
Collapse of site structure 
Collapse of booms, scaffolding or other temporary structural 
or load-bearing components 
Noise and vibration 
Noise comes from the operation of plant, machinery and 
power tools, the movement of vehicles, and the delivery of 
materials 
Confined spaces 
Entering tunnels, hoppers, vats, tanks or pits to inspect or test, 
work or clean 
Ergonomic/Human 
Factors 
Poor work posture, repetitive movement, and handling of 
heavy objects 
 
The respondents were grouped into five categories: 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, and 20+ years’ 
experience, respectively. Based on the questionnaire survey data, the level of importance of 
the risk was calculated based on the questionnaire survey data.  
The data collected from the questionnaire survey was calculated according to the average 
score, as performed by Priyadarshani et al. (2013):  
Average score = 
N
sf 
                                                                                  Eq.  4-1                                   
 
where f = Frequency of responses rating each risk 
s = Score given to each risk by the respondents, and 
N= Total number of responses concerning that risk. 




   
For example, the results of the average score for the 15 risks (C5 = more than 20 years’ 
experience) are illustrated in Table 4-5.  
 
Table 4-5: Number and percentage of the safety risks in construction (C5 = more than 20 
years’ experience)    
 
Table 4-6 also shows the results of the mean value with their corresponding weightings and 
can be calculated by Equation (4-1): 
FHWA = 0.10×4.50+0.15×4.25+0.20×4.19+0.25×4.86+0.30×4.86 = 4.60 
Safety risks 
Level of importance (1=Low to 5=High) 
Average 
1 (%) 2 (%) 3 (%) 4 (%) 5 (%) 
Falls from height (FH) 
Falling object (FO) 
Manual handling (MH) 
Equipment, machinery (EM) 
Electricity (EL) 
Slips and trips (ST) 
Traffic hazards (TH) 
Vehicle overturn (VO) 
Fire and explosions (FE) 
Exposure to hazardous 
substances (ES) 
Radiation hazards (RH) 
Collapse of site structure (CO) 
Confined spaces (CS) 
Ergonomic/human factors (EH) 




































































































   
FOWA = 0.10×3.50+0.15×4.38+0.20×3.75+0.25×4.43+0.30×4.43 = 4.19 
MHWA = 0.10×2.75+0.15×2.88+0.20×3.31+0.25×3.57+0.30×2.71 = 3.08 
EMWA = 0.10×3.50+0.15×3.38+0.20×3.69+0.25×4.29+0.30×4.29 = 3.95 
ELWA = 0.10×3.50+0.15×3.50+0.20×3.50+0.25×4.00+0.30×3.57 = 3.65 
STWA =  0.10×3.00+0.15×3.00+0.20×3.44+0.25×3.29+0.30×3.71 = 3.37 
THWA = 0.10×2.50+0.15×2.50+0.20×2.50+0.25×3.29+0.30×2.57 = 2.72 
VOWA = 0.10×3.00+0.15×2.63+0.20×2.56+0.25×2.86+0.30×2.86 = 2.78 
FEWA = 0.10×3.25+0.15×2.63+0.20×3.00+0.25×3.57+0.30×2.86 = 3.07 
ESWA =  0.10×2.75+0.15×2.13+0.20×2.44+0.25×3.57+0.30×2.29 = 2.66 
RHWA = 0.10×2.75+0.15×1.75+0.20×2.00+0.25×2.14+0.30×2.00 = 2.07 
COWA = 0.10×3.25+0.15×3.13+0.20×3.13+0.25×3.86+0.30×3.43 = 3.41 
CSWA=  0.10×3.75+0.15×3.88+0.20×3.38+0.25×3.29+0.30×2.57 = 3.22 
EHWA = 0.10×3.50+0.15×3.13+0.20×3.00+0.25×2.57+0.30×2.29 = 2.75 
NVWA = 0.10×3.50+0.15×3.00+0.20×2.88+0.25×2.86+0.30×1.71 = 2.60 
 
where FHWA, FOWA, MHWA, EMWA, ELWA, STWA, THWA, VOWA, FEWA, ESWA, RHWA, COWA, 
CSWA, EHWA, and NVWA are the weighted average mean value of corresponding items shown 
in Table 4.5 respectively.  
It can be seen from the data analysis that the survey respondents indicated that falls from 
height is a very important risk on construction sites, with a weighted average value of 4.6. 





Table 4-6: Weighted average mean score of the safety risk level on construction projects 
Safety risks 














































































































































This result is consistent with the finding of Mistikoglu et al. (2015), which was that falls from 
height was the most important characteristic increasing the chance of fatality in the 
construction industry due to a fall protection system not being implemented. 
The respondents were asked to add other risks that they thought were important on 
construction sites but were not listed in the questionnaire survey. Some of the safety risks 
they mentioned are: (1) Lighting; (2) Lack of skills; (3) Site environment; (4) Platforms that 
become holes; and (5) PPE. 




   
The final section of the questionnaire to be analysed is the membership functions of three 
parameters for the five-point scale of linguistic statements as shown in Table 4-7. The 
respondents were asked about the probability of occurrence, severity of consequence and 
probability of consequence, and the proportion for defining the number of safety risks is 
provided by ticking two, three or four numbers to construct the fuzzy membership function. 
The degree of fuzzy membership can be calculated as  
   Z(X) =                      Eq. 4-2 
 where Z(X) is the degree of fuzzy membership, P(Xi) is the number of positive replies, and 
  N is the total number of responses. 
 
4.4.3 Evaluation of the Membership Functions of Three Parameters 
As Table 4.7 shows, regarding the probability of occurrence, more than 57 per cent of the 
respondents considered that falls from height is likely and 74 per cent considered that falling 
objects is very likely more than radiation hazards, traffic hazards and confined space. 
Considering the severity of consequence, falls from height 86 per cent of the respondents 
considered that falls from height and 76 per cent of the respondents considered that collapse 
of site structure are catastrophic than manual handling, slips and trips, traffic hazards, 
ergonomic/human factors, and noise and vibration. Regarding the probability of consequence, 
57 per cent of the respondents considered that falling objects is reasonably likely and 43 per 
cent considered that it is highly likely.  
N
XP i )(




   










































































































Falls from height 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.57 0.52 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.38 0.86 0.00 0.10 0.24 0.29 0.40 0.43 
Falling objects 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.50 0.74 0.00 0.12 0.33 0.55 0.57 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.40 0.57 0.43 
Manual handling 0.10 0.24 0.36 0.48 0.14 0.12 0.48 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.48 0.50 0.14 0.05 
Equipment, machinery, 
tools 
0.02 0.21 0.45 0.45 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.43 0.48 0.33 0.02 0.19 0.31 0.45 0.29 0.19 
Electricity 0.12 0.21 0.36 0.48 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.31 0.40 0.55 0.07 0.26 0.36 0.38 0.17 0.21 
Slips and trips 0.07 0.26 0.29 0.50 0.17 0.19 0.48 0.38 0.17 0.17 0.07 024 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.17 
Traffic hazards 0.21 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.17 0.19 0.31 0.38 0.29 0.17 0.00 
Vehicle overturn 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.38 0.38 0.21 0.38 0.36 0.24 0.14 0.02 
Fire and explosions 0.21 0.21 0.33 0.38 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.24 0.45 0.52 0.17 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.17 0.14 
Exposure to hazardous 
substances 
0.33 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.07 0.17 0.24 0.26 0.38 0.31 0.21 0.31 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.07 
Radiation hazards 0.57 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.43 0.40 0.31 0.52 0.19 0.14 0.02 0.07 
Collapse of site 
structure 
0.29 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.17 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.04 0.76 0.31 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.14 0.17 
Confined spaces 0.10 0.36 0.26 0.29 0.21 0.10 0.17 0.31 0.48 0.48 0.10 0.45 0.26 0.29 0.14 0.10 
Ergonomic/human 
factors 
0.12 0.26 0.33 0.40 0.12 0.05 0.50 0.45 0.24 0.07 0.17 0.24 0.33 0.26 0.29 0.07 
Noise and vibration 0.10 0.19 0.43 0.45 0.17 0.12 0.43 0.50 0.31 0.00 0.12 0.29 0.38 0.31 0.29 0.07 
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Comments made by respondents: 
The following points relate to the question “Do you have any other comments about this 
research project either relating to the previous questions, or otherwise?”  
1. Some respondents do not use any statistical methods to assess the safety risks on 
construction projects. Experience and subjective assessment are the only 
techniques that are being employed in risk safety management. 
2. “Make empirical formulas for safety risk management in building important.” 
3. Employers should emphasise occupational safety. 
4. This research is an interesting new study on safety risk assessment methods. 
5. “Safety risk assessment on construction projects is important.” 
6. “This project should not only consider the type of company that does construction 
work, but also define the root of safety risk.” 
7. This is good research because the safety risks on construction projects will be 
identified, assessed, and controlled in the construction industry. 
 
4.5 Summary of Findings 
Most of the findings of this survey are not surprising; however, some of them are important 
and need to be highlighted. A summary of the important findings from the questionnaires is 
provided below.   
The study found that, falls from height is considered to be a very important safety risk and 
that falling objects; equipment, machinery and tools; electricity; and collapse of site structure 
are considered to be more major safety risks than radiation hazards and noise and vibration. 
The opinions, suggestions and recommendations provided by the respondents to the 
questionnaire provided an excellent resource for the development of safety risk management 
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models to implement risk management strategies for building construction projects. The 
results of the questionnaire survey can be summarised as follows:   
 It has been shown that the identification of construction site hazards is one of the most 
important techniques used to assess existing safety risks. Safety risk analysis and 
management needs to be undertaken before a project is started and continue until the 
project is completed. Because of the dynamic nature of construction activities, the 
environment is continuously changing with fast-moving features, different stages, and 
a huge number of project participants, such as contractors, subcontractors, and clients. 
 Safety observations and inspections on the construction sites provide a means to 
identify what could cause harm. Walked inspections are designed to identify hazards 
and should be considered to improve working conditions and ensure that safety 
procedures are meeting the required standard or law, for example, a safety inspector 
shall have authority to inspect or record images or noises in the workplace that 
concern safety, occupational health and the workplace  
 An important influence in reducing the number of major incidents is an effective 
incident reporting process to look back at the less obvious hazards. Moreover, 
accident records need to be kept and investigations undertaken as soon as possible to 
control risk and prevent accidents recurring. This is not intended to lay blame but 
should focus on prevention. Near misses also need to be recorded and investigated to 
gain a full understanding of risk.  
 Seeking safety risk information from other sources such as occupational safety 
websites, including http://www.hse.gov.uk, https://www.osha.gov, 
http://www.mol.go.th, http://www.nsc.org, and http://www.shawpat.or.th can be 
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useful. Furthermore, documented safety standard operating procedures (SSOP) are 
necessary to ensure compliance with various legal requirements. This safety guidance 
is provided to ensure that safety at work is respected and managed for defining and 
documenting appropriate control methods to minimise the potential for accidents or 
injuries.   
 Risk assessments are central to managing occupational safety in construction projects. 
They should always be carried out by an expert who is experienced and competent to 
do so. Competence can be defined as a combination of knowledge, awareness, 
training, and experience. Moreover, risk assessments need be reviewed on a regular 
basis, weekly, monthly, yearly, depending on risk or if something changes, such as a 
change in production or process or a new worker. 
 Risk is defined as the likelihood that a hazard will cause harm, which is defined as 
Safety risk = Likelihood ×  Severity (Fung et al., 2010; Anbari et al., 2015). 
Numerical scores are given to the severity and likelihood of risks, and these scores are 
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CHAPTER FIVE                                                                                                   
CONCEPTS OF FRT, FUZZY AHP AND FUZZY TOPSIS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the concepts of the FRT, FAHP and FTOPSIS are outlined. Section 5.2 
describes the background of the FRT. The AHP, FAHP and MFAHP are described in section 
5.3. Section 5.4 describes the traditional TOPSIS and FTOPSIS methods. At the end of this 
chapter, conclusions are presented.  
 
5.2 Fuzzy Reasoning Technique (FRT) 
The FRT, based upon the concept of fuzzy logic and classical fuzzy sets, has been proposed 
by Zadeh in 1979 for processing uncertain information or imprecise knowledge in fuzzy 
expert systems as problems frequently involve a human factor, subjectivity. Conventional 
mathematics cannot solve problems including both qualitative and quantitative variables. 
With the FRT, the objective function of linguistic variables can be transformed into 
quantitative data. The process of transformation is illustrated in Figure 5-1.  
The Figure 5-1 indicates that the FRT increases the efficiency of the environment and the 
fuzziness of information in solving practical problems. Therefore, the application of the fuzzy 
reasoning method has been employed in a wide variety of subject areas, especially in risk 
assessment (Zeng et al., 2007; An et al., 2011, Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila (2011), Taylan et 
al., 2014).    
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Figure 5-1: Flowchart for the transformation process 
 
 
5.2.1 Introduction to Fuzzy Set Theory 
The concept of fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic was first introduced by Zadeh in 1965, when he 
published his work “Fuzzy Sets” to provide a model for dealing with the subjective judgement, 
uncertainty, and imprecision associated with data in risk assessment. The concept has been 
used in many areas related to both qualitative information and quantitative data in a uniform 
manner. Fuzzy logic theory is a branch of set theory that uses degree of membership in a set 
rather than strict true or false membership. Fuzzy logic is originally concerned with 
quantifying and reasoning with defined or vague linguistic terms, for example, good 
condition, likely, major risk. These terms are difficult to define meaningfully with a precise 









Transformation process  
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fuzzy logic system includes four stages; fuzzification, fuzzy rule base, fuzzy inference system, 








Figure 5-2: The basic fuzzy logic system 
5.2.2 Fuzzy Sets 
The idea of a fuzzy set is fundamental to mathematics (Zadeh, 1965). A fuzzy set is a set with 
vague, unsharp boundaries. It is known in terms of a membership function which is drawn 
from the universe discourse U for an interval of [0, 1]. A traditional function is a case of a 
membership function and a regular set (a crisp set) is a special case of a fuzzy set. However, 
the idea of a fuzzy set is a gradual interval with fixed limits concept used in traditional set 
theory. Fuzzy logic is an alternative to the classic set where every proposition must be either 
“False” (0) or “True” (1). Figure 5-3 shows the difference between a fuzzy set and a classic 
set. Point a in Figure 5-3, the crisp set A is clearly a member; point b is unambiguously not a 
member of set A. Conversely, point a in fuzzy set B is clearly a full member. Nevertheless, 
the boundary region of fuzzy point b is clearly not a member. However, point c in fuzzy set B 
is vague. Thus, the membership function in a fuzzy set is a number between 0 and 1.   
Fuzzification Crisp x in U 
 Fuzzy Inference Fuzzy Rule Base 
Fuzzy set in U 
Defuzzification 
Fuzzy set in V 
Crisp y in V 
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Figure 5-3: The crisp set boundary and fuzzy set boundary (reproduced from Ross, 2009) 
 
 Definition: (Intersection) The membership function µC(x) of set C = A  B is defined 
as µC(x) = min {µA(x), µB(x)}, x  X. 
 Definition:  (Union) The membership function µC(x) of C = A  B is defined as                           
µC(x) = max {µA(x), µB(x)}, x  X. 
 Definition: (Complement) The membership function of the complement of fuzzy set 
A, µA’(x) is defined as µA’(x) = [1 - µA(x)], x  X. 
 
5.2.3 Membership Function (MFf) 
The membership function is considered as the most important component of the fuzzy 
method. It can handle imprecision, and ambiguity in quantitative data and qualitative 
information in a uniform manner (Zeng et al., 2007). Various types of MFf can be 
manipulated, such as trapezoidal membership functions, triangular membership functions, 
generalised bell-shaped functions, and Gaussian functions. However, trapezoidal and 
triangular membership functions are the simplest types and also have been used frequently in 
fuzzy set applications. 
(A) (B) 
Crisp Set Fuzzy Set 
B 
CHAPTER FIVE                                                              CONCEPTS OF FRT, FUZZY AHP AND FUZZY TOPSIS 
 
74 
   
A triangular MFf is a function of µA(x) that depends on the scalar parameter a as a lower 
limit, c as an upper limit, and a< b<c  Figure 5-4 presents the diagram and formula of a 























Figure 5-4: Illustration of triangular membership function (MFf) 
A trapezoidal MFf is employed to convert the judgement of an expert into a universal format 
for the composition of group preferences as shown in Figure 5-5. It can be defined as X= (a, 
b, c, d), where its membership function indicates the degree of preference that is defined as 
 


























)(                                                    Eq. 5-2 
where A set of real numbers (a, b, c, d) with the relationship’s satisfaction a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ d 
determines the x coordination of the four points of a trapezoidal MFf.  
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Triangular membership function 
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Figure 5-5: Illustration of trapezoidal and triangular MFf                                                                         
(reproduced from Leśniak and Plebankiewicz, 2013) 
  
5.2.4 Fuzzification 
The fuzzification process is the process of changing a real scalar value into a fuzzy set of 
values based on its MFf. The fuzzification process allows the input into the system to be 
expressed in linguistic terms (Zeng et al., 2007, Idrus et al., 2011). For example, the freezing 
point of water is 32 F°. It is a member of the freezing water set with a degree of membership 
of 0.7. However, it is also a member of the cool water set with a degree of 0.3, as shown in 
Figure 5-6 
)(xA  
    
 
           
    
Figure 5-6: Fuzzy sets of the freezing point of water is 32 F°                                                          
(reproduced from Deng and Nickerson, 2013) 
Trapezoidal membership functions 
Triangular membership function 
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5.2.5 Fuzzy Rule Base 
A rule-based system is a conditional statement written in the If A then B form, where A, and B 
are linguistic variables. A is called the antecedent and B fuzzy is the consequent of the rule 
(Idrus et al., 2011). The development of the fuzzy rule base may be acquired based on 
historical data on the information in the previous accidents and incidents database system, 
concept mapping, and expert judgement (An et al., 2011). For many practical situations, 
several approaches can be used to generate a body of information that may also be helpful in 
developing fuzzy linguistic variables. Fuzzy rules provide a natural platform for abstracting 
information based on domain human expert knowledge and engineering judgement. 
Therefore, experts often consider fuzzy rules to be a suitable way to express their knowledge 
of a situation.  
:Ri   IF 1x  is 1A  and 2x  is 2A  and… nx is nA , THEN y is B                                         Eq. 5-3 
In the above equation x1, x2,….,xn represent the input variables to the rule, y is the output 
variable, and A1, A2,…, An are fuzzy sets.   
For example, the Ri Rule can be explained as: 
Ri: IF Probability of occurrence is Very likely and Severity of consequence is Major and 
Probability of consequence is Highly likely THEN Risk level is Unacceptable 
 
5.2.6 Fuzzy Inference 
Fuzzy inference is the process of transforming given input values into a determined output 
using fuzzy logic (Beriha et al., 2012). Mamdani’s fuzzy inference method is the most 
commonly used fuzzy methodology. Consider the following rules: 
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Rule#1: If x is X3 and y is Y1, then z is Z1 
Rule#2: If x is X2 and y is Y2, then z is Z2 
Rule#3: If x is X1, then z is Z3 
For example,  
Rule #1: If site safety is adequate and the number of safety officers is small, then safety risk is low 
Rule #2: If site safety is marginal and the number of safety officers is large, then safety risk is acceptable 
Rule #3: If site safety is inadequate, then safety risk is high  
where x, y and z are site safety, the number of safety officers and safety risk of the linguistic 
variables; X1, X2 and X3 are inadequate, marginal and adequate of the linguistic values; Y1 













Figure 5-7: The basic structure of Mamdani’s fuzzy inference method                                            
(reproduced from MathWorks, 2015) 
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5.2.7 Defuzzification 
After the aggregation step, the final result is defuzzified into a crisp number that drives the 
system. During the defuzzification, a fuzzy centroid method or centre of gravity is the most 
prevalent and used to defuzzify the aggregated result into a crisp output as shown in Figure 5-













*                                                                                                          Eq. 5-4 







Figure 5-8: The fuzzy centroid method (reproduced from Zeng et al., 2005) 
 
5.3 Modified Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (MFAHP) 
The MFAHP has been developed based on the traditional AHP. This section provides the 
details of the development. 
 
5.3.1 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
 
The AHP, which was developed by Saaty in 1980, is a quantitative technique based on 
mathematics to solve many complicated decision-making problems using a hierarchical 
structure (Taylan et al., 2014). Nowadays, it is used around the world in a wide variety of 
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way to solve MCDM problems, such as, business, industry, and health and safety, which 
helps in setting their priorities (Badri et al., 2012; Aminbakhsh et al., 2013). The AHP has 
also been used for identifying and weighting in the field of project risk assessment (Zeng et 
al., 2007, An et al., 2011; Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila, 2011).  This structured technique 
works by minimising complex evaluation criteria into a series of one-to-one pairwise 
comparisons (Taylan et al., 2014).  
The steps of the traditional AHP technique are described briefly below (Bhushan and Rai, 
2007): 
1. The problem is decomposed into its constituent parts. 
2. A hierarchy is a hierarchical system of ranking and organising, for example, all 





Figure 5-9: Example of the hierarchical structure used for construction risk projects 
 
 
3. Data are collected from experts, and is required to compare with questions such as 
‘How strongly important does S1 dominate S2?’ on a ratio scale between 1 (equally 
important) and 9 (absolutely important) to the more important criterion, as shown in 
Figure 5-10 
4. The pairwise comparisons of various criteria are generated into a square matrix. 
5. The principal eigenvalue is used to find the relative weights of the elements. 
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Figure 5-10: Example of the AHP questions 
 
Regardless of the method used to collect the data from the experts in the traditional AHP 
technique sometimes experts are unable to compare two factors or are unable to give the 
exact crisp numbers when conducting the pairwise comparisons as they are not confident of 
the degree of importance (Janackovic et al., 2013; Abdullah and Zulkifli, 2015; An et al., 
2016). For example, expert#1 knows that criterion S1 is more strongly important than 
criterion S2 due to a lack of certainty regarding information and difficulty in capturing 
uncertain and imprecise. The experts probably give a range of numbers between 6 and 8 to 
describe these criteria.  
Therefore, the traditional AHP method seems inadequate to capture experts’ judgements 
clearly.  To deal with problems relating to subjective judgement, uncertainty and imprecision 
associated with data in safety risk assessment the FAHP, which is described in Section 5.3.2, 
can handle the uncertainty and ambiguity associated with linguistic terms in a uniform 
manner. 
 
5.3.2 Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) 
The FAHP technique, which first appeared in Laarhoven and Pedrycz in 1983, uses triangular 
membership functions which are compared with fuzzy ratios instead of crisp data as in 
Hazard group 1 (S1) Hazard group 2 (S2) 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Hazard group 2 (S2) Hazard group 3 (S3) 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Saaty’s research. Buckley (1985) determined the fuzzy priorities of comparison ratios of 
fuzzy trapezoidal membership functions. This reduces the subjectivity of human judgement 
by using more uniform expressions, provides a more flexible approach to the pairwise 
comparison process by playing a key role in handling this issue, and allows the experts to 
cope with imprecise, ambiguous data in the decision process. Consequently, the linguistic 
terms have been used to help the experts to reach a conclusion. Chang (1996) developed a 
new method for engaging group decisions using the FAHP technique based on triangular 
fuzzy numbers, as shown in Figure 5-11. Furthermore, many AHP methods developed by 










Figure 5-11: Linguistic variables of triangular fuzzy numbers                                                      
(reproduced from Ibadov et al., 2013) 
 
Nevertheless, the field of project risk evaluation often involves a large number of pairwise 
comparison metrics in the decision process. Basically, when applying FAHP, the pairwise 
comparison can be obtained as n (n-1)/2 comparisons (Chen et al., 2011). The width of 
pairwise comparison metrics increases as the number of pairwise comparison metrics 
increases. Consequently, the judgements are based on the expert’s experience and 



















2 4 6 8 
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correctly justified in a precise way. Furthermore, inconsistent conclusions do not provide the 
lack of confidence to make a decision. The MFAHP is described in Section 5.3.3.  
 
5.3.3 Modified Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (MFAHP) 
The MFAHP technique was used to synthesise the opinions of experts to identify the fuzzy 
weights of each criterion. It was developed for creating a consistent pairwise comparison 
matrix from a set of n-1 judgements that generates a huge requirement for expert judgement 
and reduces the consistency of results. It should be suitable technique for tackling practical 
MCDM problems and is more appropriate and effective than FAHP in real practice when 
there are a huge number of comparisons. (An et al., 2016).  
It should be noted that in this thesis, the MFAHP method is employed for calculating the 
favourable weight of fuzzy linguistic variables and fed into FTOPSIS to construct the safety 
risk management model, which will be outlined in Chapter 6.  
 
The steps of the MFAHP procedure to compute the fuzzy weights are as follows: 
1. Construct a pairwise comparison matrix from a panel of experts. The judgements 
of pairwise comparison are synthesised regarding the degree of importance by 
linguistic variables. A corresponding trapezoidal MFf is employed to transfer 
expert knowledge and engineering judgement into a comparison matrix (An et al., 
2011; An et al., 2016). The qualitative descriptors and their corresponding 
trapezoidal MFf numbers are described as shown in Table 5-1. 
 
2. Compare risk hazard contributors and convert the pairwise comparison into fuzzy 
numbers. A total of N = (n-1) paired should be compared. For instance, for two 
risk hazards FH (Falls from height) and FO (Falling objects), if FH is more 
CHAPTER FIVE                                                              CONCEPTS OF FRT, FUZZY AHP AND FUZZY TOPSIS 
 
83 
   
absolutely important than FO, a trapezoidal fuzzy number of (8, 9, 9, 9) is 
assigned to FH, as shown in Table 5-1.  
 
 
Table 5-1: Scale for relative importance used in the pairwise comparison matrix 
 
3. Aggregate fuzzy numbers and construct the fuzzy pairwise synthesised matrix. 
The aggregated fuzzy numbers are employed to construct the pairwise synthesised 
matrix, as shown in Equation 5-5. 
                      𝑅1         𝑅2 …      𝑅𝑛 



















]                     Eq. 5-5 
                                     i = 1, 2, … m; j = 1, 2, …,n 
      Xij = {ai,j, bi,j, ci,j, di,j}, Xji = {1/di,j, 1/ci,j, 1/bi,j, 1/ai,j} 
Qualitative descriptors Membership function 
Equally important (EI) (1,1,1,2) 
Between equally important and weakly important (BE) (1,2,2,3) 
Weakly important (WI) (2,3,3,4) 
Between weakly important and strongly important (BW) (3,4,4,5) 
Strongly important (SI) (4,5,5,6) 
Between strongly important and very strongly important (BS) (5,6,6,7) 
Very strongly important (VS) (6,7,7,8) 
Between very strongly important and absolutely important (BV) (7,8,8,9) 
Absolutely important (AI) (8,9,9,9) 
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 where Xij indicates the aggregated trapezoidal fuzzy number representing the quantified 
judgement on Ri compared to Rj. 
 
According to their definition, “A reciprocal multiplicative preference relation M = (mi,j) is 
consistent if and only if mi,j×mj,k = mi,k, i, j, k ϵ {1,2,…,n} and i ≤ j ≤ k ”  and “For a 
reciprocal multiplicative preference relation M = (mi,j) i ≤ j ≤ k, the following statements are 
equivalent” (An et al., 2011; An et al., 2016). Therefore:  
 
mi,j× mj,k = mi,k ,                        i ≤ j ≤ k                       Eq. 5-6 
mi,j= mi,i+1 × mi+1,i+2  ×…, mj-1,j,  i < j                       Eq. 5-7 
 
For example, m4,13 = {a4,13, b4,13, c4,13, d4,13}   and m13,4 = 1/ m4,13 = {1/d4,13, 1/c4,13, 1/b4,13, 1/a4,13} 
can be obtained as 
a4,13 =  a4,5× a5,6 × a6,7 × a7,8 × a8,9 × a9,10 × a10,11 × a11,12 × a12,13  
b4,13 =  b4,5× b5,6 × b6,7 × b7,8 × b8,9 × b9,10 × b10,11 × b11,12 × b12,13  
c4,13 =  c4,5× c5,6 × c6,7 × c7,8 × c8,9 × c9,10 × c10,11 × c11,12 × c12,13  
d4,13 =  d4,5× d5,6 × d6,7 × d7,8 × d8,9 × d9,10 × d10,11 × d11,12 × d12,13  
 
It should be noted that a consistent multiplicative preference method can be structured from a 
set of n-1 preference data within the interval [1/v, v] (v>0). As a multiplicative preference 
relation decision matrix is not in the interval [1/9, 9], by taking logarithms, the above 










,                               Eq. 5-8 
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According to their definition, “A fuzzy matrix M = (mi,j) is reciprocal if and only if mi,j = 1/ mj,i” 
and “A fuzzy matrix M = (mi,j) is consistent if and only if mi,j × mj,k = mi,k ” (An et al., 2016).  
4. Calculate fuzzy weight. The fuzzy weight can be determined by using the 
geometric mean method (Chen, 2013; An et al., 2016) and is defined as 
 






































                                    Eq. 5-9 
 

































                                     Eq. 5-10 
where Wi indicates the fuzzy weight of events 
 
5. Compute the fuzzy weights of the alternatives. According to Equations (5-9) and 
(5-10), the fuzzy weight numbers are obtained using from the geometric mean 
method. Furthermore, the total weight factors (WF) can be calculated by using 
Equation (5-12)  
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                Wi =   6
)(2 dicibiai 









                       Eq.5-12 
5.4 Fuzzy Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution 
(FTOPSIS) 
FTOPSIS was developed based on traditional TOPSIS. This section outlines the development 
of TOPSIS. 
5.4.1 Traditional TOPSIS 
The TOPSIS method was originally suggested by Hwang et al. (1981) for MCDM problems 
(Yoon and Hwang et al., 1980; KarimiAzari et al., 2011; Tamosaitiene et al., 2013; Jato-
Espino et al., 2014). This technique is a very helpful concept for coping with situations which 
are too complex to be calculated (Zavadskas et al., 2010). The main idea of this technique is 
regarding the chosen alternative that should have the shortest and farthest distances from the 
positive ideal and negative ideal solutions respectively (Tan et al, 2010; Chen, 2013). A wide 
variety of studies on TOPSIS methods can be found in Chapter 2. However, the traditional 
formulation of the TOPSIS method, human judgements in the decision-making process, is 
represented with crisp numbers, non-obtainable and incomplete information. The FTOPSIS 
will be outlined in the following section.   
5.4.2 Fuzzy Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (FTOPSIS) 
The FTOPSIS method is an MCDM method which has been employed to solve the problems 
under the fuzzy environment. It can be used to address both quantitative and qualitative risk 
data and information in the classic TOPSIS. 
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The procedure of FTOPSIS is similar to the classic one and can be represented in a chain of 
calculation steps (Zavadskas et al., 2010; Tamosaitiene et al., 2013; Taylan et al., 2014): 
1. Construct the normalised fuzzy decision matrix, after obtaining the initial decision 
matrix. A fuzzy MCDM can be determined in the matrix format as (Taylan et al., 
2014): 
𝐶1 𝐶2 … 𝐶𝑛 



















]                          Eq. 5-13 
                             i = 1, 2, … m; j = 1, 2, …,n 
The element xij of the matrix indicates the rating of performance of the ith alternative project. 
The normalised fuzzy numbers decision matrix was calculated by (Tan et al., 2010; Taylan et 
al., 2014) 











        i = 1, 2, … m; j = 1, 2, …,n                               Eq. 5-14 
2. Determination of the weighted and normalised matrix of decision. The weighted and 
normalised value vij  is determined as follows: 
 
vij = Rij × WFj           i =1, 2,..., m ; j = 1, 2, ..., n                            Eq. 5-15 
               where WFj is the weight of the jth attribute. 
 
3. Obtain the fuzzy positive ideal solution (A+) and the fuzzy negative ideal solution (A-) 
(Tan et al., 2010; KarimiAzari et al., 2011; Chen, 2013; Taylan et al., 2014)   
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       A+ = (v1+max, v2+max, v3+max,…, vn+max)                                         Eq. 5-16
  A- = (v1- min, v2- min, v3- min,…, vn- min)                                         Eq. 5-17 
                     where vj+ = max {vij} i =1, 2,..., m ; j = 1, 2, ..., n                 
                     where vj- = min {vij}  i =1, 2,..., m ; j = 1, 2, ..., n 
 
4. Compute the separation process by the m-dimensional Euclidean distance. The 
separation process of each option from the fuzzy positive ideal solution and the fuzzy 
negative ideal solution, respectively was calculated (Zavadskas et al., 2010) as  
 
















2)(   i = 1, 2, … m                            Eq. 5-19 
5. Compute the fuzzy closeness coefficient to the ideal solution. The fuzzy closeness 
coefficient of each alternative is calculated by (Tan et al., 2010; KarimiAzari et al., 
2011)  






dCC i*        i = 1, 2, … m                         Eq. 5-20 
5.5 Summary 
FRT, AHP, FAHP, MFAHP, TOPSIS and FTOPSIS have been reviewed in this chapter. The 
FRT based on the conceptual basis of fuzzy logic and the classical fuzzy set containing the 
membership function, fuzzification process, fuzzy inference and defuzzification process are 
outlined. It provides a suitable method to handle imprecision and ambiguity in qualitative 
data and information in a uniform manner. Furthermore, the AHP, FAHP and MFAHP 
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employed to create appropriate weightings of the criteria have been presented. The AHP has 
a particular application in the group decision-making method which is usually used in many 
fields around the world, especially in making comparisons. The MFAHP was introduced to 
deal with a huge amount of judgemental information, as it reduces the uncertainty associated 
with experts’ judgements. Moreover, the overall approach of FTOPSIS based on the 
traditional TOPSIS was introduced, in which a final ranking for evaluating the importance of 
safety risks can be obtained for building construction projects. The developed construction 
safety risk management model will be presented in Chapter 6. 





CHAPTER SIX                                                                                                   
DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the developed safety risk management model. Section 6.2 introduces a 
third safety risk assessment parameter, probability of consequence. The proposed 
construction safety risk management model, which includes the steps of safety hazard 
identification and risk data collection, safety risk criteria calculation, safety risk estimation, 
safety risk ranking, safety risk control and mitigation and safety risk monitoring, is discussed 
in section 6.3. Section 6.4 presents a case example showing safety risk management in 
building construction projects. At the end of this chapter, some features of the developed 
safety risk management model are discussed. This chapter incorporates content from a 
conference publication jointly by the author (Sansakorn and An, 2015).  
  
6.2 Suggestion for the Third Parameter (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
Two fundamental safety risk parameters, probability of occurrence (PO) and severity of 
consequence (SC), are commonly used to assess risk magnitude (RM) in safety management 
of a construction project. PO represents the likelihood that an event will happen. SC defines 
the number of minor injuries, major injuries and fatalities resulting from the occurrence of a 
specific event. The magnitude of a specific risk also depends highly upon the probability that 
the accident will occur. These two parameters do not take into account the probability of the 
consequence caused in the consideration of the project safety risk assessment process to 
obtain accurate and the reliable results. Therefore, a third parameter, probability of 
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consequence (PC), is proposed. PC indicates the likelihood of the occurrence of an accident if 
an event becomes a reality to assess such a safety risk associated with the construction 
project’s effectiveness and efficiency. 
  
6.3 Proposed Construction Safety Risk Management Model (Sansakorn and An, 
2015) 
The architecture of the proposed construction safety risk management model is shown in 
Figure 6-1, which includes the development of the qualitative descriptors representing risk 
inputs, i.e. probability of occurrence (PO), severity of consequence (SC), and probability of 
consequence (PC), and risk outputs, i.e. risk magnitude (RM). The proposed model consists 
of six steps: risk data collection and hazard identification, risk criteria calculation, risk 
estimation, risk ranking, risk control and mitigation, and risk monitoring. The details of the 
proposed safety risk management model are described in the following sections. 
 
6.3.1 Step 1: Risk Data Information Collection and Hazard Identification  
6.3.1.1 Establishing a safety risk management team (Sansakorn and An, 2015)                                                                      
. 
To identify safety hazards associated with a construction project, a safety risk management 
team composed of people from different disciplines/backgrounds needs to be established. The 
members of a safety risk management team must be carefully selected. The selected experts 
should have essential experience and a high degree of knowledge of the construction 
activities (Zeng et al., 2007). The safety risk management team should include experts, for 
example, site construction managers, project managers, site engineers, and safety officers (An 
et al., 2011). The safety risk management team will undertake the review of safety hazard 
identification and risk data. 
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Fig. 1 Construction safety risk management modeling 
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6.3.1.2 Allocation of experts’ contribution factors 
A contribution factor is allocated to each member of the safety risk management team based 
on their individual skills, knowledge, experience, and expertise. Scores are employed to 
compute the contribution factors. All the weight factors must add up to 1 (Cn = 
E1+E2+E3+…+En = 1), where En is assigned as a contribution factor of each expert and 
assumes that there are n experts in the safety risk management team. When the circumstances 
have changed, however, it is necessary to review the contribution factors.  
 
6.3.1.3 Problem definition (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
Safety risk management starts with the problem definition, which involves identifying the 
specific safety requirements at different levels of a project, e.g. at the project level, sub-
project levels, and element levels of a project. The requirements may include safety 
regulations and safety rules developed by the HSE and the company’s policy. For example, a 
construction building project can be divided into specific activities in the construction process, 
for which risk hazard identification can be carried out based on the activities identified, as 
shown in Figure 6-2. Level 1 shows that the construction building project can be categorised 
into M sub-projects based on the types of safety risks, e.g. sub-project 1, sub-project 2… and 
sub-project M at level 2. Each sub-project can be broken down into activities at level 3. At 
level 4, each activity can also be broken down into all possible safety risk hazards, for 
example, risk hazard 1 is falls from height, risk hazard 2 is falling objects, risk hazard 3 is 
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Figure 6-2: The hierarchical structure of problem definition for construction risk projects 
 
6.3.1.4 Data and information collection (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
Once the problem definition is completed, the safety risk assessment moves from the problem 
definition to the data collection. The data can be collected from previous similar projects, 
reports and databases. In many cases, however, if the statistical record does not exist, expert 
judgement needs to be applied. Moreover, the data collection will be expressed as qualitative 
descriptors and associated with parameters, i.e. PO, SC and PC. 
 
6.3.1.5 Safety hazard identification (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
All the potential safety hazards associated with a building construction project need to be 
identified and classified into different categories at different levels. The process of hazard 
identification must involve an investigation into all the potential sources of project 
construction risk and their consequences. Many of the tools and techniques for hazard 
identification, including checklists, ‘what if?’ analysis, the brainstorming approach, FMEA, 
HAZOP study, concept hazard analysis (CHA), preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), job 
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2010; An et al., 2011; Pinto et al., 2011; Liu and Tsai, 2012), are widely used in the 
construction industry, and they can be applied to identify the hazards of a project.   The 
information gained from hazard identification will be used in the risk analysis. 
Checklists are utilised to identify, review, and correct any conditions or tasks, potential 
hazards that may arise from direct or indirect exposure to a construction project or are lists of 
known hazards or hazard causes that have been derived from past experience. This technique 
is a simplistic tool that can be employed by inexperienced practitioners (Glossop et al., 2000; 
Liu and Tsai, 2012) and can be carried out by a small, multidisciplinary group composed of 
experienced people. Therefore, checklists are a valuable hazard identification tool; however, 
it is not easy to develop a well-designed checklist (Pinto et al., 2011). In other operating 
conditions, existing checklists may not be used as the sole tool in the hazard identification 
process, since they may not cover all types of hazard, particularly facility-specific hazards. 
‘What if?’ analysis is one of the most commonly used techniques for identifying potential 
hazards. It is a structured brainstorming approach for determining specific what-if questions 
about the construction process being reviewed. This method is conducted by a facilitator who 
designates the construction process scope. This technique is easy to use and has been 
effectively applied to various projects (Glossop et al., 2000).  
Brainstorming, the most common approach used in risk identification (Lyons and Skitmore, 
2004), is an unrestricted but facilitated discussion within a group of experts. A facilitator 
prepares prompts or issues ahead of the group session and then encourages imaginative 
thinking and discussion among group members during the session. This technique is 
complementary to systematic functional hazard identification (An et al., 2011). The 
brainstorming method can reveal hazards not identified in the systematic approach.  
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 PHA is a qualitative technique which is used to identify all potential hazards and accidental 
events that may lead to an accident (Pinto et al., 2011; Liu and Tsai, 2012). This technique is 
used as an early means of hazard identification during the design and development of the 
process. It is often used to follow-up on the hazards that have been identified during CHA 
(Glossop et al., 2000). In fact, PHA consists of drawing a table by matching a danger with 
one or more unwanted events and potential causes at the system and sub-system level. The 
last column will list the requirements in respect of each of the potential causes identified. An 
example of a PHA is shown in Table 6-1.  
Table 6-1: An example of PHA (Source: Shewring, 2011) 










failure to follow 
road safety and 
vehicle regulation. 
 
Injury due to crash 
 
Speed limit on roads 
reduced from 40 kph 
to 15 kph 
  2. Vehicle striking 
132 kV electric lines 
Boom left up on 
crane while moving 
beneath. 
 Electrocution Using resistant 
equipment designed to 
reduce the possibility of 
direct contact with the 
overhead power line 
 
FMEA is used to identify potential hazards associated with a process by investigating the 
failure modes for each process item. This technique has difficulty in identifying hazards that 
require the failure of more than one process item due to the complex interaction of the 
failures (Glossop et al., 2000). An example of FMEA is shown in Table 6-2 (Nielsen, 2002). 
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Seen as dripping or water flow 
in the building during and after 
rain. Finding location of damage 
can be very difficult 
 
No normal traffic on the 
roofing material. Remove 
all waste material from 





The roof leaks shortly after 
construction. Seen as dripping or 
water flow in the building during 
and after rain. Finding the 
location of damage can be very 
difficult. 
 
Control system for 
workmanship. The contactor 




The material cracks from frost 
damage or temperature variation.  
Use materials tested for 
aging in a climate like the 
one on site. Inspect roof and 
look for cracks or other 
damage.  
 
JHA is a systematic way to identify hazards associated with a specific task or operation. It is 
useful for communicating and controlling known hazards in the workplace. Also called job 
safety analysis, this technique is a way for the employers and employees to document hazards 
and note the steps necessary to reduce or eliminate the risk when performing a particular task 
(Rozenfeld et. al., 2010). An example of JHA is shown in Table 6-3 (Reese and Eidson, 
2006). 
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Table 6-3: An example of a JHA: replacing tyre on pickup truck (Source: Reese and Eidson, 
2006) 
 






1.1 Struck by a pickup truck 
1.2 Slip and fall to same level 
1.3 Exposure to cold, frostbite 
1.4 Overexertion removing 
spare tyre from carrier 
 
1.1 Engine must be switched off 
1.2 Observe area. Remove tripping or 
stumbling hazards or move vehicle 
to better location 
1.3 Wear PPE such as gloves and 
appropriate clothing 
1.4 Follow safety manual 
2) Raise truck 2.1 Struck by a pickup truck 
 
2.2 Struck by jack 
2.3 Contact with hot exhaust 
 
2.4 Overexertion using jack 
2.1 Place truck in park and engage 
parking brake. Raise truck using jack 
until flat tyre is totally off the ground 
2.2 Follow jacking procedure carefully 
2.3 Exhaust system may be very hot 
(do not touch) 
2.4 Use jack as described in safety 
manual 
3) Change tyre 3.1 Caught between tyre and 
ground 
3.2 Overexertion lifting tyre 
off 
3.3 Contact with hot hub wheel 
3.1 Check jack stability before any 
work is performed on the raised truck 
3.2 Use proper lifting techniques 
 
3.3 Wear gloves when removing tyre 
A HAZOP study is a systematic and structured approach using parameter and deviation 
guidewords that is very useful in identifying hazards for a specific design phase. The 
technique relies on a very detailed system description being available and usually involves 
breaking down the system into well-defined sub-systems and functional or process flows 
between sub-systems. Each element of the system is then subjected to discussion within a 
multidisciplinary group of experts against the various combinations of the guidewords and 
deviations (Glossop et al., 2000). In a complex construction project such as a hospital, it may 
be helpful for design engineers (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005). An example of HAZOP is 
shown in Table 6-4.  
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Table 6-4: An example of a HAZOP study (Source: García-Serna, 2007) 
 
















1.1. Pressure in the line increases up 
to control valve 
 
2.1. More vent gas to scrubber. 
Scrubber pressure increases. 
Scrubber cannot clear all the vented 
gas. Gases containing methyl 
isocyanate (MIC) are vented into the 
atmosphere. Gases containing MIC 
are vented into the flare system 
 
1.1.1. Lines are designed to 
support that pressure. No 
consequences for safety 
2.1.1. Pressure safety valves 
connected to the flare 
2.1.2. Bypass line direct to 
the flare. Rupture disk 
 
Less Flow 1. Nitrogen 
valve closes 
1.1. Low pressure in vessel during 
emptying 
1.1.1. Possibility of backward 
pressurisation through the 
scrubber line 
1.1.1.1. Install a low-
pressure interlock that 
stops the feed pump. 
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CHA consists of a literature review of previous incidents, enabling identification of areas of 
the process of specific concern. It is performed during the concept and early design stages 
and requires the process flow diagram, with any main add-on safety systems (Glossop et al., 
2000). An example of CHA is shown in Table 6-5 (Rasmussen and Whetton, 1997). 
 
Table 6-5: An example of CHA (Source: Rasmussen and Whetton, 1997) 





















materials to flare, 
where they are 
burned 
 





of energy, bright 
lights at night, etc. 
 





Consider gas detectors 
and water sprays at 










Failure to ensure 
safe disposal of 
effluent which may 
be toxic 
Failure to ensure 
safe disposal of 
liquid draining 








methane will be 
liberated into the 
sewers, where it 
may be transported 
considerable 
distances before 
reaching a source 
of ignition 
Consider use of off-
spec gas as fuel 
 
Install gas detectors 
and forced ventilation 
system with safe 
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6.3.2 Step 2: Risk Criteria Calculation (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
This step is to calculate the risk criteria, which consists of eight principal components: 
determining the risk criteria, determining fuzzy membership functions, inputting PO, SC and 
PC, converting input into standardised trapezoidal fuzzy number, fuzzy aggregation, fuzzy 
inference, fuzzy rule base, and defuzzification as described below. 
 
6.3.2.1 Determining the risk criteria (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
The three fundamental risk parameters are used to assess the risk magnitude of the safety 
construction industry, i.e., PO, SC and PC. The safety risk management team needs to discuss 
and select a set of criteria for safety risk assessment. Risk criteria are standards, which define 
the scope of the risk parameters, PO, SC, and PC. 
PO refers to the number of times an event occurs or the failure frequencies in a certain time 
period, which may estimate PO as “Very unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Fairly unlikely”, “Likely”, 
and “Very likely”, as shown in Table 6-6. 
 
Table 6-6: Definitions of qualitative descriptors of PO 
 






Failure is unlikely but possible during lifetime 
Likely to happen once during lifetime 
Between unlikely and likely 
Occasional failure 






Source: Sansakorn and An, 2015 
SC refers to the number of minor injuries, major injuries and fatalities resulting from the 
occurrence of a specific event. Five linguistic variables, “Negligible”, “Minor”, “Moderate”, 
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“Major”, and “Catastrophic”, are used to describe consequence severity to estimate SC, as 
shown in Table 6-7. 
Table 6-7: Definitions of qualitative descriptors of SC 
 








Minor injuries and/or < 3 days off work 
Multiple injuries and/or between 3 days and 1 month off 
work 
Severe injuries and/or >1 month off work  







Source: Sansakorn and An, 2015 
PC is a new parameter which refers to the occurrence likelihood of the accident if an event 
becomes a reality. Six linguistic variables are used in this research to describe PC, “Highly 
unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Reasonably unlikely”, “Likely”, “Reasonably likely”, and “Highly 
likely”, as shown in Table 6-8.   
 
Table 6-8: Definitions of qualitative descriptors of PC 
 











The probability of accident occurrence is highly unlikely 
 
The probability of accident occurrence is unlikely but the 
failure event could occur  
The probability of accident occurrence is between 
unlikely and likely 
The probability of accident occurrence is likely 
The probability of accident occurrence is between likely 
and highly likely 
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The five levels of RM in terms of linguistic variables are defined as “Low”, “Acceptable”, 
“Average”, “High”, and “Unacceptable”. Their definitions are generally similar to those in 
the occupational health and safety management regulations published by the HSE as shown 
in Table 6-9. 
Table 6-9: Definitions of qualitative descriptors of RM 
 







Risk is low or insignificant and can be readily controlled 
Risk is acceptable 
Risk is medium 
Risk is high; however, risk control should be undertaken 
if it is reasonably practicable to so 
Risk is unacceptable; proper action must be taken to 







Source: Sansakorn and An, 2015 
6.3.2.2 Determine fuzzy membership functions (MFf) (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
In the literature, linguistic variables are described by different types of fuzzy membership 
functions according to the situation in the interested area, including triangular, trapezoidal, 
generalised bell- shaped, and S-shaped functions (Zeng et al., 2007). However, trapezoidal 
and triangular membership functions are the most frequently used in construction project risk 
assessment. The selection of the form of MFf by the safety risk management team is 
generated by the usefulness of the linguistic groups identified in the knowledge acquisition 
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Figure 6-3: Fuzzy probability of occurrence definition 
 
            
            
    
 
 







Figure 6-5: Fuzzy probability of consequence definition 
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Figure 6-6: Fuzzy risk magnitude definition 
6.3.2.3 Input PO, SC and PC (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
Input data can usually be derived from several sources, for example historical data, experts’ 
judgements, and experiences. The data format of the inputs can be a range of numbers, e.g. (3, 
5), a linguistic term, e.g. “Unlikely”, a numerical value, e.g. “5”, triangular fuzzy numbers, 
e.g. (1, 2, 3), or trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, e.g. (1, 2, 3, 4) (see Table 6-10). 
 
Table 6-10: Experts’ judgement and corresponding standard trapezoidal fuzzy number (STFN) 
 





A numerical value 
A range of numbers 
A linguistic term #1 
A linguistic term #2 
A triangular fuzzy number 
 
A trapezoidal fuzzy 
number 
 ….is a 
….is between a and b 
….is High  
….is about c 
….is between a and c 
and most likely to be b 
….is between a and d 
and most likely to be b 





(a, b , c) 
 
















             
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
             
0 1 2 3 4 5 
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6.3.2.4 Convert input into Standardised trapezoidal fuzzy number (STFN) (Sansakorn and An, 
2015) 
A triangular membership function is a function of µA(x) that depends on the scalar parameter 
a as a lower limit, d as an upper limit, and a< b< c< d  Figure 6-7 presents the diagram and 







Figure 6-7: Illustration of trapezoidal member functions (MFf)  
 
The STFN is employed to convert the judgement of experts into a universal format for the 
composition of group preferences. An STFN can be defined as X= (a, b, c, d), with its 
membership function indicating the degree of preference (Zeng et al., 2007; An et al., 2011), 
which is defined as 
                  mA (x) =
0, x £ a
(x - a) / (b - a), x Î (a, b)
1, x Î (b,c)
(d - x) / d - c), x Î (c, d)









                                Eq. 6-1 
where A set of real numbers (a, b, c, d) with the relationship’s satisfaction a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ d 
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6.3.2.5 Aggregated STFN of PO, PC and SC (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
The fuzzy aggregation of STFN scores can be carried out by applying the fuzzy weighted 
trapezoidal averaging operator, which is defined by  
Fuzzy aggregated score (Fagg) = STFN1i × c1+STFN2i × c2…+STFNni × cn                   Eq. 6-2
       
where Fagg is the fuzzy aggregated score, STFN1i, STFN2i,…, STFNni are the STFN scores of 
parameter i measured by experts respectively, and cn  are contribution factors allocated to 
experts, for example,  c1 assigned to Expert1 , and c1+c2 +…, cn = 1. 
It should be noted that if some experts provide zero scales (An et al., 2011), the aggregation 
of STFN scores is defined as  






...2211           Eq. 6-3 
where Fagg’ is the aggregated fuzzy scale and cn is the contribution of experts who provide 
zero scales. 
6.3.2.6 Calculation of fuzzy values (STFN) (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
Assume APO, ASC and APC are three STFN of PO, SC and PC of a hazardous event 
respectively. APO, ASC and APC are defined as 
APO= {(𝑢, 𝜇𝐴𝑃𝑂(𝑢)|𝑢 ∈ 𝑈 = [0, 𝑢], 𝜇𝐴𝑃𝑂(𝑢)𝜖[0,1]}            Eq. 6-4 
ASC= {(𝑣, 𝜇𝐴𝑆𝐶(𝑣)|𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 = [0, 𝑣], 𝜇𝐴𝑆𝐶(𝑣)𝜖[0,1]}                   Eq. 6-5 
APC= {(𝑤, 𝜇𝐴𝑃𝐶(𝑤)|𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 = [0,𝑤], 𝜇𝐴𝑃𝐶(𝑤)𝜖[0,1]}             Eq. 6-6 
where µAPO, µASC, and µAPC are trapezoidal MFf of APO, ASC, and APC and u, v and w are 
input variables in the universe of discourse U, V and W of PO, SC and PC respectively. 
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6.3.2.7 Fuzzy reasoning evaluation (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
The Mamdani method as stated in Section 5.2.6 of Chapter 5, is employed to develop a fuzzy 
reasoning process where rules are relevant to the current situations of the project to calculate 
the fuzzy output. The fuzzy rule base comprises the following fuzzy if-then rules (Zeng et al., 
2007; Majumder et al., 2013): 
Ri: If u is QiPO and v is QiSC and w is QiPC, then x is QiRM                           Eq. 6-7 
  where i = 1,2,3…,n and u, v, w, and x are variables in the universe of discourse U, V, W, and 
X of PO, SC, PC, and RM, and QiPO, QiSC, QiPC, and QiRM  are qualitative descriptors of PO, 
SC, PC, and RM respectively. 
In this study, the rule base consists of 150 if-then rules. For a three-by-one system, the 
deputation develops the shape of a PO ×SC × PC cube as shown in Figure 6-8. It can be seen 
that each sliced fuzzy cubic rule consists of 25 rules with a particular PC descriptor, such as 
1= Highly unlikely, 2 = Unlikely, 3 = Reasonably unlikely, 4 = Likely, 5 = Reasonably likely 
and 6 = Highly likely. 
The firing strength of 𝛼𝑖 of the ith rule with input fuzzy sets APO, ASC, and APC is calculated 
using fuzzy intersection operation as  









𝜇𝑄𝑖𝑃𝐶(𝑤)]                                                 Eq. 6-8 
where 𝜇𝐴𝑖𝑃𝑂(𝑢), 𝜇𝐴𝑖𝑆𝐶(𝑣) and 𝜇𝐴𝑖𝑃𝐶(𝑤) are the MFf of fuzzy sets APO, ASC and APC, 
respectively. 
The control output of fired rule Ri is obtained by 
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𝜇𝑄𝑖𝑅𝑀′(𝑥) = 𝛼𝑖 ∩  𝜇𝑄
𝑖
𝑅𝑀              Eq. 6-9                    
where 𝛼𝑖  is the firing strength of rule Ri, and µQuire is the membership functions of fuzzy 













Figure 6-8: Fuzzy cubic rules and sliced fuzzy cubic rule deputations                                  
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The maximum operator can be used to calculate the total relation by (An et al., 2011) 




𝑅𝑀2, … , 𝜇𝑄
𝑖
𝑅𝑀𝑛)}         Eq. 6-10 
µQiRM’ (x) is the output fuzzy membership function after aggregation.  
 
6.3.2.8 Defuzzification (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
The defuzzifier is defined as the output of the fuzzy inference engine to crisp point. 
Conceptually, the task of this step is an important procedure to convert the aggregated result 
into a crisp number. The centre average method is most commonly employed for 
defuzzification (Zeng et al., 2007; An et al., 2011). Assume the output of fuzzy inference 
engine is obtained as: 
𝜇𝑅𝑙 = {(𝑥, 𝜇𝑅𝑀(𝑥))|𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝜇𝑅𝑙(𝑥) ∈ [0,1]}                      Eq. 6-11                      
and RM can be calculated as 
 

















                                  Eq. 6-12 
 
where 𝑖 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑛, ci denotes the centre of fuzzy term set i of RM, and µRM(ci) denote the 
membership function of the fuzzy term set of RM. 
It should be noted that the fuzzy weight factors of safety risk groups are obtained based on 
the MFAHP as mentioned in chapter 5. The overall 𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  of the construction safety 
project is defined by  





    i= 1, 2, 3…, n                              Eq. 6-13 
   where RM is Risk Magnitude and WF is fuzzy weight factor,  
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Similarly, the 𝑅𝑀𝑠𝑢𝑏−𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 of a construction safety project can be obtained by   





   i= 1,2,3… , n                 Eq. 6-14 
 
6.3.3 Step 3: Establishment of Risk Estimation (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
The outcomes of risk assessment are represented as the risk magnitude, such as low, 
acceptable, average, high and unacceptable risk, which can be used in the decision-making of 
safety officers, risk analysts, engineers and project managers. However, the results need to be 
reviewed by experts and risk analysts in the safety risk management group. 
 
6.3.4 Step 4: Risk Ranking  
The purpose of risk ranking is to identify and rank the safety risks in construction projects, 
based on the outcomes of risk assessment to address all the safety risks on all construction 
project sites effectively based on limited resources. To overcome this problem properly, the 
risk level of each project must be assessed and prioritised, so that an appropriate level of 
effort can be applied to manage those projects safely. Specifically, resources will be directed 
to manage construction sites with a higher safety risk ranking. The proposed methodology 
involves ranking all the safety risks using FTOPSIS and FAHP calculations in a merged 
listing with all identified and assessed safety risks ranked from safety risk with the highest 
importance to the safety risk with the lowest importance. 
 
6.3.5 Step 5: Controlling and Mitigating Risk Hazards (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
The best way to control a risk hazard is to eliminate the hazard. If this is not reasonably 
practicable, apply the hierarchy of control to reduce the risk. A combination of these controls 
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may be used. Administration and PPE must be implemented if the risk still exists after the 
other control measures have been implemented (Hughes and Ferrett, 2012). 
Risk hazard mitigation measures must be applied by reducing the probability of occurrence or 
controlling the possible consequence if a hazardous event has been identified and analysed 
with as having high risk level. 
 
6.3.6 Step 6: Monitoring Risk Hazards 
Monitoring is a vital part of construction safety risk management (Carr and Tah, 2001). It is 
important to determine whether the risk assessment was complete and accurate. It is also 
essential to ensure that changes in the workplace have not introduced new hazards or changed 
hazards that were once ranked as a lower priority to a higher priority. A review is required for 
each new risk hazard, i.e. the starting of a new project; changes to the workplace, work 
procedure, process or flow; changing tools, equipment, and machinery; new employees; 
moving to a new building or work area; or if the occupational health and safety representative 
requests a review. 
However, risks should be reviewed habitually or based on the seriousness of the safety risks 
to ensure that the risks of workers being harmed have not changed.  
 
6.4 A Case Example: Safety Risk Assessment and Management for 
Building Construction Projects (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
A case example of falls from height in a building construction project is presented to 
demonstrate the proposed safety risk assessment model. Falls from height are considered as 
major injuries. It is crucial to undertake risk assessment for most projects, and proper risk 
management is required (Limsupreeyarat et al., 2010). In many cases, a worker falls from 
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height due to improper scaffold construction, inadequacy of the edge protection, unprotected 
openings in buildings, lack of edge protection for working on roofs, dangerous demolition 
work or inappropriate use of ladders and hoists (OSHA, 1998; Hamid et al., 2008; OSHA, 
2011). However, the FRT, based on the principle of fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic, offers 
advantages, which can be employed to reduce the uncertainty and vague information 
associated with building construction projects and activities. The application of the proposed 
methodology consists of six stages as stated in section 6.3, which are described in Section 
6.4.1. 
 
6.4.1 Safety Hazard Identification and Analysis 
A safety risk management group is established to undertake the review of safety risks on a 
building construction site. The safety risk management group consisting of five experts is 
required to have appropriate knowledge and qualifications. A contribution factor is allocated 
to each expert, as shown in Table 6-11.  




6.4.2 Safety Risk Criteria 
(1) Determination of PO, SC, PC, RM, and membership functions of PO, SC, PC and RM 
Three fundamental risk parameters, PO, SC and PC, are used to assess the risk magnitude of 
a construction project. PO is classified into five levels: “Very unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Fairly 
Experts Background Contribution factor 
E1 Safety Manager 0.25 
E2 Project Manager 0.23 
E3 Senior Safety Officer 0.20 
E4 Safety Officer with 15 years’ experience 0.17 
E5 Site Engineer with 15 years’ experience 0.15 
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unlikely”, “Likely”, and “Very likely”. PC is classified into six levels: “Highly unlikely”, 
“Unlikely”, “Reasonably unlikely”, “Likely”, “Reasonably likely”, and “Highly likely”. SC is 
is classified into five levels: “Negligible”, “Minor”, “Moderate”, “Major”, and “Catastrophic”. 
RM is classified into five levels: “Low”, “Acceptable”, “Average”, “High”, and 
“Unacceptable”, as shown in Tables 6-6-6-9 respectively. PO, PC, SC and RM are defined by 
a trapezoidal MFf , as shown in Figures. 6-3-6-6 respectively. 
(2) Fuzzy aggregation 
Experts in the Safety risk management team can provide a numerical value, a linguistic term, 
a range of numbers, a triangular fuzzy number and a trapezoidal fuzzy number to describe a 
specific identified hazard. In this case example, Expert E1 uses a range of numbers, E2 uses a 
numerical value, and E4 uses a triangular fuzzy number, while E3 and E5 use linguistic terms, 
as shown in Table 6-12, to describe the hazard group falls from height. 










Probability of occurrence 𝜇(𝑥) = (2.58,  3.03,  3.60,  4.05)  
 
Probability of occurrence 𝜇(𝑥)
= ((2,2,4,4) × 0.25 + (3,3,3,3) × 0.23 + (3,4,4,5) × 0.20
+ (2,3,3,4) × 0.17 + (3,3.5,4,4.5) × 0.15)
= (2.58,  3.03,  3.60,  4.05)  
Severity of occurrence 𝜇(𝑥) = (3.81, 4.26, 4.58, 4.93)  
Probability of consequence 𝜇(𝑥) = (3.43, 3.87, 4.27, 4.72)  
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Table 6-12: Evaluation and STFN of PO, SC, and PC 
 
(3) Fuzzy inference 
This step is to convert the aggregation of PO, SC, and PC into matching fuzzy sets for fuzzy 
inference. For example, the aggregated STFN of PO = (2.58, 3.03, 3.60, 4.05), as shown in 
Figure 6-9 (the thick segments), and then the matching fuzzy set PO is obtained by 




Similarly, SC and PC can be obtained, the matching fuzzy sets of SC and PC as shown in 









Severity of                    
consequence 









E1 (2,4) (2,2,4,4) (4,5) (4,4,5,5) (3,4) (3,3,4,4) 
E2 3 (3,3,3,3) 5 (5,5,5,5) 4 (4,4,4,4) 
E3 About 4 (3,4,4,5) About 4.5 (3.5,4.5,4.5,5) About 4.5 (3.5,4.5,4.5,5.5) 
E4 (2,3,4) (2,3,3,4) (3,4,5) (3,4,4,5) (4,5,6) (4,5,5,6) 
E5 Likely (3,3.5,4,4.5) Major (3,3.5,4,4.5) Likely (2.5,3,4,4.5) 
Aggregated 
STFN (2.58, 3.03, 3.60, 4.05) (3.81, 4.26, 4.58, 4.93) (3.43, 3.87, 4.27, 4.72) 
        𝑃𝑂 = {(𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦,  0.975),  (𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦,  1.000), 
              (𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦,  0.050)} 
𝑆𝐶 = {(𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟,  0.728),  (𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐,  1.000)} 
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Figure 6-10: The matching fuzzy set SC 
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Figure 6-11: The matching fuzzy set PC 
The safety risk management team produced 150 rules in the fuzzy rule base that are used in 
this study, as shown in Figure 6-12a and Figure 6-12b. The rules are interpreted thus: If PO is 
Very unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Highly unlikely, then RM is Low; and if PO is 
Very likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly likely, then RM is Unacceptable. 
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For a three-by-one system, the fuzzy rule base develops the shape of a PO × SC × PC cube, 
as shown in Figure 6-12. 
The min-max implication is then employed in this case study example to calculate fuzzy 
preference. The fuzzy inference can be broken down into four steps, as described below 
(Zeng, 2005). 
Determining which rule is on the rule base. From the mapping of inputs of PO×SC×PC, the 
following 12 rules are fired, contributing to the actual evaluation process. These 12 rules are: 
Rule #106: If PO is FUPO and SC is MASC and PC is LIPC,  then RM is A 
Rule #107: If PO is FUPO  and SC is MASC and PC is RLPC, then RM is H 
Rule #112: If PO is LIPO   and SC is MASC and PC is LIPC,  then RM is H 
Rule #113: If PO is LIPO   and SC is MASC and PC is RLPC, then RM is H 
Rule #118: If PO is VLPO  and SC is MASC and PC is LIPC,  then RM is H 
Rule #119: If PO is VLPO  and SC is MASC and PC is RLPC, then RM is U 
Rule #136: If PO is FUPO and SC is CASC and PC is LIPC,   then RM is H 
Rule #137: If PO is FUPO and SC is CASC and PC is RLPC,  then RM is H 
Rule #142: If PO is LIPO   and SC is CASC and PC is LIPC,   then RM is H 
Rule #143: If PO is LIPO   and SC is CASC and PC is RLPC,  then RM is U 
Rule #148: If PO is VLPO  and SC is CASC and PC is LIPC,   then RM is U 
Rule #149: If PO is VLPO  and SC is CASC and PC is RLPC,  then RM is U 
 
(1) Taking the minimum operator to calculate the strength of the fired rules, the process is 
shown as follows: 
 
 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 # 106:  𝛼106 =  𝜇 𝐹𝑈(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.975,0.728,  1.000) = 0.728 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #107:  𝛼107 =  𝜇 𝐹𝑈(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝑅𝐿(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.975,  0.728,  0.760) = 0.728 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #112:  𝛼112 
=  𝜇 𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1.000,  0.728,  1.000) = 0.728 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #113:  𝛼113 =  𝜇 𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝐴 (𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝑅𝐿(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1.000,  0.728,  0.760) = 0.728 
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where FUPO, LIPO, and VLPO are the qualitative descriptors, “Fairly unlikely”, “Likely”, and 
“Very likely” of PO, respectively and MASC and CASC are the qualitative descriptors, “Major” 
and “Catastrophic” of SC and LIPC, RLPC, are the qualitative descriptors, “Likely” and 
“Reasonably likely” of PC respectively.  










𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #106 :  𝛼106 ∩  𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (0.728,  𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀) ) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #107 :  𝛼107 ∩  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (0.728,  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) ) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #112 :  𝛼112 ∩  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛  (0.728,  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) ) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #113 :  𝛼113 ∩  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛  (0.728,  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) ) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #118 :  𝛼118 ∩  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛  (0.050,  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) ) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #119 :  𝛼119 ∩  𝜇𝑈(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛  (0.050,  𝜇𝑈(𝑅𝑀) ) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #136 :  𝛼136 ∩  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛  (0.975,  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) ) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #137 :  𝛼137 ∩  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛  (0.760,  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) ) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #142 :  𝛼142 ∩  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛  (1.000,  𝜇𝐻(𝑅𝑀) ) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #143 :  𝛼143 ∩  𝜇𝑈(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛  (0.760,  𝜇𝑈(𝑅𝑀) ) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #148 :  𝛼148 ∩  𝜇𝑈(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛  (0.050,  𝜇𝑈(𝑅𝑀) ) 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #149 :  𝛼149 ∩  𝜇𝑈(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛  (0.050,  𝜇𝑈(𝑅𝑀) ) 
 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #118:  𝛼118 =  𝜇𝑉𝐿(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.050,  0.728,  1.000) = 0.050 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #119:  𝛼119 =  𝜇𝑉𝐿(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝑅𝐿(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.050,  0.728,  0.760) = 0.050 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #136:  𝛼136  
=  𝜇𝐹𝑈(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝐶𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.975,  1.000, 1.000) = 0.975 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #137:  𝛼137    
=  𝜇𝐹𝑈(𝑃𝑂) ∩ 𝜇𝐶𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩ 𝜇𝑅𝐿(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.975, 1.000, 0.760) = 0.760 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #142:  𝛼142     
=  𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝑂) ∩ 𝜇𝐶𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩ 𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1.000, 1.000, 1.000) = 1.000 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒  #143:  𝛼143 =  𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝐶𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝑅𝐿(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1.000,  1.000,  0.760) = 0.760 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 # 148:  𝛼148 =  𝜇𝑉𝐿(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝐶𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.050,  1.000,  1.000) = 0.050 
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #149:  𝛼149 =  𝜇𝑉𝐿(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝐶𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝑅𝐿(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.050,  1.000,  0.760) = 0.050 
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It should be noted that the following rules 
Rule #107, Rule #112, Rule #113, Rule #118, Rule #136, and Rule #137 are included in Rule 
#142, and then Rule #119, Rule #148 and Rule #149 are included in Rule #143.  
Taking the maximum operator to calculate 
 
 
(4) Defuzzification  
This step is to convert the fuzzy output RM into a matching numerical value of RM. By using 
the centre average calculation method, the crisp value is obtained RM= 4.013 is obtained, 




Figure 6-13: Defuzzification of RM 
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3 × 0.728 + 4 × 1.00 + 5 × 0.760
0.728 + 1.000 + 0.760
 = 4.013 
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6.4.3 Safety Risk Estimation (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
The overall safety risk magnitude is 4.013 under the defined scale system of RM, i.e. the 
safety risk of falls from height is between High and Unacceptable with confidence of 97.4 
per cent (µ = 0.974) for High and 2.6 per cent (µ = 0.026) for Unacceptable. This value 
requires risk reduction measures to be implemented to reduce the risk level of falls from 
height on building construction projects and provides useful information for safety managers, 
safety officers and safety analysts to carry out safety-based decision-making. The appropriate 
corrective and preventive actions in this building construction project management are 
provided. 
 
6.4.4 Safety Risk Ranking 
Once the particular safety risks of building projects, including falls from height (FH), falling 
objects (FO), manual handling (MH), equipment, machinery and tools (EQ), electricity (EL), 
slips and trips (ST), traffic hazards (TH), vehicle overturn (VO), fire and explosions (FE), 
exposure to hazardous substances (ES), radiation hazards (RH), collapse of site structure 
(CO), ergonomic/human factors (EH), confined spaces (CS), and noise and vibration (NV), 
have been identified based on previous accident reports and the safety risk management 
team’s judgement,  an MFAHP is applied in the following section. 
6.4.4.1 Calculation of the criteria weight by using a modified fuzzy analytical hierarchy 
process (MFAHP) 
At this stage, the risk management team were asked to make pairwise comparisons of 15 
safety risks by using fuzzy linguistic variables. Nine linguistic variables were used to capture 
the subjective judgements of the relative importance of the risks (An et al., 2016), as shown 
in Table 5-1. 
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According to the basic principles, the experts were asked to make pairwise judgements of all 
risks. It should be noted that n (n-1)/2, as mentioned earlier, and in this case, 15 × (15-1)/2 = 
105 comparisons. According to Equations (5-2), and (5-3), however, using the MFAHP 
method using only n-1, (15-1) = 14 comparisons can be obtained (An et al., 2016). Then, 
aggregated pairwise comparison values were obtained by Equation (6-3). For example, the 
aggregated STFN pairwise comparison of FH vs. FO (x1,2) is as follows: 
 
FH vs. FOa = {
1×0.25+2×0.23+2×0.20+1×0.17+1×0.15
0.25+0.23+0.20+0.17+0.15
} = 1.43 
 
FH vs. FOb = {
2×0.25+3×0.23+3×0.20+2×0.17+2×0.15
0.25+0.23+0.20+0.17+0.15
} = 2.43 
 
FH vs. FOc = {
2×0.25+3×0.23+3×0.20+2×0.17+2×0.15
0.25+0.23+0.20+0.17+0.15
} = 2.43 
 
FH vs. FOd = {
3×0.25+4×0.23+4×0.20+3×0.17+3×0.15
0.25+0.23+0.20+0.17+0.15
} = 3.43 
 
FH vs. FO {a, b, c, d} = {1.43, 2.43, 2.43, 3.43} 
 
Finally, the aggregated STFN of 14 pairwise comparisons were obtained, as shown in Table 
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Table 6-13: Pairwise comparison of the safety risks  
 
Then, the completed transformation fuzzy number relation decision matrix of all the safety 
risks can be obtained according to Equation (5-1) as follows: 
For example, the calculation of trapezoidal fuzzy number pairwise comparison of  
FO vs. FH (x2,1)  
  
X1,2 = {ai,j, bi,j, ci,j, di,j}, X2,1 = {1/di,j, 1/ci,j, 1/bi,j, 1/ai,j} 
FO1,2 = {1.43, 2.43, 2.43, 3.43},  
FO2,1 = {1/ (3.43), 1/ (2.43), 1/ (2.43), 1/ (1.43)} 
FO2,1= {0.29, 0.41, 0.41, 0.70} 
 
Comparison Aggregated STFN 
FH vs FO (x1,2) (1.43,2.43,2.43,3.43) 
FO vs MH (x2,3) (1.23,1.78,1.78,2.78) 
MH vs EQ (x3,4) (3.66,4.66,4.66,5.66) 
EQ vs EL (x4,5) (2.25,3.25,3.25,4.25) 
EL vs ST (x5,6) (5.00,6.00,6.00,7.00) 
ST vs TH (x6,7) (6.37,7.37,7.37,8.37) 
TH vs VO (x7,8) (6.52,7.52,7.52,8.52) 
VO vs FE (x8,9) (2.95,3.95,3.95,4.95) 
EF vs ES (x9,10) (7.06,8.06,8.06,8.83) 
ES vs RH (x10,11) (3.63,4.63,4.63,5.63) 
RH vs CO (x11,12) (2.80,3.80,3.80,4.80) 
CO vs EH (x12,13) (4.37,5.37,5.37,6.37) 
EH vs CS (x13,14) (3.08,4.08,4.08,5.08) 
CS vs NV (x14,15) (6.35,7.35,7.35,8.35) 
CHAPTER SIX                                                  DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
 
125 
   
and FO 2,15 can be obtained by Equation (5-7) as follows:  
FO2, 15 a = a2,3× a3,4× a4,5× a5,6× a6,7 × a7,8 × a8,9 × a9,10 × a10,11 × a11,12 × a12,13 × a13,14 × a14,15  
FO2, 15 a = 1.23× 3.66× 2.55× 5.00× 6.37 × 6.52 × 2.95 × 7.06 ×3.63 ×2.80 × 4.37 × 3.08 × 
6.35 = 3.8E+07 
FO2, 15 b = b2,3× b3,4× b4,5× b5,6× b6,7 × b7,8 × b8,9 × b9,10 × b10,11 × b11,12 × b12,13 × b13,14 × b14,15  
FO2, 15 b = 1.78× 4.66× 3.55×6.00× 7.37 × 7.52 × 3.95×8.06 × 4.63 ×3.80 ×5.37 × 4.08 × 
7.35 = 8.1E+08 
FO2, 15 c = c2,3× c3,4× c4,5× c5,6× c6,7 × c7,8 × c8,9 × c9,10 × c10,11 × c11,12 × c12,13 × c13,14 × c14,15  
FO2, 15 c = 1.78× 4.66× 3.55× 6.00× 7.37 × 7.52 × 3.95 × 8.06 × 4.63 × 3.80 × 5.37 × 4.08 × 
7.35 = 8.1E+08 
FO2, 15 d = d2,3× d3,4× d4,5× d5,6× d6,7 × d7,8 × d8,9 × d9,10 × d10,11 × d11,12 × d12,13 × d13,14 × d14,15  
FO2, 15 d = 2.78× 5.66× 4.55× 7.00× 8.37 × 8.52 × 4.95 × 8.83 × 5.63 × 4.80 × 6.37 × 5.08 × 
8.35 = 1.1E+10 
FO2, 15 {a, b, c, d} = {3.8E+07, 8.1E+08, 8.1E+08, 1.1E+10} 
Using Equations (5-1), and (5-7), the completed trapezoidal fuzzy number preference relation 
decision matrix is shown in Table 6-14. 
It should be noted that FH1,3 and FH1,15 are not in the interval [1/9-9]. The completed 
trapezoidal fuzzy number preference relation decision matrix is needed to transfer the 
MFAHP preference relation decision matrix in the interval. In this case, by using Equation 
(5-8), the maximum of D = max (xij) = x1, 15 = 3.6E+10 and the following transformation 
functions are applied as (An et al., 2016). 
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Table 6-14: Completed trapezoidal fuzzy number preference relation decision matrix 
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 Table 6-14: Completed trapezoidal fuzzy number preference relation decision matrix (cont.) 
 






































































































































































































































































































































































































For example,  









 = 6.91 




 = 6.91 






Finally, the MFAHP preference relation decision matrix is obtained, as shown in Table 6-15. 
Using Equations (5-5), and (5-6), the geometric mean method and the weights of all safety 
hazards are obtained, and by using Equation (5-7), defuzzification is applied to convert them 
into crisp numbers.  
For example, the total weight factors of falls from height (FH) are as follows: 
 














































   
Table 6-15: MFAHP preference relation decision matrix  
 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   









 √1 × 1.03 × 1.05 × 1.18 × …× 5.00
15
,
 √1 × 1.08 × 1.14 × 1.31 × …× 6.91
15
,
 √1 × 1.08 × 1.14 × 1.31 × …× 6.91
15
,























































   
  






















   2.836
{2.836+2.551+2.340+⋯+0.415}










By using Equation (5-11), defuzzification is applied to convert to crisp numbers. For example, 




} = 0.1352 
Finally, the total weighting factors of all the safety hazards are obtained according to each 
criterion and shown in Table 6-16. 




   
Table 6-16: Fuzzy weights of safety hazards  
 
Safety hazards Fuzzy weights WF 
FH 0.13, 0.14, 0.14, 0.14 0.1352 
FO 0.12, 0.13, 0.13, 0.13 0.1250 
MH 0.12, 0.12, 0.12, 0.12 0.1180 
EQ 0.10, 0.10, 0.10, 0.10 0.1032 
EL 0.09, 0.09, 0.09, 0.09 0.0925 
ST 0.08, 0.08, 0.08, 0.08 0.0791 
TH 0.07, 0.07, 0.07, 0.06 0.0661 
VO 0.06, 0.06, 0.06, 0.05 0.0551 
EF 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05 0.0487 
ES 0.04, 0.04, 0.04, 0.04 0.0403 
RH 0.04, 0.04, 0.04, 0.03 0.0352 
CO 0.03, 0.03, 0.03, 0.03 0.0312 
EH 0.03, 0.03, 0.03, 0.03 0.0268 
CS 0.02, 0.02, 0.02, 0.02 0.0238 
NV 0.02, 0.02, 0.02, 0.02 0.0199 
 
 
6.4.4.2 Evaluation of the solutions and determination of the final rank by FTOPSIS 
In this step, the evaluation of the fuzzy matrix is completed by estimating the alternatives of 
subjective judgments. The experts were asked to construct the normalised fuzzy decision 
matrix by using the linguistic variables presented in Table 6-17. The linguistic terms were 
converted into corresponding STFN, as shown in Table 6-18, and the aggregated fuzzy 
evaluation matrix is shown in Table 6-19. It should be noted that due to the limited evaluation, 
the STFN of PO, SC and PC for FH and FO only are provided here. 
Table 6-17: Experts’ judgement and corresponding STFN 
Input type Description Input values STFN 
A numerical value 
A range of numbers 
A linguistic term 1 
A linguistic term 2 
Triangular fuzzy number 
Trapezoidal fuzzy number 
 ….is a 
….is between a and b 
….is High  
….is about c 
….is between a and c and most 
likely to be b 
….is between a and d and most 





(a, b , c) 
 












   
Table 6-18: Evaluation and STFN of PO, SC and PC 
 





Probability of occurrence Severity of consequence Probability of consequence 






E1 2,4 2,2,4,4 4,5 4,4,5,5 3,4 3,3,4,4 
E2 3 3,3,3,3 5 5,5,5,5 4 4,4,4,4 





E4 4 4,4,4,4 4 4,4,4,4 Likely 2.5,3,4,4.5 
E5 3,4 3,3,4,4 5 5,5,5,5 4,5,6 4,5,5,6 
Aggregated 
STFN 2.92, 3.12, 3.77, 3.97      4.28, 4.48, 4.37, 4.83  3.04, 3.83, 4.25, 4.59 
FO 
E1 3 2,2,4,4 4,5 4,4,5,5 3,4 3,3,4,4 
E2 2,4 3,3,3,3 5 5,5,5,5 4 4,4,4,4 





E4 Likely 2,3,3,4 3,4,5 3,4,4,5 4,5,6 4,5,5,6 
E5 3 3,3.5,4,4.5 Major 3,3.5,4,4.5 Likely 2.5,3,4,4.5 
Aggregated 












Risk = PO×PC×SC 
FH 2.92, 3.12, 3.77, 3.97 4.28, 4.48, 4.73, 4.83 3.40, 3.83, 4.25, 4.59 42.43, 53.53, 75.79, 87.92 
FO 2.69, 2.77, 3.60, 3.69 2.83, 2.83, 3.57, 3.57 3.15, 3.25, 3.85, 3.95 23.94, 25.48, 49.48, 51.96 
MH 2.22, 2.68, 3.75, 4.22 3.10, 3.25, 3.62, 3.77 3.05, 3.30, 3.90, 4.15 20.94, 28.74, 52.94, 65.95 
EQ 2.80, 3.05, 3.22, 3.47 2.25, 2.60, 2.60, 2.95 3.17, 3.17, 3.40, 3.40 19.97, 25.14, 28.46, 34.80 
EL 2.34, 2.57, 3.39, 3.63 3.77, 3.97, 4.45, 4.65 2.54, 2.77, 3.57, 3.80 22.36, 28.26, 53.86, 64.05 
ST 3.33, 3.57, 4.40, 4.65 2.67, 3.15, 3.52, 4.00 2.80, 2.80, 3.40, 3.40 24.86, 31.49, 52.66, 63.17 
TH 2.20, 2.37, 2.83, 3.00 2.40, 2.63, 2.88, 3.11 2.63, 2.80, 3.45, 3.62 13.89, 17.45, 28.12, 33.77 
VO 2.11, 2.11, 2.11, 2.11 2.14, 2.51, 2.51, 2.88 2.61, 2.61, 2.61, 2.61 11.73, 13.76, 13.76, 15.80 
EF 2.74, 3.00, 3.60, 3.87 4.00, 4.37, 4.52, 4.89 2.17, 2.65, 3.05, 3.53 23.74, 34.74, 49.63, 66.72 
ES 1.77, 1.77, 1.77, 1.77 3.17, 3.55, 3.55, 3.93 2.47, 2.47, 2.77, 2.77 13.86, 15.52, 17.41, 19.27 
RH 2.22, 2.22, 2.22, 2.22 3.30, 3.30, 3.45, 3.45 1.52, 2.32, 2.72, 3.52 11.12, 16.97, 20.80, 26.92 
CO 2.58, 2.75, 3.05, 3.22 4.10, 4.10, 4.10, 4.10 1.84, 1.84, 2.30, 2.30 19.44, 20.72, 28.73, 30.33 
EH 2.39, 2.81, 3.01, 3.43 2.20, 2.20, 2.84, 2.84 3.04, 3.24, 3.56, 3.76 15.95, 19.99, 30.38, 36.57 
CS 2.49, 2.74, 2.74, 2.99 3.28, 3.35, 4.24, 4.32 1.86, 1.98, 2.23, 2.36 15.13, 18.17, 25.91, 30.38 
NV 1.58, 2.00, 2.00, 2.42 1.89, 1.97, 3.08, 3.15 1.86, 1.96, 2.16, 2.26 5.54, 7.68, 13.25, 17.19 




   
Using Equation (5-14), the normalised matrix of fuzzy decision is obtained, as illustrated in 
Table 6-20. The next step is to obtain a fuzzy weighted and normalised decision matrix by 
utilising weights calculated using the MFAHP. The fuzzy weighted and normalised decision 
matrix is obtained using Equation (5-15), as shown in Table 6-21. 
 
Table 6-20: Normalised fuzzy decision matrix  
 
Based on the STFN presented in Table 6-21, the fuzzy positive ideal solution (𝐴+) by using 
Equation (5-16) and the fuzzy negative ideal solution (𝐴−) by utilising Equation (5-17) are 
determined as (0.0652, 0.0823, 0.1165, 0.1352) and (0.0013, 0.0017, 0.0030, 0.0039) 
respectively. Then, the distance of each risk from the fuzzy positive ideal solution (𝑑+) and 
the fuzzy negative ideal solution (𝑑−)  is computed using Equations (5-18) and (5-19) 




0.4826, 0.6089, 0.8620, 1.0000 
FO 0.2722, 0.2898, 0.5628, 0.5910 
MH 0.2382, 0.3269, 0.6022, 0.7501 
EQ 0.2271, 0.2859, 0.3238, 0.3959 
EL 0.2543, 0.3215, 0.6125, 0.7285 
ST 0.2827, 0.3581, 0.5989, 0.7185 
TH 0.1579, 0.1985, 0.3198, 0.3842 
VO 0.1334, 0.1565, 0.1565, 0.1797 
EF 0.2700, 0.3951, 0.5645, 0.7588 
ES 0.1576, 0.1765, 0.1980, 0.2192 
RH 0.1265, 0.1930, 0.2366, 0.3062 
CO 0.2211, 0.2357, 0.3267, 0.3449 
EH 0.1814, 0.2274, 0.3456, 0.4160 
CS 0.1721, 0.2067, 0.2947, 0.3456 
NV 0.0630, 0.0874, 0.1507, 0.1955 




   
respectively. Finally, a preference order can be ranked according to Equation (5-20) and the 
order of the index, as shown in Table 6-22. 
 
Table 6-21: Weighted normalised fuzzy decision matrix 
 
For example, the fuzzy positive ideal solution (𝑑+) of FO is as follows: 
 
 2222 )135.0073.0()116.0070.0()082.0036.0()065.0034.0( id   
 
0948.0ofFOdi  










0.0652, 0.0823, 0.1165, 0.1352 
FO 0.0340, 0.0362, 0.0704, 0.0739 
MH 0.0281, 0.0386, 0.0710, 0.0885 
EQ 0.0234, 0.0295, 0.0334, 0.0409 
EL 0.0235, 0.0297, 0.0567, 0.0674 
ST 0.0224, 0.0283, 0.0474, 0.0568 
TH 0.0104, 0.0131, 0.0211, 0.0254 
VO 0.0073, 0.0086, 0.0086, 0.0099 
EF 0.0131, 0.0192, 0.0275, 0.0369 
ES 0.0064, 0.0071, 0.0080, 0.0088 
RH 0.0044, 0.0068, 0.0083, 0.0108 
CO 0.0069, 0.0074, 0.0102, 0.0108 
EH 0.0049, 0.0061, 0.0093, 0.0112 
CS 0.0041, 0.0049, 0.0070, 0.0082 
NV 0.0013, 0.0017, 0.0030, 0.0039 




   
Finally, a preference order can be ranked according to the order of the *
iCC index using 
Equation (17), as shown in Table 6-22. 
For example, the order of the *





ofFOCCi = 0.5330 
 
The same procedure can be used to compute the distances, as shown in Table 6-22. 
 
Table 6-22: Calculation of the fuzzy closeness coefficient for each risk 
Risk 
hazards 




Falls from height  0.0000 0.2017 1.0000 1 
FO Falling objects  0.0948 0.1082 0.5330 3 
MH Manual handling  0.0868 0.1177 0.5754 2 
EQ Equipment, machinery and tools  0.1426 0.0596 0.2948 6 
EL Electricity  0.1126 0.0905 0.4454 4 
ST Slips and trips  0.1252 0.0770 0.3807 5 
TH Traffic hazards  0.1701 0.0317 0.1569 8 
VO Vehicle overturn  0.1900 0.0123 0.0608 10 
EF Fire and explosions  0.1558 0.0462 0.2288 7 
ES Exposure to hazardous substances  0.1920 0.0102 0.0504 13 
RH Radiation hazards  0.1913 0.0105 0.0521 12 
CO Collapse of site structure  0.1892 0.0127 0.0629 9 
EH Ergonomic/human factors  0.1906 0.0111 0.0551 11 
CS Confined spaces  0.1945 0.0072 0.0359 14 
NV Noise and vibration  0.2017 0.0000 0.0000 15 
*
iCC




   
The final results are summarised based on the closeness coefficient ( ) values ranked in 
descending order : FH > MH > FO > EL > ST > EQ > EF > TH > CO > VO > EH > RH > 
ES > CS > NV. The next step is the control of safety risks, which will be addressed in the 
next section.  
 
6.4.3 Safety Risk Control and Monitoring 
According to the results obtained, falls from height (FH) is one of the most dangerous hazard 
groups. Common cases of work at height injuries are falls from scaffolding and ladders and 
through fragile roofs. Falls from height are currently defined as one of the biggest single 
causes of worker deaths and major injuries on construction sites (Wong et al., 2016). This 
includes using platforms such as fixed scaffolding, mobile scaffold towers, scissor lifts, 
podium platforms, cherry pickers, and moveable platforms and roof work, floors, fragile 
surfaces, hole in the ground, and using fixed ladders or stepladders. Wong et al (2016) state 
that the number of scaffolding accidents has the highest frequency of falls, as scaffolders 
spend more time working at height than the other trades.  
The work at height regulations proposed by the HSE recommend avoiding the need to work 
at height whenever possible, for example, by using vehicles with automated or manual 
systems that enable loads to be sheeted safely from the ground. On the other hand, if working 
at height cannot be avoided, should be ensured that proper planning and supervision is 
undertaken so that the work can be carried out as safely as is reasonably practicable. Lone 
working must be avoided, emergencies and rescue manuals should be appropriately planned. 
The places of work are also a consideration, and potential hazards such as high-risk areas and 
fragile roofs must be taken into consideration. Equipment such as work platforms, scaffolding 
and stepladders must be appropriate for the job, built and maintained safely, inspected, tested, 
*
iCC




   
and dismantled appropriately. Safety inspections should be undertaken regularly by a 
competent person and documented, and faulty equipment should be repaired or disposed of as 
necessary (HSE, 2011).  
All site project equipment should be appropriate with working at height protection and 
suitable for safety protection where necessary (HSE, 2011). PPE should be utilised with the 
other safety protection equipment to prevent the residual risk remaining within an intolerable 
level. Site project staff should be well trained and qualified to cope with difficulties in 
dealing with safety measures regarding site equipment and features. The site equipment 
should be regularly inspected depending on the safety situation awareness on site, and staff 
profiles should be reviewed every six months as a minimum to suggest any useful ideas and 
recommendations (HSE, 2011).  
 
6.5 Summary 
The proposed construction safety risk management model using the FRT, MFAHP and 
FTOPSIS methods was established to assess both qualitative and quantitative safety risk data. 
Three parameters (PO, SC and PC) were employed in the proposed model to obtain and 
improve reliability and accuracy outcomes of safety risk analysis. This newly developed 
safety risk management model can be used to obtain both a safety risk level and categories of 
safety risk with a degree of confidence and a final safety ranking for evaluating important 
safety risks in the construction projects. Four case studies will be presented in the next 
chapter to demonstrate the proposed safety risk management model application. 
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This chapter presents case studies on safety risk assessment and management in building and 
mass rapid transit railway construction projects, which are used to illustrate the developed 
safety risk assessment and management methodology, including an evaluation of important 
safety risks using the FRT, FAHP, and FTOPSIS methods which have been incorporated into 
the model. The case study materials were collected from the particular construction projects 
in Thailand: CH Karnchang PCL, Syntec Construction PCL, Sangfah Construction and 
Engineering Co. Ltd and Bouygues- Thai Ltd. The results of the safety risk assessment are 
safety risk scores for overall project, hazard groups, hazardous events, and types of safety 
risk with a confidence percentage. Then, each hazard group is assessed and prioritised by 
using the FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS methods to obtain the safety risk ranking from the 
highest importance to the lowest importance. Finally, discussion and the decision-making 
process based on controlling, mitigating, and monitoring risk hazards is provided. Some key 
parts of this chapter incorporate content from a conference publication jointly by the author 
(Sansakorn and An, 2015).  
7.2 Case Study 1: Building Construction Project  
 
7.2.1 Background of Case Study 1 
“Building Construction Company 1” is used instead of the building construction company’s 
name due to business confidentiality. The company provides various types of services, 
including structural and architectural works; infrastructure works; civil engineering; design; 
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consultancy and management; mechanical and electrical engineering services; piling and 
foundation engineering services and retrofitting; and refurbishment services. This 
construction project is a condominium project in Bangkok, Thailand. The condominium 
comprises a single building with 38 floors and 802 units.   
 
7.2.2 Establishing a Safety Risk Management Team                                                                              
To order to analyse safety risks related with a project of the building construction, six experts 
involved in the development of the safety risk management model were selected based on 
their individual skills, knowledge, experience, and expertise. One is a project manager who 
had worked on building construction projects for more than 35 years. Two experts are 
projects engineers with 15 years’ experience in working on building construction projects. 
The other three experts are a senior safety officer, a safety officer, and a site superintendent, 
as shown in Table 7-1.  
Table 7-1: Description of experts’ contribution factor 








Expert 1 Project Manager 5 35 5 10 0.20 
Expert 2 Senior Safety Officer 4 40 5 9 0.18 
Expert 3 Project Engineer 4 15 5 9 0.18 
Expert 4 Project Engineer 4 15 5 9 0.18 
Expert 5 Site superintendent 3 25 5 8 0.16 
Expert 6 Safety Officer 2 5 3 5 0.10 
 
7.2.3 Safety Hazard Identification 
 
To carry out safety risk assessment and management, the safety risk management team of the 
building construction project verified to contain all the hazard groups and hazardous events 
by brainstorming and discussions. The building construction safety system is divided into 14 
CHAPTER SEVEN                                                                                                                                            CASE STUDIES 
 
140 
   
hazard groups: falls from height; falling objects; manual handling; equipment machinery and 
tools; electricity; slips and trips; traffic hazards; vehicle overturn; fire and explosions; 
exposure to hazardous substances; collapse of site structure; confined space; ergonomic/ 
human factors; and noise and vibration. Each hazard group includes several identified and 
codified risk events, which are described below and in Figure 7-1. 
(1) Falls from height includes eight hazardous events: working platform (FH-01), 
placement ladder (FH-02,) erection of scaffolding (FH-03), climbing cranes (FH-04), 
temporary ladder (FH-05), hole in the ground (FH-06), working on height unprotected 
(FH-07), and through opening elevator shaft (FH-08). 
 
(2) Falling objects includes seven hazardous events: part of climbing cranes, scaffolds 
(FO-09), operating, cleaning and clearing (FO-10), blown by wind (FO-11), hand-
held tools (FO-12), hopper and bucket (FO-13), stacked items (FO-14), and objects 
under pressure or tension (FO-15). 
 
(3) Manual handling includes two hazardous events: hoists (MH-16) and mobile crane 
lifting (MH-17). 
 
(4) Equipment, machinery and tools includes three hazardous events: heavy equipment 
(EQ-18), steel bar bending machine (EQ-19), and vibrator machine (EQ-20). 
 
(5) Electricity includes four hazardous events: wires (EL-21), electrical work (EL-22), 
overhead power lines (EL-23), and arc welding machine (EL-24). 
 
(6) Slips and trips includes five hazardous events: tripping over building materials (ST-
25), slipping on wet surfaces (ST-26), trips caused by small change in level (ST-27), 
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trips caused by water pipes, rebar (ST-28), and walking around construction site (ST-
29). 
 
(7) Traffic hazards includes two hazardous events: collision with another vehicle (TH-30) 
and collision with plant/people (TH-31). 
 
(8) Vehicle overturn includes two hazardous events: crane overturn (VO-32) and mobile 
plant (Bobcats, tractor) (VO-33). 
 
(9) Fire and explosions includes four hazardous events: hot work (FE-34), working near 
flammables (FE-35), gas cylinder or hose leakage (FE-36), and fire extinguisher has 
been discharged (FE-37). 
 
(10) Exposure to hazardous substances includes three safety hazardous events, i.e. 
solvents (ES-38), cement dust (ES-39), corrosive substances (ES-40). 
 
(11) Collapse of site structure includes five hazardous events: collapse of boom (cranes) 
(CO-41), collapse of scaffolding (CO-42), temporary structure (CO-43), steel sheet 
piles (CO-44), and kingpost (CO-45). 
 
(12) Confined space includes two hazardous events: deep excavations (CS-46) and closed 
tanks (CS-47). 
 
(13) Ergonomic and human factors includes three hazardous events: poor work posture 
(EH-48), repetitive movement (EH-49), and extreme muscular exertion (EH-50). 
 
(14) Noise and vibration includes five hazardous events: piling (NV-51), excavation 
(NV-52), hammering (NV-53), vibrator machine (NV-54), and hand-held power tools 
(NV-55). 
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Figure 7-1: Hazard identification at building construction project 1 
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7.2.4 Establishment of Safety Risk Criteria 
7.2.4.1 Determining the safety risk parameters and fuzzy membership functions (MFf) 
(Sansakorn and An, 2015)
In this case study, the three fundamental risk parameters, probability of occurrence (PO), and 
severity of consequence (SC), and probability of consequence (PC), were adopted and form 
the basis for the questions put to the experts. Five linguistic variables of probability of 
occurrence (PO), which refers to the number of times an event occurs or the failure 
frequencies in a certain time period are suggested “Very unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Fairly 
unlikely”, “Likely”, and “Very likely” as shown in Table 7-2. 
 
Table 7-2: Definitions of PO of building construction project 1 
 






Failure is unlikely but possible during lifetime 
Likely to happen once during lifetime 
Between unlikely and likely 
Occasional failure 






Source: Sansakorn and An, 2015 
The trapezoidal membership functions (MFf) are applied to describe these linguistic variables, 
as shown in Figure 7-3.  
Severity of consequence (SC) refers to the number of minor injuries, major injuries and 
fatalities resulting from the occurrence of a particular event,  for which the five linguistic 
variables are: “Negligible”, “Minor”, “Moderate”, “Major”, and “Catastrophic”, which 
represent no injury, minor injuries and/or <3 days off work, multiple injuries and/or between 3 
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days and 1 month off work, severe injuries and/or >1 month off work, and fatality and/or large 









Figure 7-2 Fuzzy PO of MFf  of building construction project 1 
 
Table 7-3: Definitions of SC of building construction project 1 
 








Minor injuries and/or <3 days off work 
Multiple injuries and/or between 3 days and 1 month off 
work 
Severe injuries and/or >1 month off work  








The linguistic variables “Negligible”, “Minor”, “Moderate”, “Major”, and “Catastrophic”, 
are defined by the trapezoidal membership functions as shown in Figure 7-3. 
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Figure 7-3: Fuzzy SC of MFf of building construction project 1 
Probability of consequence (PC) is a new parameter which refers to the likelihood of accident 
occurrence if an event becomes a reality, Six linguistic variables are used in this research to 
describe PC “Highly unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Reasonably unlikely”, “Likely”, “Reasonably 
likely”, and “Highly likely” as shown in Table 7-4.   
 
Table 7-4: Definitions of PC of building construction project 1 
 











The probability of accident occurrence is highly unlikely 
 
The probability of accident occurrence is unlikely but the 
failure event could occur  
The probability of accident occurrence is between 
unlikely and likely 
The probability of accident occurrence is likely 
The probability of accident occurrence is between likely 
and highly likely 
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Similarly, the trapezoidal membership functions (MFf) of PC are determined to describe these 









Figure 7-4: Fuzzy PC of MFf of building construction project 1 
 
The risk magnitude (RM) is defined in terms of the linguistic variables, “Low”, “Acceptable”, 
“Average”, “High”, and “Unacceptable”, where the highest score is 5 and the lowest score is 
0, with the safety risk ranging from 4 to 5 defined as “Unacceptable”.  These definitions are 
generally similar to those in the occupational health and safety management regulations 
published by the HSE, as shown in Table 7-5. 
The linguistic variables, “Low”, “Acceptable”, “Average”, “High”, and “Unacceptable” are 
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Table 7-5: Definitions of RM of building construction project 1 
 







Risk is low or insignificant and can be readily controlled 
Risk is acceptable 
Risk is medium 
Risk is high; however, risk control should be undertaken 
if it is reasonably practicable to so 
Risk is unacceptable. Proper action must be taken to 


















Figure 7-5: Fuzzy RM of MFf of building construction project 1 
7.2.4.2 Establishment of fuzzy rule base 
In this case, experts’ judgement and knowledge are used to derive the fuzzy rules, and five 
linguistic variables of PO and SC and six of PC are employed to determine the safety risk 
magnitude of the hazardous events, hazard groups, and all systems. Therefore, a rule base 
comprising 150 (5 × 5 × 6) if-then rules is developed which is shown in Figure 7-6. 
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For example, the rule at the bottom right of the fuzzy sliced cubic rule base of “Highly likely” 
would be described as “IF PO is Very likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly likely, 
THEN RM is Unacceptable” or “IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is still Catastrophic and PC 
is Highly likely, THEN RM is High”. 
 
7.2.5 Input PO, SC and PC 
Once the safety risk parameters and MFf have been determined, the data on PO, SC and PC is 
obtained from the experts. For example, it can be seen that Experts E1-4 use numerical values, 
E5 provides a range of numbers in PO, a triangular fuzzy number in SC, and a numerical 
value in PC, while E6 uses numerical values in PO and PC and a range of numbers in SC to 
describe the hazardous event of working platform (FH-01) in building construction project 1, 
as shown in Table 7-6.  






Severity of                    
consequence 









E1(0.20) 2 (2,2,2,2) 3 (3,3,3,3) 3 (3,3,3,3) 
E2(0.18) 2 (2,2,2,2) 1 (1,1,1,1) 3 (3,3,3,3) 
E3(0.18) 3 (3,3,3,3) 5 (5,5,5,5) 5 (5,5,5,5) 
E4(0.18) 1 (1,1,1,1) 5 (5,5,5,5) 3 (3,3,3,3) 
E5(0.16) (1,2) (1,1,2,2) (3,4,5) (3,4,4,5) 1 (1,1,1,1) 





    (3.16, 3.32, 3.42, 3.58) 
 
     (3.04, 3.04, 3.04, 3.04) 
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7.2.6 Fuzzy Aggregation 








The obtained results of risk parameters are shown in Table 7-7. 
 
7.2.7 Fuzzy Inference (Sansakorn and An, 2015) 
This step is to convert the aggregation of PO, SC and PC into matching fuzzy sets for fuzzy 
inference. For example, the aggregated STFN of PO of FH-01 = (1.84,  1.84,  2.00,  2.00), as 
shown in Figure 7-7 (the thick segments), and the matching fuzzy set PO is obtained by 
intersections between the STFN and fuzzy sets of PO: 
 
Similarly, the matching fuzzy sets of SC and PC of FH-01 are  
          𝑃𝐶 = {(𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦,  0.80),  (𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦,  0.92)} 
𝑆𝐶 = {(𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒,  0.52),  (𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟,  1.000)} 
 
                                 𝑃𝑂 = {(𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦,  0.32),  (𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦,  1.000) 
              
Severity of occurrence 𝜇(𝑥) = (3.16, 3.32, 3.42, 3.58)  
Probability of occurrence 𝜇(𝑥) = (1.84,  1.84,  2.00,  2.00)  
 
Probability of occurrence 𝜇(𝑥)
= ((2,2,2,2) × 0.20 + (2,2,2,2) × 0.18 + (3,3,3,3) × 0.18
+ (1,1,1,1) × 0.18 + (1,1,2,2) × 0.16 + (2,2,2,2) × 0.10)
= (1.84,  1.84,  2.00,  2.00)  
Probability of consequence 𝜇(𝑥) = (3.04, 3.04, 3.04, 3.04)  
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Figure 7-7: Fuzzy PO of MFf of building construction project 1 
The min-max implication is then employed to calculate the fuzzy preference. The fuzzy 
inference can be broken down into four phases, as described below.  
Stage 1 is to determine which rules are in the rule base. From the mapping of inputs of 
PO×SC×PC, the following eight rules are developed, contributing to the evaluation process.  
Rule#69:IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably unlikely, THEN RM is Acceptable 
Rule#70:IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Likely, THEN RM is Average 
Rule#99:IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably unlikely, THEN RM is Average 
Rule#100:IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Likely, THEN RM is Average 
Rule#75:IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably unlikely, THEN RM is 
Average 
Rule#76:IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Likely, THEN RM is Average 
Rule #105:IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably unlikely, THEN RM is Average 
Rule #106:IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Likely, THEN RM is Average 
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Stage 2 is to apply the minimum operator to calculate the strength of the fired rules, this 
process is as follows: 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #69:  𝛼69 =  𝜇 𝑈𝑁(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝑂(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝑅𝑈(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.32,0.52,  0.92) = 0.32 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #70:  𝛼70 =  𝜇 𝑈𝑁(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝑂(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.32,  0.52,  0.08) = 0.08 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #75:  𝛼75 =  𝜇 𝐹𝑈(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝑂(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝑅𝑈(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1.00,  0.52,  0.92) = 0.52 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #76:  𝛼76 =  𝜇 𝐹𝑈(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝑂 (𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1.00,  0.52,  0.08) = 0.08 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #99:  𝛼99 =  𝜇𝑈𝑁(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝑅𝑈(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.32,  1.00,  0.92) = 0.32 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #100:𝛼100 = 𝜇𝑈𝑁(𝑃𝑂) ∩ 𝜇𝑀𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.32,  1.00,  0.08) = 0.08 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #105:  𝛼105 =  𝜇𝐹𝑈(𝑃𝑂) ∩ 𝜇𝑀𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩ 𝜇𝑅𝑈(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1.00,1.00, 0.92) = 0.92 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #106:  𝛼106 =  𝜇𝐹𝑈(𝑃𝑂) ∩ 𝜇𝑀𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩ 𝜇𝐿𝐼(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1.00, 1.00, 0.08) = 0.08 
 
where UNPO and FUPO, are the qualitative descriptors “Unlikely” and “Fairly unlikely” of PO, 
respectively, MOSC, MASC are the qualitative descriptors “Moderate” and “Major” of SC 
respectively, and RUPC and LIPC, are the qualitative descriptors “Reasonably unlikely”  and 
“Likely” of PC respectively. 
Stage 3 is to determine the control fired rules in outputs:  
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #69:  𝛼69 ∩  𝜇𝐴(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.32, 𝜇𝐴(𝑅𝑀)) 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #70:  𝛼70 ∩  𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.08, 𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀)) 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #75:  𝛼75 ∩  𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.32, 𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀)) 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #76:  𝛼76 ∩  𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.08, 𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀)) 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #99:  𝛼99 ∩  𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.52, 𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀)) 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #100:  𝛼100 ∩ 𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.08, 𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀)) 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #105:  𝛼105 ∩ 𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.92, 𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀)) 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #106:𝛼106 ∩ 𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(0.08, 𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀)) 
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It should be noted that the following rules, Rule #70, Rule #75, Rule #76, Rule #99, Rule 
#100 and Rule #106, are included in Rule #105.  
The maximum operator is taken to calculate 
𝜇𝑄𝑅𝑀(𝑥) = max{min(0.32,  𝜇𝐴(𝑅𝑀)),   min(0.92,  𝜇𝑉(𝑅𝑀))} 
 
7.2.8 Defuzzification 
The fuzzy output RM can be defuzzified by Equation (6-12) based on the centre-average 
defuzzification. The safety risk magnitude of the hazardous event FH-01 is obtained as RM = 
2.61, which illustrates the risk level within RM axis, as shown in Figure 7-8. 
                         RM FH-01 =  
1.5×0.32+3×0.92












Figure 7-8: Risk magnitude of MFf of FH-01 in building construction project 1 
By following the eight steps above, the safety risk magnitude of all the hazardous events of 
building construction project 1 are computed, and the results are shown in Table 7-7 
2.61 
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Table 7-7: Safety risk magnitude of building construction project 1 
 
Hazard 
Groups Hazardous events 
Aggregated STFN Safety 
risk 
scores 
Safety risk categories Probability of 
occurrence 
Severity of                    
consequence 




FH-01 Working platform 
FH-02 Placement ladder 
FH-03 Erection of scaffolding 
FH-04 Climbing cranes 
FH-05 Temporary ladder 
FH-06 Hole in the ground 
FH-07 Working on height unprotected 
FH-08 Through opening elevator shaft 
1.84, 1.84, 2.00, 2.00 
1.94, 1.94, 1.94, 1.94 
2.00, 2.00, 2.16, 2.16 
1.74, 1.74, 1.90, 1.90 
1.56, 1.56, 1.72, 1.72 
2.76, 2.76, 2.92, 2.92 
3.40, 3.40, 3.84, 3.84 
3.24, 3.24, 3.40, 3.40 
3.16, 3.32, 3.42, 3.58 
2.84, 2.84, 2.94, 2.94 
2.84, 2.84, 2.94, 2.94 
3.66, 3.82, 3.82, 3.98 
2.66, 2.66, 2.76, 2.76 
3.28, 3.28, 3.44, 3.44 
4.06, 4.06, 4.32, 4.32 
3.72, 3.72, 3.98, 3.98 
3.04, 3.04, 3.04, 3.04 
3.24, 3.24, 3.24, 3.24 
2.48, 2.48, 2.58, 2.58 
2.48, 2.48, 2.58, 2.58 
3.14, 3.14, 3.24, 3.24 
3.32, 3.32, 3.42, 3.42 
4.40, 4.40, 4.40, 4.40 



















FO-09 Part of climbing cranes, scaffolds  
FO-10 Operating, cleaning and clearing 
FO-11 Blown by wind 
FO-12 Hand-held tools 
FO-13 Hopper and bucket 
FO-14 Stacked items 
FO-15 Objects under pressure or tension 
2.20, 2.20, 2.36, 2.36 
2.30, 2.30, 2.30, 2.30 
2.78, 2.78, 2.78, 2.78 
2.58, 2.58, 2.58, 2.58 
2.50, 2.50, 2.66, 2.66 
2.40, 2.40, 2.40, 2.40 
2.48, 2.64, 2.74, 2.90 
3.48, 3.48, 3.74, 3.74 
2.58, 2.58, 2.68, 2.68 
3.02, 3.02, 3.28, 3.28 
3.04, 3.04, 3.30, 3.30 
3.32, 3.32, 3.58, 3.58 
2.26, 2.26, 2.52, 2.52 
3.16, 3.32, 3.42, 3.58 
3.70, 3.70, 3.80, 3.80 
3.12, 3.12, 3.22, 3.22 
2.90, 2.90, 3.00, 3.00 
3.42, 3.42, 3.52, 3.52 
2.96, 2.96, 3.06, 3.06 
3.12, 3.12, 3.22, 3.22 


















MH-17 Mobile crane lifting 
2.26, 2.26, 2.36, 2.36 
2.76, 2.92, 3.02, 3.18 
3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00 
3.66, 3.82, 3.92, 4.08 
2.76, 2.76, 2.86, 2.86 








EQ-18 Heavy equipment  
EQ-19 Steel bar bending machine 
EQ-20 Vibrator machine 
3.12, 3.12, 3.38, 3.38 
2.40, 2.40, 2.66, 2.66 
2.02, 2.02, 2.12, 2.12
  
3.66, 3.82, 3.92, 4.08 
2.54, 2.54, 2.80, 2.80 
2.54, 2.54, 2.80, 2.80 
3.48, 3.48, 3.58, 3.58 
3.38, 3.38, 3.48, 3.48 









EL-22 Electrical work 
EL-23 Overhead power lines 
EL-24 Arc welding machine 
2.46, 2.46, 2.62, 2.62 
2.54, 2.54, 2.70, 2.70 
2.10, 2.10, 2.26, 2.26 
2.72, 2.72, 2.72, 2.72 
3.66, 3.66, 3.92, 3.92 
4.22, 4.22, 4.48, 4.48 
3.66, 3.66, 3.92, 3.92 
3.38, 3.38, 3.64, 3.64
   
3.46, 3.46, 3.56, 3.56 
3.54, 3.54, 3.64, 3.64 
3.08, 3.08, 3.18, 3.18 











ST-25 Tripping over building materials 
ST-26 Slipping on wet surfaces 
ST-27 Trips caused by small change  
ST-28 Trips caused by water pipes, rebar 
ST-29 Walking around construction site 
2.04, 2.04, 2.14, 2.14 
2.24, 2.24, 2.34, 2.34 
2.60, 2.60, 2.70, 2.70 
2.60, 2.60, 2.70, 2.70 
2.12, 2.12, 2.12, 2.12 
2.28, 2.28, 2.38, 2.38 
2.46, 2.46, 2.46, 2.46 
2.74, 2.74, 2.84, 2.84 
2.74, 2.74, 2.84, 2.84 
2.28, 2.28, 2.28, 2.28 
3.60, 3.60, 3.70, 3.70 
3.40, 3.40, 3.50, 3.50 
3.34, 3.34, 3.44, 3.44 
2.86, 2.86, 3.16, 3.16 
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Hazard 
Groups Hazardous events 
Aggregated STFN Safety 
risk 
scores 
Safety risk categories Probability of 
occurrence 
Severity of                    
consequence 




TH-30 Collision with another vehicle 
TH-31 Collision with plant/people 
1.92, 1.92, 1.92, 1.92 
1.92, 1.92, 1.92, 1.92 
3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00 
3.02, 3.02, 3.02, 3.02 
2.84, 2.84, 2.84, 2.84 







VO-32 Crane overturn 
VO-33 Mobile plant (Bobcats, tractor) 
2.26, 2.26, 2.26, 2.26 
2.26, 2.26, 2.36, 2.36 
3.20, 3.20, 3.20, 3.20 
3.84, 3.84, 3.84, 3.84 
2.76, 2.76, 2.76, 2.76 







FE-34 Hot work 
FE-35 Working near flammables 
FE-36 Gas cylinder or hose leakage 
FE-37 Fire extinguisher has been 
discharged 
3.12, 3.12, 3.28, 3.28 
3.08, 3.08, 3.24, 3.24 
3.08, 3.08, 3.24, 3.24 
2.70, 2.70, 2.86, 2.86 
3.78, 3.78, 4.04, 4.04 
3.74, 3.90, 4.00, 4.16 
3.38, 3.54, 3.54, 3.70 
3.30, 3.46, 3.56, 3.72 
2.96, 2.96, 2.96, 2.96 
2.76, 2.76, 2.76, 2.76 
3.26, 3.26, 3.26, 3.26 






Average: 80%, High: 20% 
Average: 56%, High: 44% 







ES-39 Cement dust 
ES-40 Corrosive substances 
2.48, 2.48, 2.58, 2.58 
2.56, 2.56, 2.74, 2.74 
2.02, 2.02, 2.02, 2.02 
  
  
3.04, 3.04, 3.14, 3.14 
3.32, 3.32, 3.42, 3.42 
3.02, 3.02, 3.12, 3.12 
2.94, 2.94, 2.94, 2.94 
3.50, 3.50, 3.50, 3.50 












CO-41 Collapse of boom(cranes) 
CO-42 Collapse of scaffolding 
CO-43 Temporary structure 
CO-44 Steel sheet piles 
CO-45 Kingpost 
2.30, 2.30, 2.40, 2.40 
2.12, 2.12, 2.38, 2.38 
1.92, 1.92, 2.18, 2.18 
2.08, 2.24, 2.34, 2.50 
2.08, 2.08, 2.34, 2.34 
3.66, 3.82, 3.82, 3.98 
3.38, 3.54, 3.54, 3.70 
3.38, 3.54, 3.64, 3.80 
3.56, 3.72, 3.82, 3.98 
3.74, 3.90, 4.00, 4.16 
2.58, 2.58, 2.58, 2.58 
2.94, 2.94, 2.94, 2.94 
2.76, 2.76, 2.76, 2.76 
3.14, 3.14, 3.14, 3.14 















CS-46 Deep excavations 
CS-47 Closed tanks 
2.56, 2.72, 2.82,2.98 
3.34, 3.34, 3.60, 3.60 
3.56, 3.72, 3.72, 3.88 
3.30, 3.46, 3.46, 3.62 
3.14, 3.14, 3.14, 3.14 









EH-48 Poor work posture 
EH-49 Repetitive movement 
EH-50 Extreme muscular exertion 
2.50, 2.50, 2.76, 2.76 
2.84, 2.84, 2.94, 2.94 
2.66, 2.66, 2.76, 2.76 
2.92, 2.92, 3.18, 3.18 
2.80, 2.80, 2.90, 2.90 
2.98, 3.14, 3.24, 3.40 
3.32, 3.32, 3.42, 3.42 
3.32, 3.32, 3.42, 3.42 














NV-54 Vibrator machine 
NV-55 Hand-held power tools 
3.02, 3.02, 3.12, 3.12 
2.38, 2.38, 2.64, 2.64 
3.20, 3.36, 3.46, 3.62 
2.86, 2.86, 2.96, 2.96 
1.74, 1.74, 1.84, 1.84 
3.00, 3.16, 3.36, 3.52 
2.62, 2.78, 3.08, 3.24 
2.90, 3.06, 3.36, 3.52 
3.00, 3.00, 3.30, 3.30 
2.62, 2.62, 3.08, 3.08 
4.04, 4.04, 4.14, 4.14 
3.76, 3.76, 3.86, 3.86 
4.50, 4.50, 4.60, 4.60 
3.80, 3.80, 3.90, 3.90 
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Table 7-8: Safety risk magnitude when compared with two parameters (2Ps) in building 








scores Safety risk categories 
Risk 
scores Safety risk categories 

































































































































































































Average: 80%, High: 20% 








Average: 80%, High: 20% 
Average: 56%, High: 44% 




































































Average: 44%, High: 56% 
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Safety risk categories 



































































Table 7-8 shows that when the third parameter, probability of consequence (PC), has been 
introduced in the proposed model, the safety risks scores from the two methods are slightly 
different. For example, for FH-02 (Placement ladder), FH-05 (Temporary ladder), FH-07 
(Working on height unprotected), MH-17 (Mobile crane lifting), EQ-18 (Heavy equipment), 
FE-36 (Gas cylinder or hose leakage), CO-43 (Steel sheet piles), CS-47 (Closed tank), NV-51 
(Piling), and NV-55 (Hand-held power tools), the hazardous event scores are higher than the 
results from the traditional method using two input parameters. After further analysis of the 
data, it was found that the results obtained from the proposed model have been affected by a 
higher probability of consequence (PC) and the severity of consequence to be estimated when 
the all hazardous events above can potentially become realities. Therefore, the obtained 
results revealed that using the developed construction safety risk assessment methodology 
improves the reliability and decreases ambiguity. 
7.2.9 Calculation of the Criteria Weights 
Once all the hazardous events of building construction project 1 have been identified and 
assessed based on the FRT, an MFAHP is applied to obtain the weighting factors of the 
hazardous groups. The process is described below. 
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An MFAHP based on trapezoidal fuzzy number is used to obtain the weights of the safety 
risk hazards to assess the overall safety risk magnitude of the construction project, especially 
when the pairwise comparison matrices become large datasets. 
According to the basic principle of engineering judgement, experts were asked to make 
pairwise assessment of all the risks. It should be noted that n (n-1)/2, as mentioned earlier, 
and in this case, there are 14 × (14-1)/2 = 91 comparisons. However, according to Equations 
(5-6) and (5-7), using the MFAHP method, only n-1, there are (14-1) = 13 comparisons. Then, 
all aggregated pairwise comparison values were obtained, as shown in Table 7-9. 
The aggregated STFN pairwise comparison can be obtained by Equation (6-3). For instance, 
the aggregated STFN pairwise comparison of FH vs. FO (RH1,2) is as follows: 
 
Aggregated STFN = 




FH vs. FO a = {
3×0.20+0.33×0.18+2×0.18+1×0.18+2×0.16+0.33×0.10
0.20+0.18+0.18+0.18+0.06+0.10
} = 1.55 
  
FH vs. FO b = {
4×0.20+0.33×0.18+2×0.18+1×0.18+3×0.16+0.33×0.10
0.20+0.18+0.18+0.18+0.06+0.10
} = 1.91 
  
FH vs. FO c = {
4×0.20+0.33×0.18+2×0.18+1×0.18+3×0.16+0.50×0.10
0.20+0.18+0.18+0.18+0.06+0.10
} = 1.93 
  
FH vs. FO d = {
5×0.20+0.33×0.18+2×0.18+1×0.18+4×0.16+0.50×0.10
0.20+0.18+0.18+0.18+0.06+0.10
} = 2.29 
 
FH vs. FO {a, b, c, d} = {1.55, 1.91, 1.93, 2.29} 
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Table 7-9: Experts’ judgements of building construction project 1 
 
Comparison 
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Table 7-9: Experts’ judgements of building construction project 1(Cont.) 
 
Comparison 
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Once the all the aggregated pairwise comparison values have been calculated, the pairwise 
comparison matrix of all the safety risks can be established by Equations (5-1) and (5-3) on 
based on the completed trapezoidal fuzzy number preference relation decision matrix as 
shown in Table 7-10. 
 
                                                                                  𝑅1         𝑅2 …      𝑅14 



















]   
 
It should be noted that FH1,6 and FH1,14 are not in the interval [1/9-9]. The completed 
trapezoidal fuzzy number preference relation decision matrix is needed to transfer the 
MFAHP preference relation decision matrix in the interval. In this case, by using Equation 
(5-8) the maximum of P1 = max (xij) = FH x1,14 = 4.5E+04, and the following transformation 









,                       








        
 
Table 7-11 lists the transferred entries that are employed as the MFAHP preference relation 
decision matrix for the modified fuzzy-AHP processes. 
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Table 7-10: Completed trapezoidal fuzzy number preference relation decision matrix preference matrix for building construction project 1 
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Table 7-11: MFAHP preference relation decision matrix for building construction project 1 
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Using Equations (5-9) and (5-10), the geometric mean method and the weights of all the 
hazard groups are obtained as follows: 
 















































 √1 × 1.09 × 1.10 × 1.27 × …× 5.62
14
,
 √1 × 1.14 × 1.15 × 1.35 × …× 6.85
14
,
 √1 × 1.14 × 1.18 × 1.39 × …× 7.59
14
,











              
   XFH = {2.082, 2.346, 2.476, 2.744} 
Similarity, XFO, XMH,  XEQ, XEL, XST, XTH, XFE, XES, XCO, XEH, XCS and XNV  can be calculated:  
 XFO = {1.892, 2.054, 2.166, 2.328}  XMH = {1.870, 2.029, 2.112, 2.268} 
XEQ= {1.614, 1.729, 1.790, 1.905}  XEL = {1.341, 1.428, 1.473, 1.560} 
 XST = {1.015, 1.075, 1.108, 1.168}  XTH = {0.897, 0.946, 0.972, 1.024} 
 XVO = {0.927, 0.978, 1.005, 1.058}  XFE = {0.930, 0.982, 1.009, 1.075} 
 XES = {0.688, 0.729, 0.751, 0.803}  XCO = {0.631, 0.668, 0.693, 0.741} 
 XEH = {0.493, 0.525, 0.545, 0.586}  XCS = {0.366, 0.392, 0.408, 0.442} 
 XNV = {0.305, 0.326, 0.343, 0.375} 
The fuzzy weight factors can be calculated by 
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   2.744
{2.744+2.328+2.268+⋯+0.375}









            
WFH = {0.14, 0.14, 0.15, 0.15}  WFO = {0.13, 0.13, 0.13, 0.13} 
WMH = {0.12, 0.13, 0.13, 0.13}  WEQ = {0.11, 0.11, 0.11, 0.11} 
WEL = {0.09, 0.09, 0.09, 0.09}  WST = {0.07, 0.07, 0.07, 0.06} 
WTH = {0.06, 0.06, 0.06, 0.06}  WVO = {0.06, 0.06, 0.06, 0.06} 
WFE = {0.06, 0.06, 0.06, 0.06}  WES = {0.05, 0.04, 0.04, 0.04} 
WCO= {0.04, 0.04, 0.04, 0.04}  WEH = {0.03, 0.03, 0.03, 0.03} 
WCS = {0.02, 0.02, 0.02, 0.02}  WNV = {0.02, 0.02, 0.02, 0.02} 







} = 0.1456 
WFO = 0.1275 
  WMH = 0.1251 
  WEQ = 0.1064 
  WEL = 0.0877 
  WST = 0.0660 
  WTH = 0.0580 
  WVO = 0.0600 
  WFE = 0.0604 
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  WES = 0.0449 
  WCO= 0.0413 
  WEH = 0.0325 
  WCS = 0.0243 
  WNV = 0.0203 
Finally, the total weight factors of all the hazard groups are obtained by using Equation (5-






 = { 0.1456
0.1456+0.1275+0.1251+⋯+0.0203
} = 0.1456 
WFFO = 0.1275 
  WFMH = 0.1251 
  WEQ = 0.1064 
  WFEL = 0.0877 
  WFST = 0.0660 
  WFTH = 0.0580 
  WFVO = 0.0600 
 WFFE = 0.0604 
 WFES = 0.0449 
 WFCO= 0.0413 
 WFEH = 0.0325 
 WFCS = 0.0243 
 WFNV = 0.0203 
 
 
Once the weight factors of the hazard groups have been obtained, the overall safety risk 
magnitude can be calculated by Equation (6-13): 




RM Overall Building Construction Project 1 = 3.12 
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Consequently, the overall safety risk magnitude of building construction project 1 is 3.12.  
The safety risk is between Average and High with confidence of 76 per cent for Average and 
24 per cent for High, as shown in Table 7-12.   
 













76%, High: 24%) 




Falling objects 3.00 Average: 100%  
Manual handling 3.22 
 
Average: 56%, High: 44% 
 
Equipment, machinery and 
tools 
3.44 Average: 12%, High: 88% 
 
Electricity 3.49 Average: 2%, High: 98%  
Slips and trips 3.00 Average: 100% 
 
Traffic hazards 2.76 Average: 100% 
 
Vehicle overturn 3.00 Average: 100% 
 
Fire and explosions 3.32 Average: 36%, High: 64% 
Exposure to hazardous 
substances 
3.00 Average: 100% 
 
Collapse of site structure 2.79 Average: 100% 
 
Confined space 3.28 Average: 44%, High: 56% 
 
Ergonomic/Human factors 3.00 Average: 100% 
 
Noise and vibration 3.48 Average: 4%, High: 96% 
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7.2.10 Calculation of the Safety Risk Rankings  
Based on the ranking of safety risks in the construction projects from highest to lowest based 
on the outcomes of the risk assessment, the FTOPSIS method is used to obtain the final 
ranking for evaluating important safety risks. The details of the aggregated STFN matrix of 
PO, SC and PC for all 14 hazard groups are presented in Table 7-13. As mentioned earlier, 
the information in the second column (PO), the third column (SC), and the fourth column (PC) 
is based on the experts’ judgements, as shown in Table 7-13. The risks in the last column are 
safety risks as a function of fuzzy PO, fuzzy SC and fuzzy PC for each row. 




Risks=PO× PC × SC Probability of 
occurrence 
Severity of                    
consequence 





3.40, 3.40, 3.84, 3.84 
 
 
4.06, 4.06, 4.32, 4.32 
 
 
4.40, 4.40, 4.40, 4.40 
 
 
60.74, 60.74, 66.15, 66.15 
FO 2.78, 2.78, 2.78, 2.90 3.48, 3.48, 3.74, 3.74 
 
3.70, 3.70, 3.80, 3.80 
 
35.80, 35.80, 39.51, 41.21 
MH 2.76, 2.92, 3.02, 3.18 
 
3.66, 3.82, 3.92, 4.08 3.26, 3.26, 3.36, 3.36 32.93, 36.36, 39.78, 43.59 
EQ 3.12, 3.12, 3.38, 3.38 3.66, 3.82, 3.92, 4.08 3.48, 3.48, 3.58, 3.58 39.74, 41.48, 47.43, 49.37 
EL 2.72, 2.72, 2.72, 2.72 4.22, 4.22, 4.48, 4.48 
 
3.54, 3.54, 3.64, 3.64 
 
40.63, 40.63, 44.36, 44.36 
ST 2.60, 2.60, 2.70, 2.70 2.74, 2.74, 2.84, 2.84 
 
3.60, 3.60, 3.70, 3.70 
 
25.65, 25.65, 28.37, 28.37 
TH 1.92, 1.92, 1.92, 1.92 
 
3.02, 3.02, 3.02, 3.02 3.02, 3.02, 3.02, 3.02 17.51, 17.51, 17.51, 17.51 
VO 2.26, 2.26, 2.36, 2.36 3.84, 3.84, 3.84, 3.84 2.76, 2.76, 2.76, 2.76 
 
23.95, 23.95, 25.01, 25.01 
FE 3.12, 3.12, 3.28, 3.28 
 
3.78, 3.78, 4.04, 4.04 
 
3.58, 3.58, 3.58, 3.58 42.22, 42.22, 47.44, 47.44 
ES 2.56, 2.56, 2.74, 2.74 
 
3.32, 3.32, 3.42, 3.42 
 
3.50, 3.50, 3.50, 3.50 
 
29.75, 29.75, 32.80, 32.80 
CO 2.30, 2.30, 2.40, 2.40 
 
3.74, 3.90, 4.00, 4.16 3.14, 3.14, 3.14, 3.14 27.01, 28.17, 30.14, 31.35 
EH 2.84, 2.84, 2.94, 2.94 
 
2.98, 3.14, 3.24, 3.40 3.42, 3.42, 3.52, 3.52 28.94, 30.50, 33.53, 35.19 
CS 3.34, 3.34, 3.60, 3.60 3.56, 3.72, 3.72, 3.88 
 
3.14, 3.14, 3.14, 3.14 37.34, 39.01, 42.05, 43.86 
NV 3.20, 3.36, 3.46, 3.62 
 
3.00, 3.16, 3.36, 3.52 
 
4.50, 4.50, 4.60, 4.60 
 
43.20, 47.78, 53.48, 58.62 
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Using Equation (5-14), the normalised matrix of fuzzy decision is obtained, as illustrated in 
Table 7-14. The next step is to obtain a fuzzy weighted and normalised decision matrix by 
utilising weights calculated by MFAHP. The fuzzy weighted and normalised decision matrix 
is obtained by using Equation (5-15), as shown in Table 7-14. 
 
Based on the STFN presented in Table 7-14, the fuzzy positive ideal solution (𝐴+) by using 
Equation (5-16) and the fuzzy negative ideal solution (𝐴−) by using Equation (5-17) are 
determined as (0.134, 0.134, 0.146, 0.146) and (0.013, 0.014, 0.015, 0.015) respectively. 
Then, the distance of each risk from the fuzzy positive ideal solution (𝑑+) and the fuzzy 
negative ideal solution (𝑑−) is computed using Equations (5-18) and (5-19) respectively. 
Finally, a preference order can be ranked according to the order of the index, as shown in 
Table 7-14. 
Once the hazard groups have been identified and evaluated, proper safety risk mitigation and 
control strategies must be provided to manipulate the potential safety risks in building 
construction project 1. According to the results of the risk ranking obtained. FH, FO, MH, EQ 
and EL are high-risk hazard groups and need the most attention, while NV, EH, TH and CS 
are low-risk hazard groups. 
 
7.2.11 Safety Risk Controls and Discussions 
According to the results of the proposed model obtained from this research, as shown in 
Table 7-14, hazard groups FH, FO, MH, EQ and EL are high-ranking hazard groups and need 
the most consideration. Conversely, hazard groups NV, EH and TH are low-ranking hazard 
groups. The ranking of the contributions of all 14 hazard groups in building construction 
project 1 in Table 7-14, is presented in Figure 7-9. 
*
iCC
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Table 7-14: Calculation of fuzzy closeness coefficient for each hazard group in building construction project 1 
 

















0.918, 0.918, 1.000, 1.000 
0.541, 0.541, 0.597, 0.623 
0.498, 0.550, 0.601, 0.659 
0.601, 0.627, 0.717, 0.746 
0.614, 0.614, 0.671, 0.671 
0.388, 0.388, 0.429, 0.429 
0.265, 0.265, 0.265, 0.265 
0.362, 0.362, 0.378, 0.378 
0.638, 0.638, 0.717, 0.717 
0.450, 0.450, 0.496, 0.496 
0.408, 0.426, 0.456, 0.474 
0.438, 0.461, 0.507, 0.532 
0.564, 0.590, 0.636, 0.663 
0.653, 0.722, 0.808, 0.886 
 
0.134, 0.134, 0.146, 0.146 
0.069, 0.069, 0.076, 0.079 
0.062, 0.069, 0.075, 0.082 
0.064, 0.067, 0.076, 0.079 
0.054, 0.054, 0.059, 0.059 
0.026, 0.026, 0.028, 0.028 
0.015, 0.015, 0.015, 0.015 
0.022, 0.022, 0.023, 0.023 
0.039, 0.039, 0.043, 0.043 
0.020, 0.020, 0.022, 0.022 
0.017, 0.018, 0.019, 0.020 
0.014, 0.015, 0.016, 0.017 
0.014, 0.014, 0.015, 0.016 










































































Figure 7-9: Ranking of all hazard groups in building construction project 1 to index   
Recommended measures for each hazard group with the most important safety risk are 
presented and discussed below. 
 
Falls from height are of significant concern because of the serious consequences of workers’ 
fall injuries. This group has eight hazardous events: working platform, placement ladder, 
erection of scaffolding, climbing cranes, temporary ladder, hole in the ground, working on 
height unprotected, and through opening elevator shaft. In this situation, the probability of 
occurrence is mitigated significantly by following the working procedure determined by the 
manufacturer. Safety training and instruction on using devices providing fall protection to the 
workers, such as strict enforcement of the use of full harnesses and fall-arresting devices, 
need control to maintain safe access to the workplaces, Furthermore, experienced and 
competent workers should be engaged for the task, and a competent person to select or design 
of the suitable anchorage points for fixing the independent safe line should be appointed. 
Finally, warning notices should be displayed in workplaces to remind workers to follow the 
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The hazard group falling objects has seven hazardous events: part of climbing cranes and 
scaffolds; operating, cleaning and clearing; blown by wind; hand-held tools; hopper and 
bucket; stacked items; and objects under pressure or tension. To reduce the risk magnitude of 
falling objects, lifting paths should be demarcated, warning signs or notices should be 
displayed, and suitable training on safe stacking and rigging of materials should be provided 
for workers. Moreover, the lifting appliances and lifting gear should be examined and tested 
by registered professional engineers and the certificates should be valid. Furthermore, a 
visual inspection of the lifting gears should be carried out before using it to ensure that it is in 
a suitable condition and safe to use. Training on safe use of lifting appliances and lifting gear 
should be provided for operators and workers. Toe boards or similar safety measures should 
be erected near the floor edge. Warning notices should be displayed to remind other workers 
entering the affected areas, and the wearing of safety helmets on site should be enforced.  
 
 
The manual handling group has two hazardous events: using hoists and mobile crane lifting. 
Adequate machines to assist in the handling of material should be provided if possible, and 
the wearing of suitable protective gloves by workers should be enforced. A manual handling 
risk assessment should be conducted by a competent person where appropriate. Instruction 
should be provided, and close monitoring should be carried out by a competent supervisor.  
 
Even if the hazard groups noise and vibration, ergonomic/human factors, and traffic hazards 
pose the fewest hazards, inspection and control of the hazardous events in these groups 
should still be maintained. For example, the noise and vibration hazard group has five 
hazardous events: piling, excavation, hammering, vibrator machine, and hand-held power 
tools. Therefore, retro-fitting existing equipment with damping materials and mufflers can be 
carried out to reduce noise levels, and barriers can be constructed from commercial panels 
which are lined with sound-absorbing material to achieve the maximum shielding effect 
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possible. Moreover, administrative control to reduce workers’ noise exposure should be 
maintained. For example, the number of site workers exposed should be transferred from 
high exposure work to a lower exposure work, which could make the workers’ daily noise 
exposure acceptable. 
 
The results using the proposed construction safety risk management model were compared 
with the method developed by building construction project 1, as shown in Table 7-15. The 
results show that the safety risk ranking in the proposed construction safety risk management 
model is slightly different from the method developed by building construction project 1. For 
example, in the proposed model, falls from height (working on height unprotected) has the 
highest safety risk score of 4.27 and type of safety risk has confidence of 54 per cent for High 
and 46 per cent for Unacceptable. Furthermore, the results show that working at height 
unprotected, hammering, electrical work, through opening elevator shaft and heavy 
equipment are identified as the five hazardous events with higher safety risk scores than any 
others in both building construction project 1’s method and the proposed model. Obviously, 
the results from the building construction project 1’s method can only produce similar safety 
risk level results and cannot provide both risk level and type of safety risk with a confidence 
percentage. Therefore, the overall the safety risk of the project and safety risk ranking can 
support construction project staff for mitigation and controlling safety risks in order to 
improve the SSOP during the construction projects. It can be concluded that the proposed 
construction safety risk management model is a reliable and less ambiguous methodology for 
management of critical hazards and dealing with uncertainties affecting the safety of 
construction projects.        
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Table 7-15: Safety risk level of building construction project 1 
FH-07 Working on height unprotected 4.27 High: 54%, Unacceptable 46%  High 
NV-53 Hammering 3.67 High 100% High 
EL-22 Electrical work 3.63 High 100% High 
FH-08 Through opening elevator shaft 3.50 High 100% High 
EQ-18 Heavy equipment  3.50 High 100% High 
FE-36 Gas cylinder or hose leakage 3.48 Average: 4%, High: 96% High 
MH-17 Mobile crane lifting 3.37 Average: 26%, High: 74% High 
CS-47 Closed tanks 3.28 Average: 44%, High: 56% High 
NV-51 Piling 3.26 Average: 48%, High: 52% High 
FE-35 Working near flammables 3.22 Average: 56%, High: 44% High 
FE-34 Hot work 3.10 Average: 80%, High: 20% High 
FH-03 Erection of scaffolding 3.00 Average: 100% High 
FH-04 Climbing cranes 3.00 Average: 100% High 
FH-06 Hole in the ground 3.00 Average: 100% High 
FO-09 Part of climbing cranes, scaffolds  3.00 Average: 100% High 
FO-10 Operating, cleaning and clearing 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
FO-11 Blown by wind 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
FO-12 Hand-held tools 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
FO-13 Hopper and bucket 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
FO-14 Stacked items 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
FO-15 Objects under pressure or tension 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
MH-16 Hoists 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
EQ-19 Steel bar bending machine 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
EQ-20 Vibrator machine 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
EL-21 Wires 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
EL-23 Overhead power lines 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
EL-24 Arc welding machine 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
ST-25 Tripping over building materials 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
ST-26 Slipping on wet surfaces 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 





Hazardous events Safety risk score Safety risk categories 
 
   Risk level 
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ST-27 Trips caused by small change  3.00              Average: 100%    Medium 
ST-29 Walking around construction site 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
VO-32 Crane overturn 3.00 Average: 100% High 
VO-33 Mobile plant (Bobcat, tractor) 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
FE-37 Fire extinguisher has been discharged 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
ES-38 Solvents 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
ES-39 Cement dust 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
ES-40 Corrosive substances 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
CO-41 Collapse of boom (cranes) 3.00 Average: 100% High 
CO-42 Collapse of scaffolding 3.00 Average: 100% High 
CO-44 Steel sheet piles 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
CO-45 Kingpost 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
CS-46 Deep excavations 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
EH-48 Poor work posture 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
EH-49 Repetitive movement 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
EH-50 Extreme muscular exertion 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
NV-52 Excavation 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
NV-54 Vibrator machine 3.00 Average: 100% Medium 
CO-43 Temporary structure 2.79 Average: 100% Medium 
TH-30 Collision with another vehicle 2.76 Average: 100% Medium 
TH-31 Collision with plant/people 2.76 Average: 100% Medium 
FH-02 Placement ladder 2.72 Average: 100% Medium 
NV-55 Hand-held power tools 2.66 Average: 100% Medium 
FH-01 Working platform 2.61 Average: 100% High 














         Safety risk categories Risk level 
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7.3 Case Study 2: Building Construction Project  
 
7.3.1 Background of Case Study 2 
“Building Construction Company 2” is used instead of the building construction company’s 
name due to business confidentiality. The company undertakes construction projects in the 
private and public sectors. It provides customers with a comprehensive range of services 
covering the whole project development process, including from preliminary development 
and market analysis, marketing, finance, engineering, operation, design, and maintenance. 
This construction project is a condominium project in Bangkok, Thailand. The condominium 
comprises three buildings, with 50 floors and 1,442 units. 
 
7.3.2 Establishing a Safety Risk Management Team                                                                              
Five experts involved in the safety risk management model were selected based on their 
individual skills, knowledge, experience, and expertise. One expert is a project manager who 
has worked on building construction project for more than 19 years. Two experts are 
production managers with 23 years’ experience in building construction projects. The other 
experts are a quality assurance (QA) officer and a safety officer, as shown in Table 7-16 
 
Table 7-16: Description of experts’ contribution factors for building construction project 2 








Expert 1 Project Manager 5 19 5 10 0.25 
Expert 2 Production Manager 5 23 5 10 0.25 
Expert 3 Production Manager 5 23 5 10 0.25 
Expert 4 QA Officer 2 7 3 5 0.125 
Expert 5 Safety Officer 2 9 3 5 0.125 
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7.3.3 Safety Hazard Identification 
 
To carry out safety risk assessment and management, hazard identification by using 
brainstorming and discussions with the safety risk management team of building construction 
project 2, information was gathered and verified to identify all the hazard groups and 
hazardous events. The building construction safety system is divided into 13 hazard groups: 
falls from height; falling objects; manual handling; equipment machinery and tools; 
electricity; slips and trips; traffic hazards; fire and explosions; exposure to hazardous 
substances; collapse of site structure; confined space; ergonomic/human factors; and noise 
and vibration. Each hazard group includes several of identified safety risk events and is 
described below and shown in Figure 7-10. 
(1) Falls from height includes nine hazardous events: working platform (FH-001), 
erection of scaffolding (FH-002,) climbing cranes (FH-003), temporary ladder (FH-
004), hole in the ground (FH-005), working on height unprotected (FH-006), through 
opening elevator shaft (FH-007), working formwork (FH-008), and excavation hole 
(FH-009). 
 
(2) Falling objects includes five hazardous events: part of climbing cranes, scaffolds (FO-
010), operating, cleaning and clearing (FO-011), hand-held tools (FO-012), post- 
tension (FO-013), and blown by wind (FO-014). 
 
(3) Manual handling includes tree hazardous events: hoists (MH-015), poor rigging (MH-
016), and mobile crane lifting (MH-017). 
(4) Equipment machinery and tools includes five hazardous events: cutting machine (EQ-
018), steel bar bending machine (EQ-019), grinder machine (EQ-020), welding 
machine (EQ-021), and concrete breaking machine (EQ-022). 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN                                                                                                                                            CASE STUDIES 
 
181 


































Hole in the ground
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Project level Hazard group level Hazardous event level 
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Figure 7-10: Hazard identification at building construction project 2 
Project level Hazard group level  Hazardous event level 
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(5) Electricity includes four hazardous events: wires (EL-023), electrical work (EL-024), 
overhead power lines (EL-025), and arc welding machine (EL-026). 
 
(6) Slips and trips includes four hazardous events: tripping over building materials (ST-
027), slipping on wet surfaces (ST-028), trips caused by small change in level (ST-
029), and trips caused by water pipes, rebar (ST-030) 
 
(7) Traffic hazards includes two hazardous events: collision with another vehicle (TH-
031), and collision with plant/people (TH-032). 
 
(8) Fire and explosions includes four hazardous events: hot work (FE-033), working near 
flammables (FE-034), gas cylinder or hose leakage (FE-035), and fire extinguisher 
has been discharged (FE-036). 
 
(9) Exposure to hazardous substances includes two hazardous events: cement dust (ES-
037), and corrosive substances (ES-038). 
 
(10) Collapse of site structure includes four hazardous events, i.e. collapse of boom 
(cranes) (CO-039), collapse of scaffolding (CO-040), steel sheet piles (CO-041), and 
kingpost (CO-042). 
 
(11) Confined space includes two hazardous events: deep excavations (CS-043), and 
closed tanks (CS-044). 
 
(12) Ergonomic and human factors includes two hazardous events: poor work posture 
(EH-045), and extreme muscular exertion (EH-046). 
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(13) Noise and vibration includes six hazardous events: piling (NV-047), excavation 
(NV-048), hammering (NV-049), vibrator machine (NV-050), hand-held power tools 
(NV-051), and concrete pump machine (NV-052). 
 
7.3.4 Safety Risk Estimation 
As the safety risk management process of building construction project 2 is similar to the 
case study on safety risk management of building construction project 1, the linguistic 
variables of the all risk parameters, PC, PO and SC and the fuzzy rule base were employed in 
this case. Once safety risk criteria were established and the data on PO, SC and PC had been 
calculated by using fuzzification, fuzzy aggregation, fuzzy inference, and defuzzification, the 
safety risk magnitude of all the hazardous events of building construction project 2 could be 
obtained as shown in Table 7-17. 
For instance, it can be seen in Table 7-17 that FH-003 (Climbing cranes) has aggregated 
STFN of 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 and 1.00 of PO, and 3.75, 3.75, 3.75, and 3.75 of SC, and 1.75, 1.75, 
1.75, and 1.75 of PC. After fuzzy inference, the matching fuzzy set of PO was evaluated as 
“Unlikely” with a membership function value of 1.00. SC was evaluated as “Major” with a 
membership function value of 1.00. PC was evaluated as “Unlikely” with a membership 
function value of 0.50 and “Reasonably unlikely” with a membership function value of 0.50. 
However, two rules were fired, contributing to the assessment procedure.  
These two rules are: “Rule#98: IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Unlikely, THEN RM is 
Acceptable” and “Rule#99: IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably unlikely, 
THEN RM is Average”. 
CHAPTER SEVEN                                                                                                                                            CASE STUDIES 
 
185 
   
Table 7-17: Safety risk magnitude of building construction project 2 
 
Hazard 
groups Hazardous events 
Aggregated STFN Safety 
risk 
score 
Safety risk categories Probability of 
occurrence 
Severity of                    
consequence 




FH-001 Working platform 
FH-002 Erection of scaffolding 
FH-003 Climbing cranes 
FH-004 Temporary ladder 
FH-005 Hole in the ground 
FH-006 Working on height unprotected 
FH-007 Through opening elevator shaft 
FH-008 Working formwork 
FH-009 Excavation hole 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.25, 1.25, 1.25, 1.25 
2.38, 2.38, 2.38, 2.38 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.13, 1.13, 1.13, 1.13 
2.75, 2.75, 3.25, 3.25 
2.25, 2.25, 2.75, 2.75 
3.75, 3.75, 3.75, 3.75 
3.13, 3.13, 3.13, 3.13 
3.50, 3.50, 3.75, 3.75 
3.13, 3.13, 3.38, 3.38 
3.50, 3.50, 3.75, 3.75 
3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00 
3.38, 3.38, 3.38, 3.38 
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 
2.50, 2.50, 2.50, 2.50 
1.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75 
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 
3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00 
3.25, 3.25, 3.25, 3.25 
2.13, 2.13, 2.13, 2.13 
2.50, 2.50, 2.50, 2.50 





















FO-010 Part of climbing cranes, scaffolds  
FO-011 Operating, cleaning and clearing 
FO-012 Hand-held tools 
FO-013 Post-tension 
FO-014 Blown by wind 
1.50, 1.50, 1.50, 1.50 
2.63, 2.63, 2.75, 2.75 
1.88, 1.88, 2.00, 2.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 
2.88, 3.13, 3.38, 3.63 
2.75, 3.00, 3.00, 3.25 
2.13, 2.13, 2.38, 2.38 
3.75, 3.75, 4.25, 4.25 
2.38, 2.38, 2.38, 2.38 
2.50, 2.50, 2.50, 2.50 
2.88, 2.88, 2.88, 2.88 
3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00 
1.88, 1.88, 1.88, 1.88 














MH-016 Poor rigging 
MH-017 Mobile crane lifting 
1.63, 1.63, 1.63, 1.63 
1.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75 
1.63, 1.63, 1.63, 1.63 
2.25, 2.25, 2.50, 2.50 
2.00, 2.00, 2.00, 2.00 
1.88, 1.88, 1.88, 1.88 
2.38, 2.38, 2.38, 2.38 
2.63, 2.63, 2.63, 2.63 




Acceptable: 22%, Average: 78 % 
Average: 100% 




EQ-018 Cutting machine 
EQ-019 Steel bar bending machine 
EQ-020 Grinder machine 
EQ-021 Welding machine 
EQ-022 Concrete breaking machine 
1.25, 1.25, 1.25,1.25 
1.50, 1.50, 1.50, 1.50 
1.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75 
1.88, 1.88, 1.88, 1.88 
1.88, 1.88, 1.88, 1.88 
2.38, 2.38, 2.88, 2.88 
2.38, 2.38, 2.63, 2.63 
3.00, 3.00, 3.50, 3.50 
2.50, 2.50, 2.75, 2.75 
2.25, 2.25, 2.50, 2.50 
2.13, 2.13, 2.13, 2.13 
2.50, 2.50, 2.50, 2.50 
2.88, 2.88, 2.88, 2.88 
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 













EL-024 Electrical work 
EL-025 Overhead power lines 
EL-026 Arc welding machine 
1.88, 1.88, 1.88, 1.88 
1.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75 
1.50, 1.50, 1.50, 1.50 
2.13, 2.13, 2.13, 2.13 
2.63, 2.63, 2.88, 2.88 
2.50, 2.50, 2.50, 2.50 
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 
2.63, 2.63, 2.63, 2.63 
2.50, 2.50, 2.50, 2.50 
2.63, 2.63, 2.63, 2.63 
1.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75 











ST-027 Tripping over building materials 
ST-028 Slipping on wet surfaces 
ST-029 Trips caused by small change  
ST-030 Trips caused by water pipes 
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 
1.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75 
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 
2.13, 2.13, 2.13, 2.13 
1.75, 1.75, 2.00, 2.00 
2.25, 2.25, 2.50, 2.50 
2.13, 2.13, 2.13, 2.13 
1.88, 1.88, 1.88, 1.88 
3.38, 3.38, 3.38, 3.38 
3.25, 3.25, 3.25, 3.25 
3.63, 3.63, 3.63, 3.63 
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Hazard 
groups Hazardous events 
Aggregated STFN Safety 
risk 
scores 
Safety risk categories Probability of 
occurrence 
Severity of                    
consequence 




TH-031 Collision with another vehicle 
TH-032 Collision with plant/people 
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 
2.00, 2.00, 2.00, 2.00 
2.00, 2.00, 2.00, 2.00 
2.63, 2.63, 2.63, 2.63 
2.75, 2.75, 2.75, 2.75 








FE-033 Hot work 
FE-034 Working near flammables 
FE-035 Gas cylinder or hose leakage 
FE-036 Fire extinguisher has been 
discharged 
 
3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00 
2.38, 2.38, 2.38, 2.38 
2.00, 2.00, 2.00, 2.00 
2.75, 2.75, 2.75, 2.75 
 
2.50, 2.50, 2.75, 2.75 
2.88, 2.88, 3.13, 3.13 
2.38, 2.38, 2.38, 2.38 
2.38, 2.38, 2.38, 2.38 
 
3.13, 3.13, 3.13, 3.13 
3.13, 3.13, 3.13, 3.13 
2.88, 2.88, 2.88, 2.88 
















ES-037 Cement dust 
ES-038 Formwork striking oil, epoxy 
2.50, 2.50, 2.50, 2.50 
1.63, 1.63, 1.63, 1.63
  
  
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 
1.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75  
3.50, 3.50, 3.50, 3.50 








CO-039 Temporary structure  
CO-040 Collapse of scaffolding 
CO-041 Steel sheet piles 
CO-042 Kingpost 
1.25, 1.25, 1.25, 1.25 
1.13, 1.13, 1.13, 1.13 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
3.75, 3.75, 4.25, 4.25 
3.63, 3.88, 4.13, 4.38 
3.75, 4.00, 4.25, 4.50 
3.75, 4.00, 4.25, 4.50 
1.63, 1.63, 1.63, 1.63 
1.75, 1.75, 1.75, 1.75 
1.25, 1.25, 1.25, 1.25 











CS-043 Deep excavations 
CS-044 Closed tanks 
1.25, 1.25, 1.25, 1.25 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
3.75, 4.00, 4.25, 4.50 
3.75, 4.00, 4.00, 4.25 
2.00, 2.00, 2.00, 2.00 








EH-045 Poor work posture 
EH-046 Extreme muscular exertion  
 
2.13, 2.13, 2.13, 2.13 
2.38, 2.38, 2.38, 2.38  
2.50, 2.50, 2.50, 2.50 
2.50, 2.50, 2.75, 2.75  
3.75, 3.75, 3.75, 3.75 












NV-050 Vibrator machine 
NV-051 Hand-held power tools 
NV-052 Concrete pump machine 
 
1.38, 1.38, 1.38, 1.38 
1.38, 1.38, 1.38, 1.38 
1.25, 1.25, 1.25, 1.25 
1.13, 1.13, 1.13, 1.13 
1.13, 1.13, 1.13, 1.13 
1.88, 1.88, 1.88, 1.88 
2.13, 2.13, 2.13, 2.13 
2.63, 2.63, 2.63, 2.63 
2.75, 2.75, 2.75, 2.75 
2.00, 2.00, 2.00, 2.00 
1.63, 1.63, 1.63, 1.63 
2.38, 2.38, 2.38, 2.38 
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 
2.25, 2.25, 2.25, 2.25 
2.00, 2.00, 2.00, 2.00 
2.00, 2.00, 2.00, 2.00 
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The firing strength in this case can be obtained by: 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #98 :   𝜇 𝑈𝑁(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝑈𝑁(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1.00,1.00,  0.50) = 0.50 
 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #99 :  𝜇 𝑈𝑁(𝑃𝑂) ∩  𝜇𝑀𝐴(𝑆𝐶) ∩  𝜇𝑅𝑈(𝑃𝐶) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1.00,  1.00,  0.50) = 0.50 
 
Therefore, 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #98 has a firing strength of 0.50 with a safety risk category of “Acceptable”, 
and 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 #99 has a firing strength of 0.50 with a safety risk category of “Average”. Using 
Equations (6-2) and (6-3), the output fuzzy membership function after aggregation and the 
final results of the defuzzification could be obtained as shown in Table 7-17.  
To validate the proposed construction safety risk analysis model’s results, the results obtained 
from the traditional two parameters (2Ps) were compared with those obtained from the 
proposed model, as shown in Table 7-18. In this table, the safety risk magnitude values for 
both parameters and the proposed model in which three parameters have been calculated 
based on the safety risk assessment methodology using the FRT are slightly different. The 
overall results have been affected by probability of consequence when the hazardous event 
with very low probability of occurrence but severity of consequence still very high than the 
probability of consequence or with very high probability of consequence but probability of 
occurrence and severity of consequence very low. 
 
7.3.5 Safety Risk Ranking 
 
To assess the overall safety risk magnitude of construction project 2, the MFAHP based on 
trapezoidal fuzzy number was used to obtain the weighting factor of each hazard group. 
Experts were asked to make pairwise comparisons of all hazard groups, and all aggregated 
pairwise comparison values were calculated, as shown in Table 7-19. A pairwise matrix 
based on experts’ judgements was constructed and an MFAHP preference relation decision 
matrix was established, as shown in Table 7-20. 
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Acceptable: 22%, Average: 78 % 
Average: 100% 




Acceptable: 22%, Average: 78 % 
Average: 100% 
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After calculating the weights using Equations (5-5), (5-6), (5-7) and (5-8), the weight factors 
of all the hazard groups were obtained, as shown in Table 7-21. The overall safety risk 
magnitude can be calculated by Equation (6-13) 
 




RM Overall Building Construction Project 2 = 2.40 
Consequently, the overall safety risk magnitude of building construction project 2 is 2.40 and 
is in the Average category with confidence of 100 per cent, as shown in Table 7-21.   
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Table 7-19: Experts’ judgements of building construction project 2 
 
Comparison 
Expert 1 (0.25) Expert 2 (0.25) Expert 3 (0.25) Expert 4 (0.125) Expert 5 (0.125) 
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Table 7-19: (Continued) 
 
Comparison 
Expert 1 (0.25) Expert 2 (0.25) Expert 3 (0.25) Expert 4 (0.125) Expert 5 (0.125) 
Aggregated 
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Table 7-20: MFAHP preference relation decision matrix for building construction project 2 
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Table 7-20: (Continued) 
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Table 7-21: Safety risk magnitude of hazard groups in building construction project 2 
 
After the weight factors were calculated by using the MFAHP, the FTOPSIS method was 
used to obtain the final ranking for evaluating of important safety risks. The results of the 
calculation of the index of all 13 hazard groups are presented in Table 7-22. 
 
7.3.6 Safety Risk Controls and Discussions 
The results of the proposed model obtained from this research are shown in Table 7-22. It can 
be ascertained that among the 13 hazard groups, FH, FO, FE and EQ are higher-ranking 
hazard groups than any others and need the most attention. Conversely, CO and NV are lower 


















Falls from height 2.25 0.192 Average: 100% 
Falling objects 2.32 0.134 Average: 100% 
Manual handling 2.10 0.082 Average: 100% 
Equipment, machinery 
and tools 2.15 0.104 Average: 100% 
Electricity 2.50 0.102 Average: 100% 
Slips and trips 2.50 0.063 Average: 100% 
Traffic hazards 3.00 0.050 Average: 100% 
Fire and explosions 3.00 0.083 Average: 100% 
Exposure to hazardous 
substances 2.50 0.050 Average: 100% 
Collapse of site structure 2.10 0.042 Average: 100% 
Confined space 2.25 0.045 Average: 100% 
Ergonomic/ Human 
factors 3.00 0.027 Average: 100% 
Noise and vibration 2.15 0.021 Average: 100% 
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Table 7-22: Calculation of fuzzy closeness coefficient for each hazard group in building construction project 2 
 
















0.926, 0.926, 1.000, 1.000 
0.797, 0.869, 0.911, 0.986 
0.353, 0.353, 0.353, 0.353 
0.579, 0.579, 0.676, 0.676 
0.482, 0.482, 0.482, 0.482 
0.665, 0.665, 0.665, 0.665 
0.554, 0.554, 0.554, 0.554 
0.900, 0.900, 0.990, 0.990 
0.756, 0.756, 0.756, 0.756 
0.292, 0.292, 0.331, 0.331 
0.360, 0.384, 0.408, 0.432 
0.798, 0.798, 0.878, 0.878 
0.513, 0.513, 0.513, 0.513 
 
0.178, 0.178, 0.192, 0.192 
0.107, 0.117, 0.123, 0.133 
0.029, 0.029, 0.029, 0.029 
0.060, 0.060, 0.070, 0.070 
0.049, 0.049, 0.049, 0.049 
0.042, 0.042, 0.042, 0.042 
0.028, 0.028, 0.028, 0.028 
0.075, 0.075, 0.083, 0.083 
0.038, 0.038, 0.038, 0.038 
0.013, 0.013, 0.014, 0.014 
0.016, 0.017, 0.019, 0.020 
0.022, 0.022, 0.024, 0.024 
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Figure 7-11: Ranking of all hazard groups in building construction project 2 to index   
Recommended measures for each hazard group with the most important safety risk are 
presented and discussed below. 
Falls from height has nine hazardous events: working platform, erection of scaffolding, 
climbing cranes, temporary ladder, hole in the ground, working on height unprotected, 
through opening elevator shaft, working formwork, and excavation hole. To reduce the 
probability of occurrence and severity of consequence, an induction safety training course on 
using fall protection devices and safety harnesses and safety belts should be provided. 
Furthermore, guard rails and toe boards should be provided for heights over 2 metres 
(including gates and pilling frames safety harnesses should be used, ladders should be 
inspected daily for defects, and mobile access tower cranes should be required if possible. 
Furthermore, warning notices should be displayed on work sites to remind workers to follow 
the SSOP.  
 
Falling objects has five hazardous events: part of climbing cranes, scaffolds; operating, 









FH FO FE EQ EL ST ES MH TH CS EH CO NV
















CHAPTER SEVEN                                                                                                                                            CASE STUDIES 
 
197 
   
probability and severity of consequence, proper lifting and rigging methods should be 
adopted and suitable training on safe use of lifting appliances and lifting gear should be 
provided for operators and workers, including suitable training on safe stacking and rigging 
of materials. Furthermore, warning notices should be displayed to remind other workers 
entering the affected areas. Moreover, the wearing of safety helmets on site should be 
enforced and the chin strip straps for the safety helmet should be used.  Lifting gear should be 
visually inspected to ensure that it is in good condition and safe to use.  
 
Fire and explosion has four hazardous events: hot work, working near flammables, gas 
cylinder or hose leakage, and fire extinguisher has been discharged. Therefore, fire 
prevention training should be provided for workers and they should keep the working areas 
clean and tidy. Training on safe use of electricity and welding machine should also be 
provided. Furthermore, a competent electrician should be appointed to check the electrical 
appliances and welding regularly, and smoking should be prohibited during the welding 
operation. “No smoking” signs should be displayed in the affected areas and a hot work 
permit system should be implemented. Moreover, a sufficient numbers of dry powder type 
fire extinguishers need to be provided near the welding operation areas and fire precaution 
training to welders/hot work operators is required. 
 
Controlling and monitoring should be applied in the confined space and noise and vibration 
groups. Although these hazard groups have been identified as minor safety risks for building 
construction project 2, the control measures should still be maintained effectively. For 
example, for the confined space hazard group, there should be a supervisor or watcher with a 
lifeline when a person is entering a confined space, and all channels, drains and catch pits 
should be inspected and maintained. 
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The results of the proposed construction safety risk assessment model were compared with 
the method developed by building construction project 2, as illustrated in Table 7-23. The 
safety risk ranking from the developed construction safety risk assessment model is slightly 
different from the method developed by building construction project 2. For instance, in the 
proposed, falls from height (hole in the ground, working on height unprotected, and through 
opening elevator shaft) had a safety risk score of 3.00 and were in the Average category with 
confidence of 100 per cent, whereas in building construction project 2’s method it had a 
safety risk levels of moderate. Those hazardous events are in a similar position in both 
methods; however, building construction project 2’s method cannot provide more safety risk 
information to the safety management team for the purposes of decision making. Therefore, it 
should be noted that the proposed construction safety risk management model can provide 
safety risk information and produce safety risk ranking similar to risk level estimated by 
building construction project 2’s method. 
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Table 7-23: Safety risk level of building construction project 2 









Safety risk categories 
 
Risk level 
FH-05 Hole in the ground 
FH-06 Working on height unprotected 
FH-07 Through opening elevator shaft  
FO-11 Operating, cleaning and 
clearing 
FO-14 Blown by wind 
EL-26 Arc welding machine 
ST-29 Trips caused by small change in 
level 
ST-30 Trips caused by water pipes 
TH-31 Collison with another vehicle 
TH-32 Collision with plant/people 
FE-33 Hot work 
FE-34 Working near flammables 
FE-35 Gas cylinder or hose leakage 
FE-36 Fire extinguisher has been 
discharged 
ES-37 Cement dust 
CS-43 Deep excavations 
EH-45 Poor work posture 
EH-46 Extreme muscular exertion 
FO-12 Hand-held tools 
FH-09 Excavation hole 
FO-13 Post-tension 
EQ-21 Welding machine 
EQ-22 Concrete breaking machine 
EL-23 Wires, switchboards 
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Table 7-23: (Continued) 
 









Safety risk categories 
 
Risk level 
NV-52 Concrete pump machine 
FO-10 Part of climbing cranes, 
scaffolds  
FH-03 Climbing cranes 
MH-16 Poor rigging 
EQ-20 Grinder machine 
EL-24 Electrical work 
ST-28 Slipping on wet surfaces 
CO-40 Collapse of scaffolding 
CO-39 Temporary structure 
CO-41 Steel sheet piles 
CO-42 Kingpost 
ES-38 Formwork striking oil, epoxy 
FH-01 Working platform 
CS-44 Closed tanks 
FH-04 Temporary ladder 
MH-15 Hoists 
MH-17 Mobile crane lifting 
FH-02 Erection of scaffolding 
FH-08 Working formwork 
EQ-18 Cutting machine 
EQ-19 Steel bar bending machine 




NV-50 Vibrator machine 












































Acceptable:22%, Average:78 % 
Acceptable:22%, Average:78 % 
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7.4 Case Study 3: Building Construction Project  
 
7.4.1 Background of Case Study 3 
 
“Building Construction Company 3” is used instead of the building construction company’s 
name due to business confidentiality. This construction project is a condominium project in 
Bangkok, Thailand. The condominium comprises two buildings with 34 floors and 864 units. 
 
 
7.4.2 Establishing a Safety Risk Management Team                                                                              
Five experts involved in the safety risk management model were selected based on their 
individual skills, knowledge, experience, and expertise. One expert is a project manager who 
has worked on building construction project for more than 10 years. One expert is a site 
manager with 25 years’ experience and one is a project co-ordinator with 10 years’ 
experience of working on building construction projects. The other experts are safety officers, 
as shown in Table 7-24 
 
Table 7-24: Description of experts’ contribution factors 








Expert 1 Project Manager 5 10 4 10 0.25 
Expert 2 Site Manager 4 25 5 10 0.25 
Expert 3 Project Co-ordinator 4 10 4 10 0.22 
Expert 4 Safety Officer 2 9 3 5 0.14 
Expert 5 Safety Officer 2 8 3 5 0.14 
 
7.4.3 Safety Hazard Identification 
 
To carry out safety risk assessment and management, following brainstorming and 
discussions with safety risk management team of building construction project 3 information 
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was gathered and verified to ensure that it contained all the hazard groups and hazardous 
events. The building construction safety system is divided into 13 hazard groups: falls from 
height; falling objects; manual handling; equipment machinery and tools; electricity; slips 
and trips; traffic hazards; fire and explosions; exposure to hazardous substances, collapse of 
site structure, confined space, ergonomic/human factors and noise and vibration. Each hazard 
group includes several identified safety risk events and is described below. 
 
(1) Falls from height includes seven hazardous events: working platform (FH-0001), 
erection of scaffolding (FH-0002,) climbing cranes (FH-0003), temporary ladder (FH-
0004), hole in the ground (FH-0005), working on height unprotected (FH-0006), and 
through opening elevator shaft (FH-0007). 
 
(2) Falling objects includes three hazardous events: part of climbing cranes, scaffolds 
(FO-0008), operating, cleaning and clearing (FO-0009) and blown by wind (FO-0010). 
 
(3) Manual handling includes two hazardous events: hoists (MH-0011) and mobile crane 
lifting (MH-0012). 
 
(4) Equipment machinery and tools includes four hazardous events: cutting machine (EQ-
0013), steel bar bending machine (EQ-0014), grinder machine (EQ-0015) and 
welding machine (EQ-0016).  
 
(5) Electricity includes four hazardous events: wires (EL-0017), electrical work (EL-
0018), overhead power lines (EL-0019) and arc welding machine (EL-0020). 
 
(6) Slips and trips includes four hazardous events: tripping over building materials (ST-
0021), slipping on wet surfaces (ST-0022), trips caused by small change in level (ST-
0023) and trips caused by water pipes, rebar (ST-0024). 





































Hole in the ground
Working on height unprotected
Through opening elevator shaft 
Falling objects
Part of climbing cranes, scaffolds 

















Project level Hazard group level Hazardous event level 
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Project level Hazard group level  Hazardous event level 
Slips and trips
Tripping over building materials
Slipping on wet surfaces
Trips caused by small change in level
Trips caused by water pipes, rebar
Traffic hazards





Gas cylinder or hose leakage











Confined space Deep excavations
Closed tanks
Ergonomic/ Human 









Figure 7-12: Hazard identification at building construction project 3 





(7) Traffic hazards includes two hazardous events: collision with another vehicle (TH-
0025) and collision with plant/people (TH-0026). 
 
(8) Fire and explosions includes four hazardous events: hot work (FE-0027), working 
near flammables (FE-0028), gas cylinder or hose leakage (FE-0029) and fire 
extinguisher has been discharged (FE-0030). 
 
(9) Exposure to hazardous substances includes one hazardous event: cement dust (ES-
0031). 
(10) Collapse of site structure includes four hazardous events: collapse of boom (cranes) 
(CO-0032), collapse of scaffolding (CO-0033), steel sheet piles (CO-0034) and 
kingpost (CO-0035). 
 
(11) Confined space includes two hazardous events: deep excavations (CS-0036) and 
closed tanks (CS-0037). 
 
(12) Ergonomic and human factors include two hazardous events: poor work posture 
(EH-0038) and extreme muscular exertion (EH-0039). 
 
(13) Noise and vibration include six hazardous events: piling (NV-0040), excavation 
(NV-0041), hammering (NV-0042), vibrator machine (NV-0043), hand-held power 
tools (NV-0044) and concrete pump machine (NV-0045). 
 
7.4.4 Safety Risk Estimation 
As the safety risk management process of building construction project 3 is similar to the 
case study of safety risk management of building construction projects 1 and 2, the linguistic 
variables of the risk parameters, PC, PO and SC and the fuzzy rule base were employed in 
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this case. Once the safety risk criteria were established and the data on PO, SC and PC were 
calculated using fuzzification, fuzzy aggregation, fuzzy inference, and defuzzification, the 
safety risk magnitude of all the hazardous events of building construction project 3 were 
obtained as shown in Table 7-25. 
To assess the overall safety risk magnitude of project 3, the weights of hazard groups were 
estimated by using MFAHP based on trapezoidal fuzzy number. Consequently, the overall 
safety risk magnitude of building construction project 3 is 3.36 and the safety risk is between 
Average and High with confidence of 28 per cent for Average and 72 per cent for High as 
shown in Table 7-26. 
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Table 7-25: Safety risk magnitude of building construction project 3 
 
Hazard 
groups Hazardous events 
Aggregated STFN Safety 
risk 
scores 
Safety risk categories Probability of 
occurrence 
Severity of                    
consequence 





FH-0001 Working platform 
FH-0002 Erection of scaffolding 
FH-0003 Climbing cranes 
FH-0004 Temporary ladder 
FH-0005 Hole in the ground 
FH-0006 Working on height unprotected 
FH-0007 Through opening elevator shaft 
 
2.75, 2.89, 3.67, 3.81 
2.83, 3.25, 3.50, 3.78 
3.33, 3.61, 4.22, 4.50 
3.11, 3.11, 3.64, 3.64 
3.36, 3.50, 4.11, 4.25 
4.00, 4.00, 4.50, 4.50 
3.33, 3.61, 3.75, 4.03 
 
2.94, 3.22, 4.08, 4.36 
2.61, 2.75. 3.50, 3.78 
3.80, 3.94, 4.22, 4.36 
2.72, 3.00, 3.22, 3.50 
3.80, 3.94, 4.72, 5.00 
2.72, 3.00, 4.11, 4.39 
4.44, 4.58, 4.86, 5.00 
 
2.86, 3.00, 3.14, 3.28 
2.64, 2.78, 2.92, 3.06 
2.89, 3.03, 3.17, 3.31 
2.42, 2.56, 2.92, 3.06 
3.31, 3.45, 3.92, 4.06 
3.39, 3.53, 3.92, 4.06 










Average: 36%, High: 64% 
Average: 82%, High: 18% 
High: 100% 
Average: 82%, High: 18% 






FO-0008 Part of climbing cranes, scaffolds  
FO-0009 Operating, cleaning and clearing 
FO-0010 Blown by wind 
3.00, 3.14, 3.28, 3.42 
2.78, 3.06, 3.53, 3.81 
3.19, 3.47, 3.86, 4.14 
3.22, 3.50, 4.11, 4.39 
2.50, 2.64, 3.00, 3.14 
2.11, 2.39, 2.61, 2.89 
2.92, 3.06, 3.78, 3.92 
2.42, 2.56, 3.06, 3.20 




Average: 8%, High: 92% 
Average: 64%, High: 36% 




MH-0012 Mobile crane lifting 
2.83, 3.11, 3.36, 3.64 
3.33, 3.61, 4.00, 4.28 
2.72, 2.86, 3.14, 3.28 
3.30, 3.58, 3.94, 4.22 
3.06, 3.20, 3.34, 3.48 
2.67, 2.81,3.09, 3.23 
3.35 
3.56 





EQ-0013 Cutting machine  
EQ-0014 Steel bar bending machine 
EQ-0015 Grinder machine 
EQ-0016 Welding machine 
3.44, 3.58, 4.22, 4.36 
2.28, 2.42, 3.28, 3.42 
2.36, 2.64, 3.36, 3.64 
2.28, 2.42, 3.28, 3.42 
2.44, 2.72, 3.22, 3.50 
2.44, 2.72, 2.97, 3.25 
2.52, 2.80, 3.19, 3.47 
2.55, 2.83, 2.83, 3.11 
2.56, 2.56, 2.84’ 2.84 
2.17, 2.31, 2.70, 2.84 
2.56, 2.70, 3.31, 3.45 





Average: 76%, High: 24% 
Average: 100% 
Average: 24%, High: 76% 




EL-0018 Electrical work 
EL-0019 Overhead power lines 
EL-0020 Arc welding machine 
 
2.61, 2.89, 3.50, 3.78 
2.72, 3.00, 3.47, 3.75 
2.44, 2.72, 2.97, 3.25 
2.36, 2.64, 3.14, 3.42 
 
3.02, 3.30, 3.94, 4.22 
2.86, 3.14, 3.75, 4.03 
2.69, 2.97, 3.22, 3.50 
2.94, 3.22, 3.22, 3.50 
 
2.78, 2.92, 3.06, 3.20 
2.67, 2.81, 2.95, 3.09 
2.28, 2.42, 3.03, 3.17 







Average: 52%, High: 48% 
Average: 76%, High: 24% 
Average: 58%, High: 42% 
Average: 54%, High: 46% 
Slips and 
trips 
ST-0021 Tripping over building materials 
ST-0022 Slipping on wet surfaces 
ST-0023 Trips caused by small change level  
ST-0024 Trips caused by water pipes 
2.36, 2.64, 3.14, 3.42 
2.75, 2.89, 3.53, 3.67 
2.22, 2.36, 3.00, 3.14 
2.25, 2.39, 3.25, 3.39 
2.22, 2.36, 2.86, 3.00 
2.08, 2.36, 2.58, 2.86 
1.61, 1.61, 2.36, 2.36 
2.22, 2.50, 3.00, 3.28 
2.75, 2.89, 3.28, 3.42 
2.61, 2.89, 2.89, 3.17 
2.50, 2.64, 3.03, 3.17 








Average: 48%, High: 52% 
Traffic 
hazards 
TH-0025 Collision with another vehicle 
TH-0026 Collision with plant/people 
2.00, 2.14, 2.75, 2.89 
2.00, 2.14, 2.75, 2.89 
2.39, 2.53, 3.14, 3.28 
2.50, 2.78, 3.25, 3.53 
1.89, 1.89, 2.17, 2.17 
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Hazard 
Groups Hazardous Events 
Aggregated STFN Safety 
risk 
scores 
Safety Risk categories Probability of 
occurrence 
Severity of                    
consequence 




FE-0027 Hot work 
FE-0028 Working near flammables 
FE-0029 Gas cylinder or hose leakage 
FE-0030 Fire extinguisher has been 
discharged 
2.72, 2.86, 3.72, 3.86 
2.53, 2.67, 3.03, 3.17 
2.03, 2.17, 2.67, 2.81 
2.50, 2.64, 3.00, 3.14 
2.69, 2.69, 3.19, 3.19 
2.58, 2.72, 3.22, 3.50 
2.97, 3.11, 3.72, 3.86 
2.94, 3.22, 3.83, 4.11 
2.64, 2.78, 3.17, 3.31 
2.42, 2.70, 2.95, 3.23 
2.28, 2.56, 2.81, 3.09 






Average: 44%, High: 56% 
Average: 58%, High: 42% 
Average: 100% 






ES-0031 Cement dust 
 
 




2.22, 2.36, 2.97, 3.11 
 










CO-0032 Temporary structure 
CO-0033 Collapse of scaffolding 
CO-0034 Steel sheet piles 
CO-0035 Kingpost 
 
1.89, 2.03, 2.64, 2.78 
2.36, 2.50, 2.89, 3.03 
2.25, 2.53, 3.25, 3.53 
1.72, 2.00, 2.50, 2.78 
 
3.80, 3.94, 4.47, 4.75 
3.72, 3.86, 4.61, 4.75 
2.47, 2.75, 3.61, 3.89 
2.97, 3.25, 4.11, 4.39 
 
2.34, 2.34, 3.12, 3.12 
2.34, 2.34, 3.59, 3.59 
2.20, 2.20, 3.06, 3.06 







Average: 62%, High: 38% 
High: 100% 




CS-0036 Deep excavations 
CS-0037 Closed tanks 
2.25, 2.39, 3.03, 3.17 
2.03, 2.17, 3.03, 3.17 
3.08, 3.22, 3.75, 4.03 
2.83, 2.97, 3.97, 4.25 
2.20, 2.20, 3.20, 3.20 
2.06, 2.06, 3.31, 3.31 
3.04 
3.21 
Average: 92%, High: 8% 




EH-0038 Poor work posture 
EH-0039 Extreme muscular exertion 
2.14, 2.42, 2.89, 3.17 
2.28, 2.42, 3.03, 3.17  
2.25, 2.25, 3.00, 3.00 
2.61, 3.25, 3.39, 3.78 
2.42, 2.70, 2.70, 2.98 












NV-0043 Vibrator machine 
NV-0044 Hand-held power tools 
NV-0045 Concrete pump machine 
3.03, 3.03, 3.56, 3.56 
3.03, 3.17, 3.53, 3.67 
3.28, 3.42, 3.56, 3.70 
2.53, 2.81, 2.81, 3.09 
3.03, 3.17, 3.67, 3.81 
2.28, 2.42, 3.03, 3.17 
2.61, 2.61, 3.14, 3.14 
2.72, 2.86, 3.72, 3.86 
2.47, 2.47, 3.72, 3.72 
2.11, 2.25, 2.64, 2.78 
2.58, 2.72, 3.11, 3.25 
1.61, 1.61, 2.61, 2.61 
3.17, 3.31, 3.92, 4.06 
2.67, 2.95, 3.42, 3.70 
2.78, 3.06, 3.31, 3.59 
2.67, 2.95, 3.20, 3.48 
3.00, 3.28, 3.78, 4.06 







Average: 56%, High: 44% 
Average: 6%, High: 94% 
High: 100% 
Acceptable: 100% 
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Table 7-26: Safety risk magnitude of hazard group in building construction project 3 
 
7.4.5 Safety Risk Ranking 
The weight factors were estimated by using the MFAHP and FTOPSIS methods to obtain the 
final ranking for evaluating important safety risks. The results of the calculation of the 
index of all 13 hazard groups are presented in Table 7-27. 
*
iCC



















Falling objects 3.40 0.147 Average: 20%, High: 80% 
Manual handling 3.57 0.101 High: 100% 
Equipment, machinery 




Average: 24%, High: 76% 
 
Electricity 3.24 0.094 Average: 52%, High: 48% 












Fire and explosions 3.28 0.058 Average: 44%, High: 56% 
Exposure to hazardous 
substances 3.46     0.051 Average: 8%, High: 92% 
 
Collapse of site 
structure 
 
2.99     0.043 Average: 100% 
Confined space 
 3.21 0.033 Average: 58%, High: 42% 
Ergonomic/Human 
factors 3.32 0.024 Average: 36%, High: 64% 
 




0.022 Average: 90%, High: 10% 
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Table 7-27: Calculation of fuzzy closeness coefficient for each hazard group in building construction project 3 
 
















0.490, 0.551, 0.881, 1.000 
0.327, 0.390, 0.591, 0.682 
0.340, 0.421, 0.564, 0.676 
0.249, 0.289, 0.447, 0.502 
0.254, 0.323, 0.489, 0.592 
0.167, 0.209, 0.341, 0.407 
0.118, 0.150, 0.265, 0.319 
0.224, 0.248, 0.436, 0.472 
0.232, 0.282, 0.429, 0.504 
0.238, 0.262, 0.554, 0.599 
0.219, 0.337, 0.470, 0.622 
0.177, 0.196, 0.421, 0.474 
0.272, 0.328, 0.500, 0.583 
 
0.091, 0.102, 0.163, 0.185 
0.048, 0.058, 0.087, 0.101 
0.034, 0.043, 0.057, 0.068 
0.028, 0.032, 0.050, 0.056 
0.024, 0.030, 0.046, 0.056 
0.012, 0.015, 0.025, 0.030 
0.006, 0.008, 0.014, 0.017 
0.013, 0.014, 0.025, 0.027 
0.012, 0.014, 0.022, 0.026 
0.010, 0.011, 0.024, 0.026 
0.007, 0.011, 0.016, 0.021 
0.004, 0.005, 0.010, 0.012 
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7.4.6 Safety Risk Controls and Discussions 
The overall safety risk magnitude of building construction project 3 is 3.36 and is in the 
safety risk category of Average with confidence of 28 per cent and High with confidence of 
72 per cent. Safety risk mitigations to reduce the overall safety risk magnitude are required. 
Thirteen identified hazard groups affected the overall safety risk magnitude in building 
construction project 3. It should be emphasised that the major contribution obtained from the 
results of the proposed model in Table 7-27 is that hazard groups FH, FO, MH, EQ and EL 
are high-ranking hazard groups and need the most attention. Conversely, hazard groups CS 
and NV are the lowest-ranking hazard groups. The ranking of the contributions of all 13 











Figure 7-13: Ranking of all hazard groups in building construction project 3 to index   
Recommended measures for each hazard group with the most important safety risk are 
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Falls from height is one of the most important hazard groups in building construction projects. 
In this project, it has seven hazardous events: working platform, erection of scaffolding, 
climbing cranes, temporary ladder, hole in the ground, working on height unprotected, and 
through opening elevator shaft. Therefore, by reducing the safety risk magnitude of this 
hazard group, the probability of occurrence and the severity of consequence will be reduced 
significantly. For example, safety training and instruction should be provided for the workers, 
safety harnesses and safety belts should be provided, barricades should be erected, warning 
signs should be displayed and there should be supervision by safety personnel. Furthermore, 
gaps between scaffold boards should be minimised or eliminated and safe access to the 
workplaces should be maintained.  
 
 Falling from objects has three hazardous events: part of climbing cranes, scaffolds; operating, 
cleaning and clearing; and blown by wind. To reduce the safety risk magnitude of this hazard 
group, safety training on safe stacking and rigging of materials should be provided for 
workers, and lifting gears should be visually inspected before use to ensure that it is in good 
condition and safe to use. Furthermore, suitable training on safe use of lifting appliances and 
lifting gear should be provided for operators and workers. Moreover, warning notices should 
be displayed to remind other workers entering the affected areas, and wearing of safety 
helmets on site should be enforced.  
 
The equipment, machinery and tools hazard group has four hazard events: cutting machine, 
steel bar bending machine, grinder machine, and welding machine. According to the statistics 
records of accidents, there are many different accidents and injuries involving use of 
machinery, such as a crush injury caused due to a missing or inadequate guard, and injuries 
caused by sharp edges or broken parts on equipment. Moreover, injuries are caused because 
of unsuitable work equipment, for instance, using the wrong tools for the job. Therefore, 
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proper staff training is required to ensure that workers understand how to use and operate the 
work equipment safely, and maintain and inspect the work equipment properly. Finally, 
suitable protective equipment should be provided for workers using the work equipment, 
such as safety footwear, safety goggles, ear protectors, safety helmets, and protective gloves. 
According to the results obtained from the proposed model, the cconfined space, noise and 
vibration, traffic hazards and ergonomic/human factors hazard groups pose a lower risk than 
the hazard groups mentioned above. Safety risk monitoring and controlling should be carried 
out to ensure that these hazard groups still have a plan and continually evaluate the plan’s 
effectiveness in reducing safety risks. For example, there are two hazard events in the 
ergonomic/human factors hazard group: poor work posture and extreme muscular exertion. 
According to the statistics, accidents and injuries can involve workload and the working 
environment. Therefore, to control and monitor the safety risk magnitude of the ergonomic 
/human factors hazard group, tasks should be designed properly in accordance with 
ergonomic principles to take account of both human limitations and strengths. Furthermore, a 
manual handling risk assessment should be carried out by a competent person where 
appropriate, and instruction and monitoring by a competent supervisor should be provided. 
 
The results of the proposed construction safety risk management model were not compared 
with the results from building construction project 3’s method, as the safety risk assessment 
records of building construction project 3 are not available. However, the results of the 
proposed construction safety risk management model provide more safety risk information on 
both safety risk levels and categories of safety risk with a degree of confidence. The model 
can be used for decision-making purposes and can help the safety managers, project 
managers and engineers for mitigation and controlling all hazardous events and improve 
SSOP of construction project 3. 
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7.5 Case Study 4: Mass Rapid Transit Railway Construction Project  
 
7.5.1 Background of Case Study 4 
“Mass rapid transit railway construction company 4” is used instead of the mass rapid transit 
railway construction company’s name due to business confidentiality. This construction 
project is a mass rapid transit (MRT) system project in Bangkok, Thailand. The MRT railway 
construction project comprises 17 stations and is 5.25 kilometres long. 
 
7.5.2 Establishing a Safety Risk Management Team                                                                              
Five experts involved in the safety risk management model were selected based on their 
individual skills, knowledge, experience, and expertise. One expert is a project supervisor 
who has worked on MRT railway construction projects for more than 38 years. One expert is 
a safety supervisor with 15 years’ experience and another is a safety co-ordinator with 13 
years’ experience in working on railway construction project. The other two experts are site 
engineers, as shown in Table 7-28 
Table 7-28: Description of experts’ contribution factors 





Expert 1 Project Supervisor 3 38 5 8 0.25 
Expert 2 Safety Supervisor 3 15 5 8 0.25 
Expert 3 Safety Co-ordinator 3 13 4 7 0.22 
Expert 4 Site Engineer 2 5 3 5 0.14 
Expert 5 Site Engineer 2 3 2 4 0.14 
 
7.5.3 Safety Hazard Identification 
 
To carry out safety risk assessment and management, following discussions and 
brainstorming with the safety risk management team of MRT railway construction project 4, 
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information was gathered and verified to ensure that it contained all the hazard groups and 
hazardous events. The MRT construction safety system is divided into nine hazard groups: 
falls from height; falling objects; manual handling; equipment machinery and tools; 
electricity; slips and trips; fire and explosions; ergonomic/human factors; and noise and 
vibration. Each hazard group includes several identified hazardous events and is described 
below. 
(1) Falls from height includes seven hazardous events: working platform (FH-00001), 
erection of scaffolding (FH-00002,) cranes (FH-00003), temporary ladder (FH-00004), 
hole in the ground (FH-00005), working on height unprotected (FH-00006), and roof 
work (FH-00007). 
(2) Falling objects includes three hazardous events: part of cranes, scaffolds (FO-00008), 
operating, cleaning and clearing (FO-00009) and blown by wind (FO-00010). 
 
(3) Manual handling includes two hazardous events: hoists (MH-00011) and manual 
lifting (MH-00012). 
 
(4) Equipment machinery and tools includes four hazardous events: cutting machine (EQ-
00013), steel bar bending machine (EQ-00014), grinder machine (EQ-00015) and 
welding machine (EQ-00016).  
 
(5) Electricity includes four hazardous events: wires (EL-00017), electrical work (EL-




(6) Slips and trips includes four hazardous events: tripping over platform building 
materials (ST-00021), slipping on wet surfaces (ST-00022), trips caused by small 
change in level (ST-00023) and trips caused by water pipes, rebar (ST-00024). 






































Hole in the ground
Working on height unprotected
Roof work
Falling objects
Part of cranes, scaffolds 

















Project level Hazard group level Hazardous event level 
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Project level Hazard group level Hazardous event level 
Slips and trips
Tripping over platform building materials
Slipping on wet surfaces
Trips caused by small change in level





Gas cylinder or hose leakage












Figure 7-14: Hazard identification at MRT railway construction project 4 
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(7) Fire and explosions includes four hazardous events: hot work (FE-00025), working 
near flammables (FE-00026), gas cylinder or hose leakage (FE-00027) and fire 
extinguisher has been discharged (FE-00028). 
 
(8) Ergonomic and human factors includes two hazardous events: poor work posture 
(EH-00029) and extreme muscular exertion (EH-00030). 
 
(9) Noise and vibration includes six hazardous events, i.e. piling (NV-00031), excavation 
(NV-00032), hammering (NV-00033), vibrator machine (NV-00034), hand-held 
power tools (NV-00035) and concrete pump machine (NV-00036). 
 
7.5.4 Safety Risk Estimation 
As the safety risk management process of MRT railway construction project 4 is similar to 
the case study on the safety risk management of building construction project 1, 2 and 3, the 
linguistic variables of the risk parameters, PC, PO and SC, and the fuzzy rule base were 
employed in this case. Once the safety risk criteria were established and the data on PO, SC 
and PC were calculated using fuzzification, fuzzy aggregation, fuzzy inference, and 
defuzzification, the safety risk magnitude of all the hazardous events of the MRT railway 
construction project 4 could be obtained, as shown in Table 7-29. 
To assess the overall safety risk magnitude of project 4, the weights of the hazard groups 
were estimated by using MFAHP based on trapezoidal fuzzy number. Consequently, the 
overall safety risk magnitude of MRT railway construction project 4 is 2.13 and is in the 
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Table 7-29: Safety risk magnitude of MRT railway construction project 4 
 
Hazard 
groups Hazardous events 
Aggregated STFN Safety 
risk 
scores 
Safety risk categories Probability of 
occurrence 
Severity of                    
consequence 





FH-00001 Working platform 
FH-00002 Erection of scaffolding 
FH-00003 Cranes 
FH-00004 Temporary ladder 
FH-00005 Hole in the ground 
FH-00006 Working on height unprotected 
FH-00007 Roof work 
 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.22, 1.22 
1.00, 1.00, 1.25, 1.25 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.97, 1.97, 2.44, 2.44 
1.22, 1.22, 1.22, 1.22 
 
1.91, 1.91, 2.13, 2.13 
1.69, 1.69, 1.91, 1.91 
1.47, 1.47, 1.69, 1.69 
1.47, 1.47, 1.69, 1.69 
1.94, 2.16, 2.16, 2.38 
1.94, 2.41, 2.41, 2.88 
2.16, 2.41, 2.63, 2.88 
 
2.97, 2.97, 2.97, 2.97 
3.33, 3.33, 3.33, 3.33 
2.30, 2.30, 2.30, 2.30 
2.58, 2.58, 2.58, 2.58 
2.05, 2.05, 2.05, 2.05 
3.41, 3.41, 3.41, 3.41 



















FO-00008 Part of climbing cranes 
FO-00009 Operating, cleaning  
FO-00010 Blown by wind 
1.28, 1.28, 1.28, 1.28 
2.33, 2.33, 2.80, 2.80 
1.42, 1.42, 1.42, 1.42 
1.66, 1.66, 1.88, 1.88 
1.66, 1.66, 1.88, 1.88 
1.66, 1.66, 1.88, 1.88 
3.19, 3.19, 3.19, 3.19 
3.44, 3.44, 3.44, 3.44 










MH-00012 Manual lifting 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.28, 1.28, 1.28, 1.28 
1.91, 1.91, 1.91, 1.91 
1.39, 1.61, 1.61, 1.83 
2.47, 2.47, 2.47, 2.47 








EQ-00013 Cutting machine  
EQ-00014 Steel bar bending machine 
EQ-00015 Grinder machine 
EQ-00016 Welding machine 
1.42, 1.42, 1.42, 1.42 
1.42, 1.42, 1.42, 1.42 
1.42, 1.42, 1.64, 1.64 
1.28, 1.28, 1.50, 1.50 
2.05, 2.05, 2.52, 2.52 
1.66, 1.66, 2.13, 2.13 
2.05, 2.05, 2.52, 2.52 
1.36, 1.36, 1.83, 1.83 
3.78, 3.78, 4.00, 4.00 
2.75, 2.75, 2.97, 2.97 
4.08, 4.08, 4.08, 4.08 











EL-00018 Electrical work 
EL-00019 Overhead power lines 
EL-00020 Arc welding machine 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.22, 1.22, 1.69, 1.69 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.22, 1.22 
1.00, 1.00, 1.22, 1.22 
2.08, 2.08, 2.30, 2.30 
1.00, 1.00, 1.22, 1.22 
1.80, 1.80, 1.80, 1.80 
2.19, 2.19, 2.19, 2.19 
2.69, 2.69, 2.94, 2.94 












ST-00021 Tripping over building materials 
ST-00022 Slipping on wet surfaces 
ST-00023 Trips caused by small change  
ST-00024 Trips caused by water pipes 
 
2.14, 2.36, 2.61, 2.83 
2.50, 2.50, 2.72, 2.72 
2.50, 2.50, 2.72, 2.72 
1.14, 1.14, 1.36, 1.36 
1.64, 1.64, 2.11, 2.11 
1.64, 1.64, 1.86, 1.86 
1.64, 1.64, 1.86, 1.86 
1.89, 2.11, 2.11, 2.33 
3.69, 3.69, 3.69, 3.69 
3.69, 3.69, 3.69, 3.69 
4.19, 4.19, 4.41, 4.41 











FE-00025 Hot work 
FE-00026 Working near flammables 
FE-00027 Gas cylinder or hose leakage 
FE-00028 Fire extinguisher discharged 
 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.91, 1.91, 2.13, 2.13 
1.66, 1.66, 1.88, 1.88 
1.44, 1.66, 1.66, 1.88 
1.66, 1.66, 1.66, 1.66 
2.55, 2.55, 2.55, 2.55 
1.80, 1.80, 1.80, 1.80 
1.80, 1.80, 1.80, 1.80 
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Hazard 
groups Hazardous events 
Aggregated STFN Safety 
risk 
scores 
Safety risk categories Probability of 
occurrence 
Severity of                    
consequence 





EH-00029 Poor work posture 
EH-00030 Extreme muscular exertion 
1.39, 1.39, 1.61, 1.61 
1.39, 1.39, 1.86, 1.86 
1.75, 1.75, 2.22, 2.22 
1.75, 1.75, 2.22, 2.22 
3.33, 3.33, 3.55, 3.55 










NV-00034 Vibrator machine 
NV-00035 Hand-held power tools 
NV-00036 Concrete pump machine 
 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 
1.66, 1.66, 1.88, 1.88 
1.66, 1.66, 1.88, 1.88 
1.66, 1.66, 1.88, 1.88 
1.66, 1.66, 1.88, 1.88 
1.66, 1.66, 1.88, 1.88 
1.44, 1.44, 1.66, 1.66 
2.19, 2.19, 2.41, 2.41 
2.19, 2.19, 2.41, 2.41 
2.19, 2.19, 2.19, 2.19 
1.97, 1.97, 2.19, 2.19 
1.44, 1.44, 1.66, 1.66 
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Table 7-30: Safety risk magnitude of hazard group in MRT railway construction project 4 
 
7.5.5 Safety Risk Ranking 
The weight factors were estimated by using the MFAHP and FTOPSIS methods to obtain the 
final ranking for the evaluating important safety risks. The results of the calculation of the










































Acceptable: 18%, Average: 82% 








2.44 0.037 Average: 100% 
 
Noise and vibration 
 
1.50 0.040 Acceptable: 100% 
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Table 7-31: Calculation of fuzzy closeness coefficient for each hazard group in MRT railway construction project 4 
 












0.544, 0.676, 0.837, 1.000 
0.555, 0.555, 0.756, 0.756 
0.260, 0.301, 0.301, 0.342 
0.496, 0.496, 0.704, 0.704 
0.285, 0.285, 0.477, 0.477 
0.717, 0.717, 0.931, 0.931 
0.203, 0.203, 0.227, 0.227 
0.414, 0.414, 0.741, 0.741 
0.152, 0.152, 0.189, 0.189 
 
0.159, 0.198, 0.245, 0.293 
0.109, 0.109, 0.149, 0.149 
0.028, 0.032, 0.032, 0.036 
0.052, 0.052, 0.074, 0.074 
0.028, 0.028, 0.046, 0.046 
0.040, 0.040, 0.052, 0.052 
0.014, 0.014, 0.015, 0.015 
0.016, 0.016, 0.028, 0.028 
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7.5.6 Safety Risk Controls and Discussions 
The overall safety magnitude of MRT railway construction project 4 is 2.13 and is in the 
Average category with confidence of 100 per cent.  Nine identified hazard groups affected the 
overall safety risk magnitude of MRT construction project 4. It should be highlighted that the 
results of the proposed model in Table 7-31 revealed that FH, FO, MH, and ST are the 
highest-ranking hazard groups. Conversely, NV and EH hazard are the lowest-ranking hazard 
groups. The ranking of the contributions of all nine hazard groups in MRT construction 











Figure 7-15: Ranking of all hazard groups in MRT railway construction project 4 to 
index   
 
Recommended measures for each hazard group with the most important safety risk are 
presented and discussed below. 
Falls from height has six hazardous events: working platform, erection of scaffolding; cranes; 
temporary ladder; hole in the ground; working on height unprotected; and roof work. To 
mitigate the probability and severity of consequence, adequate safety instruction, safety 
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suitably planned, organised, and supervised. Furthermore, equipment for working at height 
should be inspected regularly, and emergency procedures should be in place to ensure that 
physical fall prevention devices used by workers are properly maintained and used as 
prescribed. The procedures must enable the rescue of an employee in the event of a fall and 
ensure that first aid is provided to a worker who has fallen as soon as possible after the 
emergency situation arises.  
 
Falling objects is one of the most common sources of construction project injuries. This 
hazard group has three hazardous events: part of climbing cranes, scaffolds; operating, 
cleaning and clearing; and blown by wind. To avoid falling objects due to piling and 
substructure works, pipes should be stored horizontally and use stoppers to avoid the pipes 
rolling. Furthermore, rope should be used to hold the pipes together, boards, iron plates, stone 
plates should be secure tightly to the wall if they are stored vertically and containers should 
not be stored taller than a person as well as provision of net to cover the scaffolding, the toe 
board should be used. Moreover, gaps between scaffold boards should be minimised and 
safety helmet to be worn by all personnel on site.  
      
Slips and trips has four hazardous events: tripping over building materials, slipping on wet 
surfaces, trips caused by small change and trips caused by water pipes. To reduce and control 
the safety risk magnitude of MRT railway construction project 4, keeping the workplaces 
clean and tidy, placing the waste and materials in demarcated areas, displaying warning signs 
and providing safety shoes required. Furthermore, adequate lighting and handrails should be 
provided where necessary, there should be no wet floor in the vicinity of the drilling rod, and 
the working platform and access should be kept free of oil and grease. Clear warning signs 
and instructions should be displayed in the working areas to enhance the safety awareness of 
the workers.  
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Although the hazard groups make a minor contribution to the overall safety risk magnitude of 
MRT railway construction project 4, the hazardous events in the noise and vibration and 
ergonomic/human factors hazard groups still need be controlled and monitored. The noise 
and vibration has six hazardous events: piling, excavation, hammering, vibrator machine, 
hand-held power tools and concrete pump machine. Measures should be implemented to 
safety risks related to noise and vibration, information, instruction and training should be 
provided and health surveillance should be provided where there is a risk to health. Where 
possible, the source of noise should be mitigated. Noise can be reduced by improving the 
construction or work procedures. Where mitigation cannot to be carried out, it should be 
controlled. Finally, the correct hearing protection should be provided if the noise exposure 
cannot be reduced using other methods. 
 
The results of the proposed construction safety risk management model are compared with 
the results of MRT railway construction project 4’s method, as shown in Table 7-32. It can be 
noted that the safety risk ranking in the proposed construction safety risk assessment model is 
slightly different from that of the project’s method. For example, in the proposed model, falls 
from height (working on height unprotected) has a safety risk score of 2.90 and is in the 
Average category with confidence of 100 per cent. In MRT railway construction project 4’s 
method, however, it has a safety risk level of Medium, and the hazardous events are in a 
similar position in both methods. Nevertheless, the MRT railway construction project 4’s 
method cannot provide more safety risk information to the safety risk expert team for the 
purposes of decision-making. Therefore, it should be highlighted that the proposed 
construction safety management model can be applied in MRT or railway construction and 
can provide safety risk information and produce safety risk ranking similar to the risk level 
estimated by MRT railway construction project 4’s method. 
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Table 7-32: Safety risk level of MRT railway construction project 4 





Hazardous events Risk Score Safety risk categories 
 
Risk level 
FH-06 Working on height unprotected 
ST-24 Trips caused by rebar 
FO-09 Operating, cleaning and clearing 
EH-30 Extreme muscular exertion 
FH-07 Roof work 
FH-02 Erection of scaffolding 
FO-08 Part of cranes, scaffolds  
EH-29 Poor work posture 
EQ-16 Welding machine 
MH-12 Manual lifting 
EL-19 Overhead power lines 
FH-01 Working platform 
FH-03 Cranes 
FH-04 Temporary ladder 
FH-05 Hole in the ground 
FO-10 Blown by wind 
MH-11 Hoists 
EQ-13 Cutting machine 
EQ-14 Steel bar bending machine 
EQ-15 Grinder machine 
EL-17 Wires 
EL-18 Electrical work 
EL-20 Arc welding machine 
ST-21 Tripping over building materials 
ST-22 Slipping on wet surfaces 
ST-23 Trips caused by small change  
FE-25 Hot work 
FE-26 Working near flammables 
FE-27 Gas cylinder or hose leakage 
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This chapter discussed four applied case studies on safety risk assessment and management 
of building and MRT railway construction projects. The FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS 
methods were used in the proposed construction safety risk management model. It can be 
noted that the proposed construction safety risk management model can be applied in either 
building construction or MRT construction projects to quantitatively and qualitatively assess 
safety risk.  
The safety risk score of a construction project, hazard groups, hazardous events and type of 
safety risk can be obtained with a confidence percentage. Moreover, the safety risk ranking of 
all hazard groups can be obtained, which can be useful information to support effective safety 
risk decision-making for managing safety hazards and dealing with the overall safety risk of 
building construction projects. The information provided for the case studies covers the 
safety risks in each construction project based on the results obtained for the important hazard 
groups. These results will be discussed in depth in the Chapter 8. 















NV-34 Vibrator machine 
NV-35 Hand-held power tools 
























   
 




This chapter discusses the research findings from the development of the proposed 
construction safety risk management model based on the FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS 
methods. The strengths and weaknesses of the proposed model are presented. Following this, 
the achievements in the study and limitations of the research are explained. 
 
8.2 Findings  
The discussion of the findings is based on the results provided in Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. It 
is helpful to divide the findings into the following sections: literature review, survey 
programme, development of the safety risk management model and case studies. 
8.2.1 Literature Review 
There is no doubt that working on a construction site is inherently dangerous, and this needs 
to be improved according to the statistics on major accidents that have been occurred in the 
construction industry, as described in Chapter 2. The leading causes of death and injury on 
construction sites include: falls from height; falling objects; manual handling; equipment, 
machinery and tools; electricity; slips and trips; traffic hazards; vehicle overturn; fire and 
explosions; exposure to hazardous substances; radiation hazards; collapse of site structure; 
ergonomic/human factors; confined spaces; and noise and vibration. Based on confirmation 
of the safety risks identified by the project managers, safety managers and project engineers, 
it was revealed that falls from height and falling objects are the most common critical hazards 




   
in construction projects. The findings are in line with the those of Zhou and Pang (2013), 
which were that falling injuries during construction are one of the most frequent accidents in 
the construction industry and have a higher incident rate than in other industries. The same 
result was obtained by Huang and Hinze (2003), who report that falls from height has been 
ranked in the top 10 with the highest frequency amongst construction accidents compared 
with other types of accident, such as falling objects, contact with electricity, and vehicle 
collisions. It was revealed that lack of awareness and ignorance of workers are the main 
causes of accidents on building construction projects (Limsupreeyarat et al., 2010). Therefore, 
there is an urgent need for appropriate and effective prevention of these accidents.  
 
8.2.2 Survey Programme 
Major statistics on construction accidents have been presented and summarised in this thesis 
based on the statistics on major accidents. The literature shows, however, that little work has 
been done on construction safety risk assessment and management in Thailand, and there is 
very little available data to support this research. Therefore, a survey programme was 
employed to identify and confirm the safety risks which have been identified as the major 
safety risks the industry faces.  
For allocating the safety risks mentioned in the survey programme to more detailed and 
specified level of importance, the top four safety risks were proposed by the respondents for 
this research as follows: 
1. Falls from height = Very importance 
2. Falling objects = Major 
3. Equipment, machinery and tools= Major 
4. Electricity = Major 




   
It has been ascertained that among the four major safety risks, falls from height has the 
highest level of safety risk in construction projects, followed by falling objects and equipment, 
machinery and tools, and electricity (Aminbakhsh et al., 2013; Zhou and Pang, 2013; 
Mistikoglu et al., 2015;). 
The findings also revealed one of the reasons for not using statistical methods to assess safety 
risks. Some respondents explained that most construction sites have limited resources such as 
time, technical equipment, and skilled personnel. Furthermore, the qualitative risk assessment 
technique is the easiest tool to analyse the safety risk, which is one process for assessing the 
severity and likelihood of the identified safety risks (Modarres, 2006) as there is no need to 
do complicated calculations. The quantitative risk assessment technique is a formalised 
specialist method for calculating the safety risk level which uses numerical measures to 
estimate the probability of occurrence and severity of consequence. This is why this method 
is generally employed in medium and large construction project companies. The findings are 
in line with those of Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila (2011), who argue that as the problems 
facing the construction industry contain a variety of quantitative and qualitative risk data, 
including incomplete safety risk data and a high level of uncertainty, the traditional 
quantitative risk assessment method may not be sufficient to prioritise the safety risk in 
construction projects. Therefore, it is necessary to develop new construction risk assessment 
methods to cope with the risks involved in complicated situations.    
 
 
8.2.3 Development of Safety Risk Management Modelling 
 A construction safety risk management model has been developed to deal with an uncertain 
environment and vague information. It includes the steps of safety hazard identification and 
risk data collection, safety risk criteria calculation, safety risk estimation, safety risk ranking, 




   
safety risk control and mitigation, and safety risk monitoring. The main findings in this model 
are discussed below, see Section 8.2.3.1, 8.2.3.2, 8.2.3.3, 8.2.3.4. 
8.2.3.1 Safety hazard identification 
Identifying safety risks is the first and most important stage in the safety risk management 
process on a construction project. There are multiple types of identification methods for 
formulating those safety risks, including checklists, the ‘what if’ approach, the brainstorming 
approach, FMEA, a HAZOP study, CHA, PHA, and JHA. Brainstorming is typically one of 
the safety risk identification techniques available in the literature on a project site. However, 
inexperience and the insufficient skill level of the experts can lead to risks for the hazard 
identification process. Therefore, to ensure that safety risk identification is performed in an 
adequate and timely way, historical information as a guide to safety hazard identification can 
provide background information on previous challenges and help to assess hazardous events.  
The findings are consistent with those of Gajewska and Ropel (2011), which were that 
experience was considered as an information methods, and that considering the previous 
projects could be useful sources for identifying potential risks. The events in past projects, 
historical data from similar projects, and hazard lists provide valuable insight into future 
safety risks for consideration of hazards. 
 
8.2.3.2 Safety risk criteria calculation 
The findings in this study revealed that the standards of qualitative descriptors of probability 
of occurrence (PO), which refers to the number of times an event occurs or the failure 
frequencies in a certain time period, are “Very unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Fairly unlikely”, 
“Likely”, and “Very likely”. For instance, the linguistic term “Very unlikely” is used to explain 
the number of times an event occurred with a nominal value of four-five times every six 




   
months. In specific construction projects, however, the standards of qualitative descriptors 
can be changed based on historical data and information. 
 
8.2.3.3 Suggestion of the third parameter 
Safety risk has commonly been estimated using two parameters: probability of occurrence 
(PO) and severity of consequence (SC). They do not take into the probability of current 
consequence caused in the project safety risk assessment process. Nonetheless, considering 
the safety magnitude of a particular safety risk depends highly upon the probability that the 
accident will occur. Therefore, this research incorporated a third parameter, probability of 
consequence (PC), into the proposed construction safety risk management model to obtain 
more accurate and reliable results of safety risk analysis. It should be noted that the safety 
risk level without considering PC might be high; however, if the probability is very low, this 
might not be the case. For example, in scenario 2 parameters, the PO of many people working 
at height is Very likely and the SC is Catastrophic; therefore, the safety risk level will be 
estimated as Unacceptable. On the other hand, in scenario 3 parameters, the PO of many 
people working at height is also Very likely and the SC is also Catastrophic and the PC 
(added third parameter) is judged to be Unlikely; therefore, the safety risk level of working at 
height will be downgraded as Medium. This means this work can keep the process going; 
however, a control plan must be developed and should be implemented as soon as possible. 
 
8.2.3.4 Technique for hazard group ranking 
Hazard group ranking is a considerable part of the process of safety risk management. More 
important hazard groups were classified in different safety risk ranking to propose efficient 
safety risk mitigation measures. However, the MCDM methodology by using FRT, MFAHP 
and FTOPSIS is a hybrid application for solving problems with existing inherent uncertainty. 




   
This technique makes the proposed model more accurate, and reliable, and a realistic 
approach to prioritising the solutions. 
The findings in this study also revealed that the proposed model was developed using the 
FRT to cope with the uncertainties, subjectivity and vagueness that arise during construction 
projects, and then an MFAHP was used to create appropriate weightings. This method is 
useful when dealing with a huge amount judgemental information as it reduces the 
uncertainty associated with experts’ judgements. Finally, the FTOPSIS method was used to 
solve the problems under the fuzzy environment to obtain the ranking of the safety risk on 
construction sites. According to Taylan et al. (2014), “The fuzzy TOPSIS method is very 
suitable for solving group decision making problems under vague and fuzzy environments in 
construction projects”. This finding supports the finding of Abdullah and Zulkifli (2015), 
which was that fuzzy AHP has been used to obtain the relative weights of criteria when 
weights are imprecise, and uncertain and contain ambiguous information. Therefore, it was 
observed that these comprehensive methodologies are very suitable and flexible for various 
decision situations.  
 
8.2.4 Case Studies 
The proposed model was applied in four real construction case studies in Thailand, and the 
performance of this model under vague and fuzzy environments was evaluated and validated. 
Three case studies on safety risk assessment and management of building construction 
projects and one case study on an MRT railway construction project were conducted. The 
findings from all the case studies revealed that risk levels have different safety risk 
magnitudes based on different projects’ situations and features regarding the scale and type of 
projects. To demonstrate these differences, an illustrative comparable example is explained in 




   
more detail to simulate the projects’ safety risk management. The hazard group falls from 
height is clearly the highest-ranking safety risk. Interestingly, it was found that five hazard 
groups, fallings from height, falling objects, manual handling, equipment machinery and tool, 
and electricity were ranked in the top five hazard groups in all the case studies, as illustrated 
in Figures 7-10, 7-13, 7-16, and 7-19, and Tables 7-14, 7-22, 7-27, and 7-31 respectively. 
Furthermore, the results obtained for one of the hazard events in the falls from height group 
were compared with the safety risk scores for the four case studies, which are 2.61, 2.00, 3.32, 
and 1.50 respectively.  MRT railway construction project 4 is different from the other three 
building construction projects. For example, falls from height (working platform) has a safety 
risk score of 1.50 and an Acceptable level of safety risk with confidence of 100 per cent, 
which clearly illustrates the differences in site configuration and project stages. The project is 
not complex and the building is a four storey structure, which is 15-18 metres in high, and the 
project consists of a concourse and platform levels in the station. The project is strongly 
committed to the promotion of risk management practices. Therefore, the mitigation and 
control of safety risks regarding falls from height was minimal, such as edges and holes of 
the platform were fitted with effective guardrails and toe boards. Safety training and 
instruction on using devices regarding falls from height was provided for the workers, full 
harnesses and fall-arresting devices were provided. Moreover, competent workers with 
experience in working at height were engaged. Furthermore, warning notices and safety 
toolbox meetings were used to improve safety awareness on the construction site. The results 
from building construction projects 1, 2, and 3 are 2.00-3.32, as due to the wearing of PPE 
such as a safety harnesses, hardhat and safety shoes, very few hazardous events were reported 
at building construction project 3. Moreover, three building construction project 1, 2 and 3 
had more than 30 storeys, were complex building construction projects, and had more than 




   
300 construction workers including contractors and subcontractors. Therefore, the overall 
safety risk comparison of the hazardous event for the construction projects clearly represent 
the situation for the four projects and the mitigation and control safety risks in their safety 
risk management. To improve the SSOP during the construction projects, they require 
different mitigation actions based on their risk level and condition.  
 
 
Interestingly, although all four construction projects have different safety risk scores, PPE, 
such as safety harnesses and safety shoes was a control measure that was used to cope with 
safety risks in all four projects.  However, PPE should be worn when all the previous 
protection measures are unavailable or have been found to be ineffective in controlling safety 
risks to a reasonably practicable level. Surprisingly, someone workers refuse to wear PPE on 
construction sites as they do not understand why they need to wear it and consider it 
inconvenient. These reasons have been found through observations and interviews. In this 
case, proper safety training on the safety risk for workers must be provided. According to the 
comparison of hazardous events, the proposed construction safety risk management model is 
more reliable and less ambiguous methodology for effective safety risk management of 
construction projects.    
 
8.3 Achievements in the Study 
Based on the case study materials from the real construction projects that were provided by 
companies, the proposed construction safety risk management model was developed using a 
combination of the FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS methods. It should be noted that this 
proposed construction safety risk management model is not only for building construction 
projects, but can also be widely applied in other construction projects, such as railway 




   
construction projects, highway construction projects, airport construction projects, and bridge 
construction projects. 
Furthermore, in many circumstances, the most common causes of major injuries in a 
construction project in Thailand should be recognisable in other construction projects. 
Consequently, the findings of this research based on four case studies suggest effective 
mitigation and control actions for elimination, substitution, engineering controls, 
administrative controls, and PPE in the significant hazard groups before they take place. They 
can provide useful safety information on building construction project management regarding 
poor construction project performance. 
 
 
8.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
The main outcome of this research is the advancement of knowledge regarding the 
application of safety risk management to construction safety management projects. 
 
The proposed safety risk management model is developed based on FRT, MFAHP and 
FTOPSIS methods, where the potential safety risk in construction safety management is 
assessed in terms of PO, SC and PC.  It is quite appropriate for the circumstances where some 
risk events happen frequently and may possibly lead to serious consequences depending on 
the existing safety risk measures. The third parameter, PC, was incorporated into the 
proposed model to obtain more accurate and reliable results of safety risk analysis in the 
construction industry. The PC can be derived from expert judgement, and experts can provide 
a crisp value, a range of numbers or subjective judgments, based on their expert knowledge 
and information.  
 




   
The combination of the FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS methods to deal with uncertainties in 
construction projects contributes significantly to construction safety management projects 
and can be utilised to analyse and manipulate the safety risk level of every possible hazardous 
event that is identified before starting a project or during the construction period. Furthermore, 
the proposed safety risk management model can be applied to any industries which depend on 
the types and sizes of the projects, such as buildings, dams, bridges and roads which can 
change the specific safety risks.  
 
Four practical case studies are employed to fill the gap between the knowledge and practice 
to illustrate the applicability and performance of the proposed model, and to cope with 
uncertain and imprecise knowledge. The model per se provides a powerful tool that can be 
implemented in a construction project. 
 
The most common causes of major injuries in a construction project should be recognisable 
in other construction projects. Consequently, the findings of this research based on the four 
case studies suggest implementing effective mitigation and control actions before they take 
place. They can provide useful safety information on building construction project 





The improvements made in the safety risk management performance in the building 
construction industry have an immediate impact on: 1) Practising the theoretical contribution, 
including the safety risk management concept by professionals involved in construction 
safety risk management such as project managers, safety officers, engineers and others 
working in the construction industry, especially when it comes to improving the safety 




   
management performance on building construction sites. Although it might not be possible to 
take this as a textbook formula to ensure a higher level of workplace safety, most players in 
the construction industry would probably be able to employ the ideas and suggestions for 
improvements if they were able to adapt them to their own organisational context. (2) 
Explaining the third parameter, PC, as it discriminates a hazardous event with a higher PC to 
cause fatalities. This will affect the overall safety risk scores obtained through the 





This chapter has discussed the research findings of this project. By comparing the findings 
from the four construction projects, this study has found that safety risk management is based 
on different situations and different types of projects. Obviously, the construction industry 
has the greatest risk of being injured as major construction sites can have significant levels of 
risk. The achievements in this study have been revealed and the knowledge contribution of 
the research has been provided.  
The next chapter, Conclusions and Limitations, presents an overall summary of the thesis. 
The research project objectives are revisited to determine whether the research aim has been 
achieved, and recommendations for future studies are made.  
 




   
 
CHAPTER NINE                                                                      
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
9.1 Conclusions 
The literature review which was conducted in this research has shown that construction 
remains a high-risk industry despite the downward movement in the number of injuries. It is 
also no secret that construction can be a dangerous industry. This research project focused on 
the development of a risk assessment and safety management model for the building 
construction industry based on the FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS methods. The research has 
shown that the proposed model can assist project managers, safety officers and engineers 
with decision-making to enable them to manipulate and control safety risks in their safety risk 
management and improve SSOP during their construction projects. The main achievements 
of this research are summarised below according to the specific objectives. 
 
OBJECTIVE 1: To examine the current occupational safety problems and investigate the 
various types of risk. 
 Data on accidents in the construction industry was collected from reports, articles and 
the industry and identify the main types of accident occurring in construction projects. 
The findings from the data on accidents revealed the most common causes of major 
injuries and their consequences at construction sites.  
 
 The major statistics on major construction accidents were found and summarized in 
this thesis, and the data were collected from websites. The findings in this study show 




   
that construction workers are more likely at a high risk of injury as result of their 
works.  
 
OBJECTIVE 2: To undertake a comprehensive literature review to establish potentially 
viable research routes. 
 Potential safety risk assessment methodologies were analysed and classified, and it 
was found that the FRT, AHP and TOPSIS methods were more suitable to be used in 
the development of the safety risk analysis model. The literature in the field of safety 
risk management was reviewed to establish a research framework to be applied in this 
research. The findings revealed that safety risk assessment and management processes 
in construction are important. These include the processes concerned with identifying, 
assessing, ranking, controlling and monitoring project safety risks. The safety risk 
assessment techniques currently used in the construction industry may not provide 
satisfactory results, as a hazardous event may be very difficult to establish using a 
quantitative risk assessment due to the high level of uncertainty involved and 
incomplete risk information to determine the probability of a possible consequence 
scenario. Many research studies have provided evidence that the FRT method is 
employed to deal with imprecise, incomplete safety information in the safety risk 
assessment within construction, as it can cope with both quantitative and qualitative 
safety risk data. Regarding the combination of the AHP and TOPSIS methods, it has 
been shown that the MFAHP can be a useful tool to obtain the weight factors when 
dealing with many experts’ judgements by using the pairwise comparison matrix to 
provide consistent treatment of such judgements. Moreover, the calculated weights 
were used in an FTOPSIS procedure to evaluate the important safety risks.  




   
 It can be concluded that in the new safety risk management model, the third parameter, 
probability of consequence, was incorporated. Currently, the two fundamental risk 
parameters that are commonly used to assess risk levels in safety assessment of a 
construction project are probability of occurrence and severity of consequence. These 
two parameters do not take into account the probability of current consequences 
caused in the project safety risk assessment process to obtain more accurate and 
reliable results of safety risk analysis. Therefore, a third parameter, probability of 
consequence was used in the development of the construction safety risk management 
model  
 
OBJECTIVE 3: To identify most of the key possible safety risks in the building construction 
industry 
 Survey programme was employed to identify safety risks and concerns within the 
construction industry. The findings show that falls from height is considered to be a 
very important safety risk and that falling objects pose a more major safety risk than 
radiation hazards and noise and vibration, which are common in building construction 
projects. Regarding the survey programme, it was confirmed by the project managers, 
safety managers, safety officers and site engineers that the safety risks in the building 
construction industry comprise: falls from height; falling objects; manual handling; 
equipment, machinery and tools; electricity; slips and trips; traffic hazards; vehicle 
overturn; fire and explosions; exposure to hazardous substances; radiation hazards; 








   
OBJECTIVE 4: To develop a safety risk management model for risk assessment and an 
occupational safety management strategy based on FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS. 
 
 The data collected were used to define the standards of qualitative descriptors 
associated with the safety risk management model that was developed for safety risk 
analysis.  
 
 The third parameter, probability of consequence (PC), was incorporated into the 
model to obtain more accurate and reliable results of safety risk analysis. Probability 
of consequence is defined as the occurrence likelihood of the accident if an event 
becomes a reality. However, the probability of consequence can be derived from 
experts’ judgements based on their knowledge and experience, which usually involves 
a safety risk assessment team from different disciplines/backgrounds and a high 
degree of knowledge of the construction activities. The overall safety risk scores from 
the proposed model have been affected by the probability of consequence with very 
low of the probability of occurrence but very high of the severity of consequence or 
very high of probability of occurrence and the severity of consequence or very high of 
probability of consequence or very low of probability of occurrence and probability of 
consequence but very high of severity of consequence.  
 
 The proposed safety risk management model was developed by using a combination 
of the FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS methods. It can be used appropriately to estimate, 
assess, prioritise, control, mitigate, and monitor the potential safety risks in 
construction projects. The findings revealed that the proposed model can efficiently 
assess both quantitative and qualitative safety risk data in an uncertain environment 
with vague information. It can also provide the results of both safety risk scores and 




   
types of safety risk with a confidence percentage, including system safety risk levels 
in terms of safety risk score and safety risk ranking, which provide useful information 
for project managers, safety managers and site engineers and enable them to improve 
their safety risk management and SSOP 
 
 The 15 hazard groups were identified and categorised according to their relative 
safety risks in the project, and then the final safety risk ranking for the evaluation of 
important safety risks was obtained by using the MFAHP and FTOPSIS methods. 
This can provide a safety risk ranking with valuable information for safety risk 
decision-making where weights are vague and imprecise in construction projects. 
 
OBJECTIVE 5: To verify the reliability of risk assessment and occupational safety 
management models using case studies. 
 
 The proposed model has been applied in four real construction case studies in 
Thailand: three building construction projects and one MRT railway construction 
project. The results show that there are benefits to be gained by using the proposed 
model. It can provide comprehensive results in the form of safety risk scores in a 
defined area and safety risk categories with a degree of confidence for the whole 
construction project, hazard groups and hazardous events. Moreover, the results 
obtained from the proposed model were compared with the results from existing risk 
assessment methods used in the case study projects. The findings of all the case study 
materials reveal similar safety rankings for the association of the hazard groups. 
However, the results are more reliable than those using the existing construction 
projects methods, as more parameters were incorporated into the proposed model.  
 




   
OBJECTIVE 6: To produce an effective and efficient safety risk assessment and 
management framework that could be accepted by the Thai building industry. 
 
 Group interviews were conducted with experienced construction managers and safety 
officers, who gave their views on how to manage high safety risks in the Thai 
construction industry, which can provide safety guidance and tools to improve 
construction risk management. In this particular projects, as seen from the results, the 
major hazard group is falls from height, which ranked in first place with a high safety 
risk level in each of the real construction case studies. Therefore, safety risk 
mitigation measures must be applied, for example, all work at height must be properly 
planned and organised, induction safety training on using fall protection devices, 
safety harnesses and safety belts should be provided. Furthermore, all equipment for 
working at height must be appropriately inspected, and information concerning 
personal safety must be provided to construction workers via SSOP, safety risk 
assessment, and safety toolbox meetings. Finally, warning notices should be displayed 
in working areas to remind construction workers to follow the safety procedure. Chi et 
al. (2015) state that primary accident prevention measures should be provided, 
including fixed barriers such as handrails, guardrails, and surface opening protection 
and then secondary protection measures should be provided, including safety belts, 




9.2 Limitations of the Research 
It is important to note the limitations of this research. All research may include some 
limitations owing to the reasons for conducting this type of study. Therefore, the research 
limitations are summarised below: 




   
 The findings from this research provide comprehensive results in terms of safety risk 
levels in defined regions and safety risk categories with the degree of confidence of 
the construction project system, hazard groups, and hazardous events, and the safety 
risk ranking of hazard groups. However, it may be difficult to determine the weight 
factors by using the MFAHP method in pairwise comparison matrices and to obtain 
the safety risk ranking of the hazardous events using the FTOPSIS method when more 
than 20 hazardous events need to be compared. It would be useful to deal with this 
situation in further research. 
 
   The validation of the proposed model is based on ranking the safety risks. In 
building construction project 3, the proposed model can produce the results for the 
safety risk magnitude of the hazardous events and hazard groups that are specific to 
building construction project 3’s system. In cases where the safety risk information is 
not available, some vital information has been hidden. The comprehensive results of 
the proposed risk management model cannot be compared with the method applied by 
building construction project 3. However, the results obtained from the proposed 
model have been proved through discussion with the safety risk management team in 
building construction project 3. 
 
 The research is based on safety risk management strategies that are applicable or 
suitable for the building construction industry. While this scope makes the research 
area feasible and manageable, it can also be considered as a limiting factor. This 
limitation is influenced by the time span and the need to manage the extended data of 
safety risk management. However, it should be noted that what works in one country 




   
may not work in another. A wider scope for the study area may have capitulated 
results that could be produced across countries.  
 
9.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
Key issues identified by the present study need to be explored further. The first issue relates 
to the combination of the FRT, MFAHP and FTOPSIS methods to develop the safety risk 
management model. The research results revealed that when using MFAHP when increasing 
the number of hazard groups to more than 20 hazard groups, the calculations of pairwise 
comparison matrices become more complex and may be difficult to carry out. Therefore, in 
future research, software development is more suitable to facilitate application of the 
construction safety risk management model to reduce the time taken.  
The developed construction safety risk management model and safety risk assessment 
methodologies are not restricted to the construction industry, but can also apply to 
multidisciplinary areas, such as warehouse safety, office safety, health risk assessment, 
maintenance safety, and manufacturing safety.  
It will be beneficial if future researchers can apply the combination of FRT, MFAHP and 
FTOPSIS methods and the involvement of more than six experts’ judgements in testing how 
sound the developed model is. This may produce interesting findings, which will boost the 
confidence of the researchers on this work. It will encourage the researchers to apply this 
model to other areas of interest.  
 
9.4 Publications  
The research paper “Development of risk assessment and occupational safety management 
model for building construction projects” was presented at the International Conference on 




   
Construction and Civil Engineering (ICCCE 2015) September 25-26, 2015, London, United 
Kingdom, and was selected for publication in the International Journal of Civil, 
Environmental, Structural, Construction and Architectural Engineering Vol:9, No:9, 2015 
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IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Low 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Low 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Low 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Likely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Low 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Low 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Likely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Low 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Likely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Negligible and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Negligible and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Low 
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IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Low 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Likely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Low 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Likely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Minor and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Minor and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Minor and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Minor and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Minor and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Minor and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Minor and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Minor and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Minor and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Minor and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Minor and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Minor and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Minor and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Low 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
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IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Likely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Moderate and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Moderate and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Unacceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
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IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Major and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Major and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Major and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Major and PC is Likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Major and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Unacceptable 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Major and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Major and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Major and PC is Likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Major and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Unacceptable 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Major and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Unacceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
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IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Acceptable 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Likely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Fairly unlikely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Unacceptable 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Likely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Unacceptable 
IF PO is Likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Unacceptable 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly unlikely THEN RM is Average 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Unlikely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Reasonably unlikely THEN RM is High 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Likely THEN RM is Unacceptable 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Reasonably likely THEN RM is Unacceptable 
IF PO is Very likely and SC is Catastrophic and PC is Highly likely THEN RM is Unacceptable  
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Raw data of experts’ judgements  
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 1 
Evaluated by six experts 
Hazardous events Experts 
Probability of occurrence Severity of consequence Probability of consequence 
Score Converted STFN Score Converted STFN Score Converted STFN 
FH-01 Working platform E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
FH-02 Placement ladder E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
FH-03 Erection of scaffolding E1 (0.20) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
FH-04 Climbing cranes E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
FH-05 Temporary ladder E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
FH-06 Hole in the ground E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
FH-07 Working on height 
unprotected 
E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E2 (0.18) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E6 (0.10) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
FH-08 Through opening 
evevator shaft  
E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
FO-09 Part of climbing 
cranes, scaffolds  
E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
FO-10 Operating, cleaning 
and clearing 
E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
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 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
FO-11 Blown by wind E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
FO-12 Handheld tools E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
FO-13 Hopper and bucket E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
FO-14 Stacked items E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
FO-15 Objects under 
pressure or tension 
E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 33 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E6 (0.10) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
MH-16 Hoists E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
MH-17 Mobile crane lifting E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E6 (0.10) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
EQ-18 Heavy equipment E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E6 (0.10) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
EQ-19 Steel bar bending 
machine 
E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E6 (0.10) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
EQ-20 Vibrator machine E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
EL-21 Wires E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
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 E6 (0.10) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
EL-22 Electrical work E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
EL-23 Overhead power lines E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E6 (0.10) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
EL-24 Arcing welding 
machine 
E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
ST-25 Tripping over building 
materials 
E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E6 (0.10) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
ST-26 Slipping wet surfaces E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E6 (0.10) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
ST-27 Trips caused by small 
change in level 
E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
ST-28 Trips caused by water 
pipes, rebar 
E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
ST-29 Walking around 
construction site 
E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
TH-30 Collison with another 
vehicles 
E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
TH-31 Collision with 
plant/people 
E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
VO-32 Crane overturn E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
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 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
VO-33 Mobile plant (Bobcats, 
Tractor) 
E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
FE-34 Hot work E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
FE-35 Working near 
flammables 
E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
FE-36 Gas cylinder or hose 
leakage 
E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
FE-37 Fire extinguisher has 
been discharged 
E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
ES-38 Solvents E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
ES-39 Cement dust E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
ES-40 Corrosive substances E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
CO-41 Collapse of 
boom(Cranes) 
E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
CO-42 Collapse of scaffolding E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
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 E6 (0.10) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
CO-43 Temporary structure E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
CO-44 Steel sheet piles E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
CO-45 Kingpost E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
CS-46 Deep excavations E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
CS-47 Closed tanks E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
EH-48 Poor work posture E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
EH-49 Repetitive movement E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
EH-50 Extreme muscular 
exertion 
E1 (0.20) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
NV-51 Piling E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E2 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E6 (0.10) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
NV-52 Excavation E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E2 (0.18) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E6 (0.10) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
NV-53 Hammering E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E2 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.18) 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E6 (0.10) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (5,6) 5 5 6 6 
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NV-54 Vibrator machine E1 (0.20) 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.18) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E6 (0.10) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (5,6) 5 5 6 6 
NV-55 Hand-held power 
tools 
E1 (0.20) 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.18) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 E4 (0.18) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.16) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
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WH vs FO (RH 12 ) (2,3,4) 2.00 3.00 3.00 4 (0.33,0.5) 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.50
FO vs MH (RH 23 ) (0.14,0.17.0.20) 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.20 (1,2) 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
MH vs EQ (RH 34 ) (0.11, 0.13,0.14) 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14 (4,5) 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00
EQ vs EL (RH 45 ) (7,8,9) 7.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 (1,2) 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
EL vs ST (RH 56 ) (7,8,9) 7.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 (0.5,1) 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00
ST vs TH (RH 67 ) (4,5,6) 4.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 (0.11,0.13,0.14) 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14
TH vs VO (RH 78 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
VO vs FE (RH 89 ) (0.14,0.17,0.20) 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.20 (0.11,0.13,0.14) 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14
EF vs ES (RH 9,10 ) (2,3) 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 (3,4) 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00
ES vs CO (RH 10,11 ) (0.11,0.13,0.14) 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14 (3,4) 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00
CO vs CS (RH 11,12 ) (7,8,9) 7.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 (0.33,0.5) 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.50
CS vs EH (RH 12,13 ) (7,8,9) 7.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 (3,4) 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00
EH vs NV (RH 13,14 ) (0.14, 0.13, 0.11) 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.11 (1,2) 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
Comparison
Converted STFN Converted STFN
E 5 (0.16) E 6 (0.10)
 
Score Score Score Score
WH vs FO (RH 12 ) (3,4,5) 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 2 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FO vs MH (RH 23 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
MH vs EQ (RH 34 ) (3,4,5) 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
EQ vs EL (RH 45 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
EL vs ST (RH 56 ) (3,4,5) 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
ST vs TH (RH 67 ) (4,5) 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 0.5 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
TH vs VO (RH 78 ) (0.20, 0.25,0.33) 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.33 2 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
VO vs FE (RH 89 ) (3,4,5) 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
EF vs ES (RH 9,10 ) (3,4,5) 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 3 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
ES vs CO (RH 10,11 ) (0.14, 0.17,0.20) 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.20 4 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 2 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
CO vs CS (RH 11,12 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
CS vs EH (RH 12,13 ) 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 3 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
EH vs NV (RH 13,14 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
Comparison
E 1 (0.20) E 2 (0.18)
Converted STFN Converted STFN Converted STFN Converted STFN
E 3 (0.18) E 4 (0.18)
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BUILDING CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 2 
Evaluated by five experts 
Hazardous events Experts 
Probability of occurrence Severity of consequence Probability of consequence 
Score Converted STFN Score Converted STFN Score Converted STFN 
FH-01 Working platform E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
FH-02 Erection of scaffolding E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
FH-03 Climbing cranes E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
FH-04 Temporary ladder E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
FH-05 Hole in the ground E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
FH-06 Working on height 
unprotected 
E1 (0.25) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
FH-07 Through opening 
elevator shaft  
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
FH-08 Working formwork E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
FH-09 Excavation hole E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
FO-10 Part of climbing 
cranes, scaffolds  
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
FO-11 Operating, cleaning 
and clearing 
E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 
 E5 (0.125) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
FO-12 Handheld tools E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.125) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
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FO-13 Post-Tension E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
FO-14 Blown by wind E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
MH-15 Hoists E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
MH-16 Poor rigging E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
MH-17 Mobile crane lifting E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
EQ-18 Cutting machine E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
EQ-19 Steel bar bending 
machine 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
EQ-20 Grinder machine E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
EQ-21 Welding machine E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
EQ-22 Concrete breaking 
machine 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
EL-23 Wires E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
EL-24 Electrical work E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
EL-25 Overhead power lines E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
EL-26 Arcing welding 
machine 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
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 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
ST-27 Tripping over building 
materials 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
ST-28 Slipping wet surfaces E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
ST-29 Trips caused by small 
change in level 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 6 6 6 6 6 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
ST-30 Trips caused by water 
pipes, rebar 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
TH-31 Collison with another 
vehicles 
E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
TH-32 Collision with 
plant/people 
E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
FE-33 Hot work E1 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 6 6 6 6 6 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
FE-34 Working near 
flammables 
E1 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
FE-35 Gas cylinder or hose 
leakage 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.125) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
FE-36 Fire extinguisher has 
been discharged 
E1 (0.25) 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
ES-37 Cement dust E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
ES-38 Formwork striking oil, 
epoxy 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
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 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
CO-39 Temporary structure E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
CO-40 Collapse of scaffolding E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 22 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
CO-41 Steel sheet piles E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
CO-42 Kingpost E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
CS-43 Deep excavations E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
CS-44 Closed tanks E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
EH-45 Poor work posture E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
EH-46 Extreme muscular 
exertion 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
NV-47 Piling E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NV-48 Excavation E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NV-49 Hammering E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NV-50 Vibrator machine E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NV-51 Hand-held power 
tools 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
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 E3 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.125) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NV-52 Concrete pump 
machine 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.125) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
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FH vs FO (RH 12 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FO vs MH (RH 23 ) 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
MH vs EQ (RH 34 ) 1/7 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
EQ vs EL (RH 45 ) 1/7 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
EL vs ST (RH 56 ) 1/7 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
ST vs TH (RH 67 ) 1/5 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
TH vs FE (RH 78 ) 1/9 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
FE vs ES (RH 8,9 ) 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
ES vs CO (RH 9,10 ) 1/5 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
CO vs CS (RH 10,11 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CS vs EH (RH 11,12 ) 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00




Score Score Score Score
FH vs FO (RH 12 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FO vs MH (RH 23 ) 8 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
MH vs EQ (RH 34 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1/3 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 1/7 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 1/7 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
EQ vs EL (RH 45 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1/9 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 1/4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
EL vs ST (RH 56 ) 8 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
ST vs TH (RH 67 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1/5 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 4 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
TH vs FE (RH 78 ) 1/9 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 1/5 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1/9 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 1/8 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
FE vs ES (RH 8,9 ) 8 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
ES vs CO (RH 9,10 ) 1/9 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 1/7 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 1/5 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
CO vs CS (RH 10,11 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1/5 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CS vs EH (RH 11,12 ) 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 6 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
EH vs NV (RH 12,13 ) 1/8 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 3 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 6 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Converted STFN Converted STFN
Comparison
E 1 (0.25) E 2 (0.25) E 3 (0.25) E 4 (0.125)
Converted STFN Converted STFN
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BUILDING CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 3 
Evaluated by five experts 
Hazardous events Experts 





Score Converted STFN 
FH-01 Working platform E1 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.22) 3 3 3 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
FH-02 Erection of scaffolding E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.22) 4 4 4 4 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 2 4 4 5 (3,4,5) 3 3 4 5 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
FH-03 Climbing cranes E1 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
FH-04 Temporary ladder E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.22) 4 4 4 4 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
FH-05 Hole in the ground E1 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4,5) 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
FH-06 Working on height 
unprotected 
E1 (0.25) (4,5) 4 4 4 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 (3,5) 3 3 5 5 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
FH-07 Through opening elevator 
shaft  
E1 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (5,6) 5 5 6 6 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5,6
) 
3 4 5 6 
FO-08 Part of climbing cranes, 
scaffolds  
E1 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
FO-09 Operating, cleaning and 
clearing 
E1 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
FO-10 Blown by wind E1 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) 4 4 4 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
MH-11 Hoists E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (4,5,6) 4 5 5 6 
MH-12 Mobile crane lifting E1 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) 4 4 4 4 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
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 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5,6
) 
3 4 5 6 
EQ-13 Cutting machine E1 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.22) 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
EQ-14 Steel bar bending machine E1 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
EQ-15 Grinder machine E1 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (4,5,6) 4 5 5 6 
EQ-16 Welding machine E1 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
EL-17 Wires E1 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,5) 3 3 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.22) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (4,5,6) 4 5 5 6 
EL-18 Electrical work E1 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
EL-19 Overhead power lines E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
EL-20 Arcing welding machine E1 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
ST-21 Tripping over building 
materials 
E1 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
ST-22 Slipping wet surfaces E1 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
ST-23 Trips caused by small change 
in level 
E1 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
ST-24 Trips caused by water pipes, 
rebar 
E1 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
TH-25 Collison with another 
vehicles 
E1 (0.25) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
                                                                                                                                                                                APPENDICES 
 
322 
   
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
TH-26 Collision with plant/people E1 (0.25) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
FE-27 Hot work E1 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
FE-28 Working near flammables E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4,5) 3 3 4 5 (4,5,6) 4 5 5 6 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
FE-29 Gas cylinder or hose leakage E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
FE-30 Fire extinguisher has been 
discharged 
E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.22) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (4,5,6) 4 5 5 6 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
ES-31 Cement dust E1 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
CO-32 Collapse of boom(Cranes) E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 (3,5) 3 3 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (3,4,5) 3 3 4 5 (5,6) 5 5 6 6 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
CO-33 Collapse of scaffolding E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 (3,5) 3 3 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) 3 3 3 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (5,6) 5 5 6 6 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
CO-34 Steel sheet piles E1 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,4) 2 2 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
CO-35 Kingpost E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) (1,3) 1 1 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,4) 2 2 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
CS-36 Deep excavations E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (1,3) 1 1 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,4) 2 2 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4,5) 3 3 4 5 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
CS-37 Closed tanks E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) (1,3) 1 1 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,4) 2 2 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4,5) 3 3 4 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
EH-38 Poor work posture E1 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (4,5,6) 4 5 5 6 
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 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
EH-39 Extreme muscular exertion E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,4,5) 2 4 4 5 (5,6) 5 5 6 6 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (4,5,6) 4 5 5 6 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
NV-40 Piling E1 (0.25) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
NV-41 Excavation E1 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (4,5,6) 4 5 5 6 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
NV-42 Hammering E1 (0.25) 5 5 5 5 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 (3,5) 3 3 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 2 2 2 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
NV-43 Vibrator machine E1 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 E4 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4) 2 3 3 4 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
NV-44 Hand-held power tools E1 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) 3 3 3 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
 E5 (0.14) (2,3,4,5) 2 3 4 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 
NV-45 Concrete pump machine E1 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E4 (0.14) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (5,6) 5 5 6 6 













                                                                                                                                                                                APPENDICES 
 
324 
   




















FH vs FO (RH 12 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FO vs MH (RH 23 ) 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
MH vs EQ (RH 34 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
EQ vs EL (RH 45 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
EL vs ST (RH 56 ) 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
ST vs TH (RH 67 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TH vs FE (RH 78 ) 0.2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
FE vs ES (RH 8,9 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ES vs CO (RH 9,10 ) 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
CO vs CS (RH 10,11 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CS vs EH (RH 11,12 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00





Score Score Score Score
FH vs FO (RH 12 ) (0.20, 0.25) 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.25 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 0.2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
FO vs MH (RH 23 ) (5,6) 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 4 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 8 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
MH vs EQ (RH 34 ) (0.14, 0.17) 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
EQ vs EL (RH 45 ) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
EL vs ST (RH 56 ) (0.25, 0.33) 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.33 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
ST vs TH (RH 67 ) 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TH vs FE (RH 78 ) (1,2) 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
FE vs ES (RH 8,9 ) (0.20, 0.25) 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.25 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ES vs CO (RH 9,10 ) (5,6) 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 0.2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CO vs CS (RH 10,11 ) 0.5 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CS vs EH (RH 11,12 ) (0.25, 0.33) 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.33 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 9 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
EH vs NV (RH 12,13 ) (4,5) 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 0.2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Comparison
E 1 (0.25) E 2 (0.25) E 3 (0.22)
Converted STFN Converted STFN Converted STFN Converted STFN
E 4 (0.14)
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MRT RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 4 
Evaluated by five experts 
Hazardous events Experts 
Probability of occurrence Severity of consequence Probability of consequence 
Score Converted STFN Score Converted STFN Score Converted STFN 
FH-01 Working platform E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
FH-02 Erection of scaffolding E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
FH-03 Cranes E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
FH-04 Temporary ladder E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
FH-05 Hole in the ground E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
FH-06 Working on height 
unprotected 
E1 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E2 (0.25) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
FH-07 Roof work  E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 2 2 2 2 2 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
FO-08 Part of climbing cranes, 
scaffolds  
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
FO-09 Operating, cleaning and 
clearing 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.14) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
FO-10 Blown by wind E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
MH-11 Hoists E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
MH-12 Manual lifting E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
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EQ-13 Cutting machine E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
EQ-14 Steel bar bending 
machine 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
EQ-15 Grinder machine E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.14) 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
EQ-16 Welding machine E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
 E3 (0.22) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.14) 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
EL-17 Wires E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EL-18 Electrical work E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
EL-19 Overhead power lines E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
EL-20 Arcing welding machine E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
ST-21 Tripping over building 
materials 
E1 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.14) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
ST-22 Slipping wet surfaces E1 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 E2 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.14) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
ST-23 Trips caused by small 
change in level 
E1 (0.25) 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E3 (0.22) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (5,6) 5 5 6 6 
 E4 (0.14) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
ST-24 Trips caused by water 
pipes, rebar 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (1,2,3) 1 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 
 E4 (0.14) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
FE-25 Hot work E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
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FE-26 Working near flammables E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
FE-27 Gas cylinder or hose 
leakage 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4,5) 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
FE-28 Fire extinguisher has 
been discharged 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
EH-29 Poor work posture E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 2 2 2 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (5,6) 5 5 6 6 
 E4 (0.14) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
EH-30 Extreme muscular 
exertion 
E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
 E3 (0.22) (1,2) 1 1 2 2 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 (5,6) 5 5 6 6 
 E4 (0.14) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
NV-31 Piling E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NV-32 Excavation E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NV-33 Hammering E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NV-34 Vibrator machine E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (2,3) 2 2 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NV-35 Hand-held power tools E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (4,5) 4 4 5 5 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E5 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NV-36 Concrete pump machine E1 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E2 (0.25) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 E3 (0.22) 1 1 1 1 1 (3,4) 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
 E4 (0.14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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FH vs FO (RH 12 ) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FO vs MH (RH 23 ) 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
MH vs EQ (RH 34 ) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
EQ vs EL (RH 45 ) 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
EL vs ST (RH 56 ) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
ST vs FE (RH 67 ) 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
FE vs EH (RH 7,8 ) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00





Score Score Score Score
FH vs FO (RH 12 ) 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FO vs MH (RH 23 ) 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
MH vs EQ (RH 34 ) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
EQ vs EL (RH 45 ) 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
EL vs ST (RH 56 ) 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
ST vs FE (RH 67 ) 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
FE vs EH (RH 7,8 ) 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
EH vs NV (RH 8,9 ) 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Comparison
E 1 (0.25) E 2 (0.25)
Converted STFN
E 3 (0.22) E 4 (0.14)
Converted STFNConverted STFN Converted STFN
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